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A frustrated father who suddenly snaps and hits his child after several previous warnings. A 
previous loyal coworker who suddenly remains absent for several days at work due to 
disagreement with his boss. A married couple giving each other the silent treatment after 
repeated arguments. A usually reasonable man erratically flipping the bird after being cut 
off on the road. A war veteran resenting the army and harboring grudges after losing his 
legs and multiple friends after stepping on a landmine. A once beloved partner that gets 
killed after suspected infidelity. 
  These short vignettes described above, illustrate the variety of situations that can 
lead to and behavioral outcomes that can result from an emotion we are all familiar with, 
yet understand little about: anger1. Anger, in short, can be defined as “an emotional state 
that varies in intensity from mild irritation to intense fury and rage” (Spielberger, 1999 p. 1). 
Although little understood, its link with adverse outcomes is evident, making the 
understanding of anger a valuable enterprise. There is especially a need to better 
understand the key factors underlying a disposition towards anger, as individuals scoring 
high on this personality trait have impairments in their day-to-day functioning. To this 
purpose, the current thesis investigates the (neuro)cognitive aspects underlying anger and a 
disposition towards anger (i.e., trait anger). Before reviewing existing research on trait anger 
and its underpinnings in more detail, we first focus on anger as an emotional state. This is 
followed by a paragraph devoted to describing the clinical relevance of the construct trait 
anger in more detail. Next, a paragraph in which definitions and distinctions regarding 
constructs related to trait anger will be reviewed. Finally, cognitive models with respect to 
trait anger and reactive aggression will be discussed and an overview of the current thesis 
will be provided. 
 
  
                                                     
 
1 DiGiuseppe and Trafrate (2010) highlight the scarcity of research around this topic and its 
neglect in clinical practice as evidenced by an absence of diagnostic categories for anger 
disorders, making it a challenging construct to define. Note that the intermittent explosive 
disorder has its main focus on aggressive behavior rather than anger.  
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1.1. Anger defined: its origins and its consequences 
Anger is an emotion that is part of everyday live. Together with happiness, sadness and fear, 
anger is considered to be a basic emotion that is innate and universal to all humans (Ekman, 
1999; Panksepp, 1998; Strongman, 2003)2. Diary studies conducted in community samples 
show that people report to experience and express mild to moderate anger from several 
times daily to at least several times a week (Averill, 1983; Kassinove, Sukhodolsky, Tsytsarev, 
& Solovyova, 1997; Meltzer, 1933; Schieman, 2010; Tafrate, Kassinove, & Dundin, 2002). 
Most of these angry episodes involve significant persons in our live that we love, like or rely 
on (Averill, 1983; Schieman, 2010). Anger can be elicited by a broad range of triggers of 
which perceived threats (to the self or to those one feels related to), deliberate harm-
doings, disrespect, insults, injustice, unwanted actions of other people, and norm or rule 
violations are the most common (Potegal & Novaco, 2010). Especially in situations where 
triggers are appraised as preventable and intentional anger arises. Novaco (2011) also 
points out the intrinsic role threat perceptions play in the activation of anger. In line with 
this notion, it is found that the neurobiological threat system (amygdala, hypothalamus, and 
periaqueductal gray) becomes activated in conditions that elicit anger (Blair, 2012). Like 
other emotions, the intensity of anger is experienced on a continuous scale, ranging from 
mild forms of anger (e.g., irritation and annoyance) to severe forms (e.g., fury and rage)3, 
and is usually short-lived (Potegal & Qiu, 2010). Typically, anger episodes last around five up 
till fifteen minutes (Potegal & Qiu, 2010). However, angry rumination and thoughts of 
revenge can prolong the timecourse of anger substantially (Novaco, 2011). Moreover, angry 
feelings can be experienced over longer period of times (from several hours up till several 
days) in less intense forms as well, often referred to as an angry mood (Fernandez, 2013).  
                                                     
 
2 Although anger is considered to be a basic emotion that is universally expressed and 
recognized, the behavioural expression of anger at the same time is also evidently culturally 
modified, sometimes even cultural-specific, and governed by display rules (Matsumoto et 
al., 2010). Constructivists go as far as to suggest that anger is “a role or a socially 
constructed, reinforced behavioural script that we learn to play” (Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002, 
p. 16) and consider anger a fuzzy concept (Russell & Fehr, 1994) that cannot be defined with 
absolute certainty.  
3 Note that we conceptualize anger here as a single construct that can vary in intensity 
rather than qualitatively differentiating between forms of anger.  
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  Anger as an emotional state is a multidimensional construct with its own distinct 
physiological and neurophysiological responses, sensations, feelings, cognitions, and action 
tendencies (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010). Phenomenologically, anger is often experienced as 
a “hot” emotion (Stemmler, 2010), i.e. feeling warm bodily sensations. Its facial expression 
is characterized by furrowed eyebrows and contraction of corrugator muscles (e.g., raised 
upper eyelid, tensing of lower eyelid, tightened lips) (Matsumoto, Hee Yoo, & Chung, 2010). 
Its vocal expression is identified by a fast, loud, and rising melody tone (Green, Whitney, & 
Gustafson, 2010). In terms of physiology, anger is characterized by the activation of both 
adrenaline and nor-adrenaline systems combined with strong vagal withdrawal, as reflected 
by an accelerated heartbeat and respiration rate, increased muscle tension, increased 
diastolic blood pressure, increased respiration rate, higher skin temperature, increases in 
skin conductance responses, and decreased total peripheral resistance (Stemmler, 2010). 
Prototypically, anger is accompanied or elicited by an appraisal of wrongdoing whereby 
blame is being externalized4. The action disposition usually associated with it is to 
counteract this perceived wrongdoing (c.f. to right the wrong). In that sense, anger is viewed 
as an approach-related emotion (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). In this regard anger 
differentiates from other negatively valenced emotions, such as fear, guilt, disgust or 
sadness, as these emotions typically involve withdrawal motivation. However, we would like 
to note that under certain conditions during anger withdrawal can occur as well (e.g., 
psychological distancing, the silent treatment, refusal to cooperate). All in all, the whole 
constellation of responses associated with anger as described above implies that physical 
and psychological resources are mobilized during an anger episode to face adversity (e.g., 
the fight-flight response) and that this action readiness is signalized towards others as well 
as easily recognized by others (also see, Frijda, 1988). Correspondingly, anger can also be 
conceptualized as a moral emotion (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), a relational emotion 
(e.g., Hall, 2009), a socially constructed emotion (Schieman, 2010), and even as a bestial 
passion (see Potegal & Novaco, 2010). 
                                                     
 
4 Berkowitz (2010, 2012), however, convincingly argues that non-cognitive factors, such as 
pain, are important elicitors for the anger experience as well. He views blame placing as a 
by-product, rather than a cause. 
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  As any other emotion, anger is thought to serve an adaptive function. Some scholars 
adhere to the idea that anger serves to consolidate social order (Matsumoto et al., 2010), 
whereas others believe the main function of anger is to prevent transgressions against 
oneself or to ward off subordination to another individual (Potegal & Stemmler, 2010b), or 
to initiate a response tendency towards aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 2012; Fessler, 
2010). To my opinion, the best and most extensive description of the functionality of anger 
comes from Novaco (2010): 
 
“it energizes behavior as a high arousal state, increasing the amplitude of responding 
and serving to override inhibition; it focuses attention on situational elements having 
threat significance; it expresses or communicates negative sentiment, to convey 
displeasure and to prompt conflict resolution; it defends the self by social distancing 
and fear suppression, and it also defends self-worth by externalizing attributions of 
blame for misfortune; it potentiates a sense of personal control or empowerment 
among social groups as well as individuals; it instigates aggressive behavior due to its 
survival relevance, symbolic linkages, and learned connections; it signals information 
about personal state and situational significance, which is relevant to self-
monitoring; and it dramatizes a social role enactment, in the sense of anger 
expression as dramaturgy played out in accord with social scripts or social rules” 
(Novaco, 2010, p. 466). 
   
  So far, the image of anger arises as a natural response that serves some adaptive 
survival functions. In further support of the adaptive and functional nature of anger, Averill 
(1983) illustrates that beneficial consequences following angry episodes are more 
frequently reported than baleful consequences. Short-term positive and reinforcing effects 
of anger are: (amongst others) immediate compliance by others with the angry demands 
(van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014), facilitated interpersonal negotiations 
towards conflict resolution (van Kleef & Côté, 2007), gained respect, a sense of power and 
control over the situation, and energetic feelings caused by the release of adrenaline and 
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noradrenaline (Stosny, 1995)5. Relatedly, next to feeling angry, participants often report to 
feel more active, strong, determined, and energized (Harmon-Jones, Peterson, & Harmon-
Jones, 2010; Tibubos & Schnell, 2013). Nevertheless, the disruptive effects of anger when 
experienced or expressed improperly are not to be mitigated. Anger is typically considered 
to be a negatively valenced emotion in taxonomies of affect that may seem pleasant in 
prospect, but often becomes unpleasant in hindsight (Fernandez, 2013). Its negative 
consequences both at the individual level and for society at large are well recognized 
throughout history in religion, folklores and mythology as well as well-documented in both 
classical and recent literature (Potegal & Novaco, 2010). Anger easily causes psychological 
or physical harm and subsequently impairs adaptive functioning in the contexts of family, 
work, and interpersonal relationships. For instance, anger can lead to interpersonal 
conflicts, retaliation from others, peer rejection and victimization, breakdowns in 
negotiations, impaired problem-solving and decision making, diminished work performance, 
and traffic violations and accidents. Especially, salient is its connection to aggression and 
violent behavior (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010; Novaco, 2011)6. In severe cases anger drives 
violent offending (e.g., child abuse, domestic violence, road rage, and rape) causing legal 
problems. In extreme cases anger can have fatal effects (i.e., murder, serial killings and 
warfare). 
  In short, anger as an emotional state can be considered to be both adaptive and 
maladaptive. However, as will become evident in the upcoming paragraph, anger no longer 
                                                     
 
5 In angry clients these short-term reinforcing effects may fuel the angry fire and enhance 
resistance to acknowledge the detrimental effects their anger has for them in the long run. 
6 Although anger likely precedes aggressive and violent behavior, most anger episodes do 
not involve aggression. In fact, most anger episodes are solved in prosocial ways (Averill, 
1983) and anger is more often shown by verbal and non-confrontational motor behavior 
(e.g., rolling the eyes) rather than aggressive acts (e.g., hitting and kicking). Hence, anger 
seems neither sufficient nor necessary for aggressive behavior to occur. Conversely, 
aggressive and violent acts can also occur without any anger involved (e.g., in some cases of 
instrumental aggression). Yet, on the other hand, it remains a challenging enterprise to 
demarcate anger from aggression (Kassinove & Tafrate, 2006). For instance, when do 
aversive verbalizations change from simple acts of expressing anger into verbal aggression? 
Given this complexity some suggest anger is only quantitatively different from aggression.  
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serves adaptive means if it has become a recurring, enduring and pervasive part of 
someone’s personality. 
 
1.2. Trait Anger and its clinical relevance 
Unfortunately, for some people their anger can be so excessive in frequency, duration, and 
intensity that it distorts their daily functioning and becomes dysfunctional (Deffenbacher, 
Lynch, Oetting, & Yingling, 2001; Deffenbacher, Oetting, Thwaites, et al., 1996; Quinn, 
Rollock, & Vrana, 2014). For these people, anger has become entrenched in their 
personality, hence, some scholars refer to these individuals as high trait anger individuals 
(e.g., Spielberger, 1999; Tafrate et al., 2002). More specifically, trait anger refers to “the 
disposition to perceive a wide range of situations as annoying or frustrating and by the 
tendency to respond to such situations with elevations in state anger” (Spielberger, 1999, p. 
1). As noted below, trait anger is associated with a variety of adverse outcomes. Anger 
prone persons are quick in sensing threat (Novaco, 2011) and much more likely to be 
perceived negatively in work and social relations given their belligerent nature and blaming 
tendency (Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002). Moreover, with respect to social and occupational 
functioning, trait anger is associated with marital problems (Baron et al., 2006) and inflicting 
harm upon coworkers (Douglas & Martinko, 2001). Trait anger also has a serious negative 
influence on general well-being (Mahon, Yarcheski, & Yarcheski, 2000). Relatedly, anger 
prone individuals experience severe personal distress (e.g., feeling guilty/ashamed or 
depressed afterwards), physical distress (e.g., headache, muscle tension), and are more 
likely to keep dwelling on their anger leading to even greater distress (Tafrate et al., 2002). 
On the road, trait anger is associated with risky driving behavior as well as verbal and 
physical aggression towards other drivers (Deffenbacher et al., 2001; Deffenbacher, 2013). 
Other problematic behavior more often seen in chronically angry persons includes: 
substance use (Leibsohn, Oetting, & Deffenbacher, 1994; Shopshire & Reilly, 2013; 
Spielberger, Foreyt, Goodrick, & Reheiser, 1995), pathological gambling (Korman et al., 
2008), unhealthy eating (Anton & Miller, 2005; but also see Schneider, Appelhans, Whited, 
Oleski, & Pagoto, 2010), and suicidal behavior (Daniel, Goldston, Erkanli, Franklin, & 
Mayfield, 2009; Zhang et al., 2012). Somewhat similar to the longer-term effects of tobacco 
use, recurrent anger in angry individuals put them at much higher risk for medical problems, 
such as cardiovascular deceases (Smith, Glazer, Ruiz, & Gallo, 2004). 
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  Trait anger is also highly problematic from a clinical psychology perspective. 
Clinicians are often faced with anger-prone patients (Cullari, 1994; Hovens, Lievaart, & 
Rodenburg, 2014; Spielberger, 1999). Moreover, high trait anger individuals are much more 
likely to present with comorbid psychopathology and have an increased likelihood of 
inadequate psychosocial functioning compared to low trait anger individuals (McDermut, 
Fuller, DiGiuseppe, Chelminski, & Zimmerman, 2009). Furthermore, trait anger is predictive 
of negative treatment outcomes (Erwin, Heimberg, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2003; Rizvi, Vogt, 
& Resick, 2009). Most importantly, trait anger is associated with clinically significant anger-
related problems (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2004) and has been suggested to be a distinct 
clinical problem (McDermut et al., 2009). Finally, trait anger is key predictor of aggressive 
behavior both inside the laboratory (Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006; 
Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) as well as outside the laboratory (Barbour, Eckhardt, 
Davison, & Kassinove, 1998; Deffenbacher et al., 2001; Douglas & Martinko, 2001; Nomellini 
& Katz, 1983). For example, high trait anger individuals report to act out with aggressive 
behavior at three times the rate of individuals low on trait anger (Kassinove & Tafrate, 
2002). 
  In summary, high trait anger individuals seem to suffer a lot from a variety of 
adverse consequences if their anger remains untreated. As such, it is of critical importance 
to have a good understanding of the factors underlying trait anger7; not only from a clinical 
perspective, but also from a public-safety- and physical health perspective. Over the years, 
several studies have been conducted with this purpose in mind. In the following sections, 
some relevant models as well as the existing body of neurocognitive research on trait anger 
will be discussed8. Yet, before discussing these studies in more detail, important definitions 
                                                     
 
7 The emphasis of the current thesis is on trait anger based on its multitude of negative 
outcomes, although we acknowledge that other clinically relevant anger constructs exist 
(e.g., Anger Expression-Out).  
8 Even though there are evidently numerous factors eventually determining individual 
differences in anger, including genetic (e.g., Sluyter et al., 2000), hormonal (e.g., Reuter, 
2010), and environmental factors (e.g., Distel et al., 2012; Hoglund & Nicholas, 1995; Muris, 
Meesters, Morren, & Moorman, 2004), the current thesis will adopt a neurocognitive 
approach as this was the main focus of our research. 
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and distinctions in the literature regarding trait anger will be reviewed in order to bare 
ambiguity to a minimum. 
 
1.3. Trait Anger and Related Concepts 
The most evident and empirically validated distinction in the anger literature is between 
state and trait anger, whereby state anger refers to a psychobiological emotional state that 
varies in intensity ranging from mild annoyance to intense fury9 (i.e., how someone may feel 
at a certain moment in time, having a discrete onset and offset and being situation specific), 
and trait anger refers to individual differences in the frequency, intensity, and longevity of 
state anger (i.e., how subjects feel in general, and where it is expected that high trait anger 
individuals show state anger more frequently and intensively (Fernandez, 2013; Spielberger, 
1999). Other well-known distinctions with respect to anger refer to how people deal with 
their anger (Spielberger, 1999). Anger Expression-Out, for instance, refers to the extent to 
which individuals tend to express their anger outwardly (e.g., When angry, I slam doors). 
Anger Expression-In on the other hand refers to the extent to which individuals tend to 
suppress or hold their anger in when they are experiencing anger (e.g., When angry, I boil 
inside but don’t show it). Note, that these tendencies are not necessarily opposite sides of 
the same coin, as frequent attempts to hold anger in may also lead to frequently expressing 
anger outwardly (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010). Finally, Anger Control-In describes the 
tendency to reduce arousal generated by anger (e.g., cooling down; when angry, I try to 
relax), whereas Anger Control-Out refers to the extent to which individuals attempt to 
                                                     
 
9 A more extended and integrated definition of state anger comes from DiGiuseppe and 
Tafrate (2010) who defined anger as “a subjectively experienced emotional state with high 
sympathetic autonomic arousal. It is initially elicited by a perception of a threat (to one’s 
well-being, property, present of future resources, self-image, social status or projected 
image to one’s group, maintenance of social rules that regulate daily life, or comfort), 
although it may persist even after the threat has passed. Anger is associated with 
attributional, informational, and evaluative cognitions that emphasize the misdeeds of 
others and motivate a response of antagonism to thwart, drive off, retaliate against, or 
attack the source of the perceived threat. Anger is communicated through facial or postural 
gestures or vocal inflections, aversive verbalizations, and aggressive behavior. One’s choice 
of strategies to communicate anger varies with social roles, learning history, and 
environmental contingencies” (p. 21).   
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prevent the outward expression of anger (e.g., I control my temper). Whilst high trait anger 
individuals are often more inclined to express their anger outwardly and less inclined to 
regulate their anger, other subtypes of angry individuals exist that do not experience anger 
frequently but may act extremely aggressively when they do (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2004). 
As such, it is important to distinguish between the anger experience, and the expression and 
regulation of anger. Some consider trait anger in terms of low levels of agreeableness (e.g., 
Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994). Although trait anger and agreeableness are inversely related 
constructs (see chapter 2), agreeableness is a broader construct tapping a wider range of 
facets than trait anger. Other concepts related to anger, that should be avoided to be used 
interchangeably to describe anger, are irritability, (reactive) aggression, violence, hostility, 
and hate (see table 1 for the definitions of these constructs). Importantly, the distinctions 
between these constructs hold at both the state and the trait level. That is, even though 
trait irritability, trait aggression, and trait anger are closely related and highly correlated 
(Martin, Watson, & Wan, 2000)10, I consider them to be separate constructs in the current 
thesis, as I think it is important to treat anger (emotional component) and aggression 
(behavioral component) as separate constructs where possible. Yet, given that the 
underlying cognitive patterns may at times parallel and similarities may be more apparent 
than the differences, we will also describe some cognitive models that focus more upon 
reactive aggression than trait anger. 
  
                                                     
 
10 Spielberger (2010) suggested the anger, hostility, and aggression (AHA) syndrome based 
on the frequent co-occurrence of these concepts.  
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Table 1. Important definitions of constructs related to, but distinct from, anger. 
Construct Definition Distinction 
Aggression11 Refers to “overt motor behavior enacted with 
the intent to do harm or injury to a person or 
object, with the expectation that harm will 
occur” (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010, p. 23). 
Anger refers to an internal feeling, 
whereas aggression refers to actual 
behavior. Although anger may 
increase the likelihood of 
aggression, other factors may 
intervene to disentangle this 
relationship (e.g., Denson, DeWall, & 
Finkel, 2012). 
Violence Refers to “Aggression that has extreme harm 
as its goal” (Anderson & Bushman, 2002, p. 
29). 
See aggression. 
Hostility “Refers to a set of negative attitudes that set 
the stage for anger and aggression. They 
represent predispositions about individuals 
(e.g., “You can’t trust adolescents. They are all 
crazy). Such attitudes, or cognitive sets, 
increase the probability that neutral actions 
by the person or by members of these groups 
will be interpreted as wrong, unjust, 
purposeful, and preventable or that negative 
triggers will be seen to represent fundamental 
characteristics of the individual or group” 
(Kassinove & Tafrate, 2006, p. 6) . 
Hostility refers more to a cognitive 
attitude than to an emotional felt 
state. 
Irritability Refers to “a physiological state characterized 
by a lowered threshold for responding with 
anger or aggression to stimuli. It is a partially 
aroused physiological state without the 
thoughts that usually occur with anger” 
(DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010, p. 31) 
Irritations seems to be a milder form 
of anger that appears not to be 
mediated by cognitions, but rather 
physiologically or neurologically 
mediated. 
Hate Refers to “an enduring negative affect of 
antagonism with a strong desire to effect 
revenge or hurt an opponent, without the 
physiological arousal normally associated with 
anger. Hate can turn to anger when the 
person actually confronts the objects of his or 
her hate” (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010, p. 31). 
Whereas anger is typically described 
as a hot emotion, hate is rather 
experienced as a cold emotion (i.e. 
without warm bodily sensations). 
   
                                                     
 
11 Note that in the literature there is a further distinction between reactive and proactive 
aggression (e.g., Buss, 1966; Hubbard, Romano, McAuliffe, & Morrow, 2010), whereby 
reactive aggression describes aggressive behavior in reaction to provocation and perceived 
threat, whereas instrumental aggression describes aggressive behavior aiding in goal pursuit 
beyond physical violence (e.g., robbery). Similar distinctions have found to be present in 
animal aggressive behavior (e.g., Lorenz, 1966). However, several scholars suggest that the 
proposed distinction is flawed as multiple motives (e.g., revenge and instrumental motives) 
may underlie aggression (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010). For instance, anger may precede 
deliberate, planned instrumental aggressive behavior. Moreover, reactive aggressive 
behavior may be rewarding (e.g., compliance with demands).  
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1.4. Cognitive models of (trait) anger and reactive aggression 
Cognitive models of anger and reactive aggression have received widespread attention. 
Central to these models is the idea that differences in trait anger and reactive aggression 
can be explained through individual information processing differences. That is, it is 
assumed that whether or not people are inclined to react with anger or aggression in 
response to situations is (partly) mediated by cognitive processes, such as attention, 
cognitive control, and interpretation. Some influential models and theories in this field will 
now be described. 
Based on work of Beck (2000) and Ellis (1977), cognitive-behavioral conceptual models of 
anger (e.g., Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002, 2011) have postulated that specific cognitions play a 
role in the experience of anger, such as hostile attributions and externalizing blame 
(misinterpreting neutral or ambiguous situations as hostile), horrifying and catastrophizing 
(i.e., exaggerating unpleasantness of a situation), low frustration tolerance (i.e., 
underestimating ability to deal with the situation), self-centered demandingness (i.e., 
elevating personal desires into dictates), and global ratings (i.e., overgeneralizing specific 
unwanted behavior of others as internal personality dispositions). Studies have indeed 
confirmed that high trait anger individuals tend to show these cognitive distortions more 
frequently (Martin & Vieaux, 2013; Tafrate et al., 2002). Moreover, treatments based on 
these models have shown to be effective (Beck & Fernandez, 1998; Deffenbacher, Dahlen, 
Lynch, Morris, & Gowensmith, 2000; Deffenbacher, 1999; Del Vecchio & O’Leary, 2004; 
DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2003). Whereas these earlier studies had the main focus on 
identifying the knowledge structures (e.g., beliefs and rules) that were assumed to underlie 
biased information-processing deficits in dysfunctional angry populations, current studies 
are more focused on examining the role of information processing mechanisms themselves 
as underlying aspects of dysfunctional anger. 
  Pointing out the mediating role information processing plays, appraisal theorists 
(Clore & Centerbar, 2004; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2004; Smith & Kirby, 2004; Wranik & 
Scherer, 2010) argue that the way people evaluate occurring events influences which 
emotions will be elicited, whereby only certain appraisals lead to the generation of anger. 
Although there is no complete agreement on which kind of appraisals are necessary for 
anger to occur, most scholars agree that anger is typically caused when personally 
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significant goals are blocked by improper, blameful acts of someone external or something 
external in situations where the person feels powerful enough to deal with the provoking 
source successfully. Although these theories account for the occurrence of state anger 
rather than trait anger, we could imply from this literature that individuals who appraise 
more situations as frustrating are more likely to be high on trait anger. This is indeed what 
has been found in several studies (Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001; Kuppens & Tuerlinckx, 
2007; Kuppens, van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007). 
  In a somewhat similar vein, Dodge and Crick’s Social Information Processing (SIP) 
theory (Dodge & Crick, 1990) puts emphasis on how information is encoded and interpreted 
in explaining angry reactivity. In fact, it is considered to be one of the most influential 
models highlighting information processing as a key element in understanding angry 
reactivity. According to this model (see Figure 1), social cues have to be skillfully processed 
in order to react properly to the situation: (1) information has to be encoded, (2) 
information has to be interpreted, (3) interaction goals need to be clarified, (4) alternative 
strategies have to be hypothesized, (5) a response has to be selected from the hypothesized 
strategies, (6) and finally the selected response has to be carried out. Importantly, biases 
and deficiencies in processing any of these steps may, according to this model, increase the 
likelihood of aggressive behavior12. Based on this model, numerous empirical studies have 
been conducted that have confirmed the link between deviations in these processes on the 
one hand and aggressive behavior on the other hand, including the link between hostile 
attributions of intent and reactive aggression (for reviews, see Akhtar & Bradley, 1991; De 
Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002; Dodge, 2006). With respect to trait 
anger, Wilkowski and Robinson (2008b) propose that hostile interpretation biases at the 
first two stages of this model (encoding and interpreting information) can be seen as 
predisposing individuals towards increased anger and reactive aggression13. Indeed, several 
                                                     
 
12 For instance, the failure to interpret a peer’s intention as benign (i.e., making a hostile 
attribution), that is proposed to be partly dependent on encoding malicious information, is 
thought to increase the likelihood of retaliatory aggressive behavior. Additionally, aggressive 
children may come up with less effective solutions to problematic situations they encounter.  
13 Some may argue that the encoding of information has more to do with selective attention 
than with interpretation.  
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studies have established these information processing biases in high trait anger individuals 
specifically (Epps & Kendall, 1995; Hazebroek et al., 2001; Wingrove & Bond, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1. Dodge and Crick’s Social Information Processing (SIP) theory (Dodge & Crick, 1990; Dodge, 
2006). 
 
  Another highly influential model in the field of anger and reactive aggression is 
Berkowitz’s Cognitive Neo-Associationistic theory (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; 
Berkowitz, 1990, 2010, 2012), which bears on the frustration-aggression hypothesis 
(Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939) that suggests that goal obstruction (c.f. 
frustration) leads to aggressive inclinations. Whereas most scholars generally agree that 
anger is an activator of aggression and view illegitimate frustrations and appraisals of 
blameworthiness as necessary generators of anger, Berkowitz’s contrasting view is that 
aggressive behavior is produced by negative affect following aversive events rather than 
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anger per se14 (see Figure 2). Importantly, Berkowitz puts emphasis on the fact that anger 
and aggressive actions can arise automatically even in the absence of (conscious or non-
conscious) appraisals as a result of associative networks linking negative affects with anger-
related feelings, thoughts, and aggressive behavior15. Hence, according to this model anger 
and aggressive inclinations result from (1) initial negative effect/ displeasure caused by 
decidedly unpleasant events and (2) from internal or external stimuli associated with 
negative effects (e.g., the mere presence of weapons or adopting an angry pose). The Neo-
Associationistic model further implies that simultaneously other associations more closely 
related to freeze or flight behavior than to fight behavior may co-occur as a result of the 
negative affect as well (for instance, fear and avoidance behavior can become dominant of 
anger and aggressive behavior in situations where overwhelming danger is sensed). Another 
assumption from this model is that following the initial negative affect, the relative 
dominance of the eventual emotions and behavior eventually shown is dependent on a host 
of factors, including genetic, learned, and situational factors. As such, following the initial 
automatic associative processes, cognitive processes, including appraisals, may result into 
more fully developed emotional experiences. Finally, another important notion of this 
theory is that through spreading activation one anger component (e.g., hostile thoughts) 
will activate other anger components (e.g., physiological arousal) based on the strength of 
their associative connections. Following this theory, individual differences in trait anger may 
be explained by the functioning of associative networks, for example by chronically 
accessible hostile thoughts, stronger interconnections between hostile thoughts, and/or 
wider connections between hostile concepts and non-hostile concepts in high trait anger 
individuals (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). Yet, inconsistent results have been found with 
                                                     
 
14 For instance, Berkowitz (2012) notes that “frustrations generate anger and aggressive 
inclinations only to the extent that they are decidedly unpleasant” (p.324). Anger in this 
models is viewed as occurring next to aggression.  
15 For example, anger and aggression elicited by priming effects and pain-induced 
aggression. However, there is still controversy about what actually is involved in the concept 
cognition. Berkowitz holds that if we adhere to the definition favored by Izard (1993) and 
Zajonc (1998, 2000), that is when “the term should have to do with the transformation of 
sensory input into a new mental construction”, cognition is not always involved in eliciting 
anger and aggression (p.108).  
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respect to memory processes and the accessibility of hostile thoughts in anger disposed 
individuals (for reviews, see Owen, 2011; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). Another point of 
criticism is that the definition of the term unpleasant stimulus results in a tautology: one can 
only refer to a trigger as unpleasant based on the behavioral outcome. 
 
 
Figure 2. Berkowitz’s Cognitive Neo-Associationistic theory (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Berkowitz, 
1990, 2010, 2012). 
 
 Two relevant cognitive theories with respect to aggression in general are the General 
Aggression Model (GAM; Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 2011) 
and the I3 theory (Finkel, 2007). The General Aggression Model is a broad model that 
integrated several theories into a unifying framework in order to provide a general theory of 
human aggression (see Figure 3). In short, the GAM posits that internal states (cognition, 
arousal, and affect) mediate the effects of situational (e.g., provocation, pain, drugs) and 
personality variables (e.g., personality traits, sex, beliefs, values) on aggression. In line with 
the Neo-associationistic account of Berkowitz, GAM assumes that spreading activation 
processes may make hostile cognitions and feelings more accessible. Another important 
tenet of GAM is that appraisal and decision processes can be automatic or deliberate16. The 
causal role anger plays in aggressive behavior is also mentioned in the GAM. More 
specifically, GAM notes five reasons why anger can increase the probability of responding 
aggressively. According to the model, anger (1) activates high emotional arousal, (2) brings 
                                                     
 
16 These automatic processes explain why angry clients may be unaware of their triggers 
causing the sensation of feeling taken by surprise and out of control. 
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16 These automatic processes explain why angry clients may be unaware of their triggers 
causing the sensation of feeling taken by surprise and out of control. 
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aggression into the person’s mindset, (3) provides a feeling of threat and retaliation, (4) 
keeps the person primed to aggression over time (e.g., increased attention to provoking 
cues), and (5) reduces inhibitions to aggression (e.g., anger provides a justification for 
aggressive behavior and interferes with higher-level cognitive processes usually recruited in 
moral reasoning and judgement). Interestingly, Digiuseppe and Tafrate (2010, p. 67) note 
that GAM can be seen as a general model of anger as well given that “most of the personal, 
situational, biological, and psychological factors that affect aggression also influence anger 
arousal”. 
  The I3 theory (Finkel, 2007) is a meta-theory which proposes that three interacting 
orthogonal processes lie at the heart of all behavior (in this case aggression): instigation, 
impellance, and inhibition (see Figure 4). Instigating factors include factors to which 
someone is exposed in particular contexts that normatively evoke a certain behavior. For 
example, provocation is thought to be an instigating factor which normatively evokes an 
aggressive response (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Impelling factors include situational or 
stable factors that heighten the chance that individuals will enact certain behavior when 
encountering instigating factors in specific contexts. For instance, trait aggressiveness and 
provocation-focused rumination are thought to be impelling factors that increase the 
likelihood of aggressive behavior in response to provocation (Denson, DeWall, et al., 2012). 
Lastly, inhibiting factors encompass dispositional or situational factors that heighten the 
chance that individuals will override instigating and impelling forces, thereby overriding or 
reducing the intensity of the proclivity to enact the behavior. For instance, state and trait 
self-control can be taken as inhibiting factors reducing the likelihood or intensity of 
aggressive behavior (Denson, DeWall, et al., 2012; DeWall, Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 
2007). In essence, aggression is thought to occur when instigating and impelling forces 
exceed inhibitory forces. 
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Figure 3. The General Aggression Model (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; DeWall, Anderson, & Bushman, 
2011).  
 
Figure 4. The I3 theory (Finkel, 2007). 
 
In both of the above mentioned meta-theories, trait anger can be seen as a personality 
variable that increases the chance of aggressive behavior. GAM further provides clues that 
individuals disposed towards anger and aggressive behavior are more likely to suffer from 
impaired cognitive processes, such as the tendency to interpret ambiguous situations as 
hostile as well as a tendency to focus attention more often towards hostile cues. In addition, 
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the I3 model provides clues that anger disposed individuals might lack sufficient inhibitory 
model. Wilkowski and Robinson (2008b, 2010) who focus more specially on the cognitive 
underpinnings of trait anger in their integrative review, put emphasis on exact these three 
processes: automatic hostile interpretations, ruminative attention, and effortful control (cf. 
cognitive control). Given this model most exclusively focusses on trait anger, and hence 
forms the basis of the current thesis, it will be described in more detail in the following 
paragraph. 
 
 
Figure 5. Wilkowski and Robinson’s (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010) integrative cognitive model of 
trait anger and reactive aggression.  
 
  Cognitive processes in the model of Robinson and Wilkowski (2008b, 2010) are seen 
as mediating and moderating the effects of hostile situational influences onto subsequent 
outputs related to anger and aggression. More specifically, they postulate that anger 
disposed individuals are inclined to interpret ambiguous information as hostile, which is an 
automatic process that precedes attentional and effortful control processes and leads to the 
more frequent elicitation of anger17. Within this model, subsequent cognitive processes may 
mitigate or exacerbate inclinations towards anger following hostile interpretations (see 
Figure 5). For instance, when a situation is considered or interpreted to be hostile, according 
to this model, it will automatically capture attention which leads to angry rumination and in 
                                                     
 
17 Alternatively, it could well be the case that selective attention precedes interpretation.  
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turn amplifies anger and the likelihood of enacting reactive aggressive behavior. High trait 
anger individuals are thought to have difficulties disengaging attention from the hostile 
information, explaining their more intense and prolonged anger episodes. Indeed, several 
studies have shown that high trait anger individuals have difficulties in disengaging from 
hostile stimuli (Eckhardt & Cohen, 1997; Honk et al., 2001; Putman, Hermans, & van Honk, 
2004; Smith & Waterman, 2004), although it is unclear to what extent these results are due 
to state anger (Owen, 2011). Perhaps state anger influences information processing, 
whereby most reliable effects occur in high trait anger individuals who are experiencing 
state anger (Schultz, Grodack, & Izard, 2010). Moreover, experimental studies have shown 
that angry rumination maintains or intensifies state angry feelings (Bushman, 2002; Denson, 
Moulds, & Grisham, 2012; Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), 
whereas distraction results in decreases of state anger (Konecni, 1974; Mischkowski, Kross, 
& Bushman, 2012). Finally, effortful control processes may interfere with these automatic 
inclinations towards anger and aggression. Importantly, high-trait-anger individuals are 
proposed to self-regulate their automatic inclinations towards anger and aggression less 
effectively. That is, whereas individuals low on trait anger are proposed to successfully 
recruit effortful control resources in potentially hostile situations, high trait anger 
individuals are thought to allow these resources to remain dormant. More specifically, 
effortful control processes may mitigate angry and aggressive inclinations in the following 
ways in this model: (1) by reinterpreting hostile interpretations in favor of non-hostile 
interpretation, (2) by disengaging attention from hostile information, and (3) by suppressing 
angry and aggressive behavioral tendencies. With regard to effortful control, abundant 
cognitive behavioral experiments has shown that cognitive control deficits become most 
apparent under conditions where anger is primed (Wilkowski, Robinson, & Troop-Gordon, 
2010; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2007, 2008a; Wilkowski, 2011). Further confirming the causal 
link between cognitive control and reactive aggression, a different line of research has 
demonstrated that reductions in state self-control following ‘ego depletion’ manipulations18 
result in less anger control following provocation (DeWall et al., 2007; Finkel & Campbell, 
                                                     
 
18 Ego depletion refers to a state of temporary weakened self-control as a result of previous 
acts of exercising self-control (e.g., attempts to quit smoking) (Baumeister et al., 2007).  
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2001; Finkel, DeWall, Slotter, Oaten, & Foshee, 2009; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006), whereas 
boosts in self-control lead to decreases in reactive aggressive behaviours (Denson, 2015; 
Wilkowski, Crowe, & Ferguson, 2015). Yet, there is a need to better understand the 
neurocognitive mechanisms associated with trait anger. For instance, only a few 
electroencephalographic (EEG) studies have been conducted in high trait anger individuals 
(Jaworska et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014), while electrophysiological measures can provide 
more objective and sensitive assessments of cognitive processes involved (Fabiani, Gratton, 
& Coles, 2000). 
  To recapitulate, all of the theoretical models described above postulate that 
neurocognitive processes play a role in explaining individual differences in anger and 
reactive aggression, which is soundly supported by empirical studies. Moreover, most of the 
theories point out that these processes interact with each other as well as with other 
situational and dispositional factors. Finally, most of the above theories highlight the 
distinction between initial automatic processes and later more controlled processes that 
play a role in trait anger and reactive aggression. 
 
1.5. A neurocognitive perspective on Trait Anger 
By including EEG measurements or neuroimaging during the performance of cognitive tasks 
(e.g., Go/NoGo task) that require the recruitment of specific cognitive functions (e.g., 
response inhibition and error-monitoring), more insight can be gained about the timing and 
the neural substrates of the cognitive processes involved in trait anger. Importantly, 
cognitive control encompasses several separate but interacting neurocognitive 
subcomponents (Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004), and only a few of these 
subcomponents have been given sufficient attention with regard to trait anger. For instance, 
EEG studies focusing on error-processing deficits in relation to trait anger were at the start 
of the current PhD Project non-existent, although neural error-processing deficits were to 
be expected in high trait anger individuals (Robinson, Wilkowski, Meier, Moeller, & 
Fetterman, 2012). Similarly, little was known about response inhibition on the 
neurophysiological level, especially under circumstances where anger is primed, even 
though previous studies suggest impulse control in hostility-primed contexts may be 
impaired in high trait anger individuals (e.g., Wilkowski, 2011). The results of the EEG studies 
that were conducted had produced mixed results. That is, whereas one study found support 
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for reduced attentional control and diminished response inhibition in HTA individuals on a 
continuous performance task (Jaworska et al., 2012), another study could not find support 
for reduced inhibitory control on a Go/NoGo task in HTA individuals (Liu et al., 2014). Given 
that both studies used a neutral task and it is suggested that especially in hostile contexts 
HTA individuals allow cognitive control processes to lay dormant (Wilkowski & Robinson, 
2008b, 2010), inhibitory control deficits at the neural level may have remained undetected. 
One goal of this thesis was therefore to investigate inhibitory control on a 
neurophysiological level in a context where anger was primed. Additionally, we examined 
error-processing on the neurophysiological level in relation to trait, as there were 
indications for distorted error-processing at the behavioral level (Robinson et al., 2012). 
Greater insight into the dysfunction of neural networks associated with cognitive control 
with regard to trait anger is of essential importance, as it could provide valuable information 
about the aetiology and maintenance of this harmful personality trait. For instance, error-
processing and response inhibition deficits may explain the existence of inappropriate 
(aggressive) behaviour in high trait anger individuals despite its negative consequences. 
 
1.6. Causal links between cognitive processes and anger: The impact of angry 
rumination and mental fatigue on anger and self-control 
To date, most studies on cognitive risk factors for trait anger have investigated such factors 
in isolation. However, it seems unlikely that cognitive risk factors would operate in isolation. 
Instead, cognitive factors probably influence each other or interact in such a way that the 
impact of one factor is influenced by the other. In line with this idea, researchers in the field 
of anxiety and depression proposed the “combined cognitive bias hypothesis” (Everaert, 
Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006), and indeed found evidence to 
support the idea that cognitive risk factors interact (e.g., Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & 
Koster, 2013). A similar approach may be highly informative for understanding cognitive risk 
factors for a disposition towards anger. Several questions seem of particular importance in 
this respect: (a) To what extent are cognitive risk factors for trait anger interrelated 
(“association questions”)?, (b) To what extent do cognitive risk factors for trait anger 
causally influence each other (“causal questions’)?, and (c) To what extent do cognitive risk 
factors for trait anger jointly predict someone’s disposition towards anger (“predictive 
magnitude questions”)? Answering these questions will help to gain a broader 
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understanding of the interrelations and interactions among risk factors for trait anger, and 
may inform us on which risk factors are essential to target during treatment. 
  The integrative cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression (Wilkowski & 
Robinson, 2008b, 2010) provides an important first step in informing about the possible 
interrelations and interactions of the involved cognitive processes. Clear hypotheses based 
on the model can be made. Yet, some of the relationships specified in this model have not 
been thoroughly tested and new relationships between these cognitive processes may be 
established. The second aim of the present thesis is therefore to gain more insight in the 
causal links between the cognitive processes and anger as well as their impact on each other 
using experimental designs. For instance, whereas the model of Wilkowski and Robinson 
(2008b, 2010) predicts that cognitive control has an impact on ruminative attention, recent 
research suggests that the relationship between cognitive control and ruminative attention 
may also be the other way around. More specifically, according to the multiple systems 
models of angry rumination (Denson, 2013), angry rumination should result in reductions in 
cognitive control leading to subsequent aggressive behaviour (Denson, 2009, 2013). 
However, to our knowledge direct investigations of the impact of angry rumination on 
cognitive control are scarce (Denson, Pedersen, Friese, Hahm, & Roberts, 2011). As 
information about the impact of angry rumination on cognitive control may advance our 
understanding of rumination-induced aggression, we sought to investigate this relation in 
this thesis. 
  Interestingly, the hypothesis put forward in the multiple systems model of angry 
rumination, i.e. that angry rumination should result in reduced self-control, is heavily reliant 
on resource depletion accounts (DeWall et al., 2007; Finkel & Campbell, 2001; Stucke & 
Baumeister, 2006), which are in turn based on the Strength Model of Self-Control 
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). More specifically, the multiple systems model of angry 
rumination predicts that angry rumination may result in reduced self-control, as a result of 
ego depletion following attempts to (a) reduce anger intensity, (b) inhibit angry thoughts, 
and (c) to inhibit aggressive inclinations, subsequently heightening the likelihood of 
aggressive behaviour. Yet, in the literature much debate exists, however, as to whether ego 
depletion (cf. resource depletion) is a real phenomenon warranting explanation (Carter, 
Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015) as well as about what processes underlie the effects 
observed in ego depletion experiments. For instance, it is not clear to what extent 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
General introduction
30 
  
motivation and mental fatigue may moderate the effects observed (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010). An important question therefore is whether effects of ego depletion 
manipulations on aggressive behavior are caused specifically by engaging in acts of self-
control or may also be caused by a more general state of mental fatigue. Another goal of 
this thesis was to examine this question by investigating the impact of a mentally fatiguing 
task, unrelated to ego depletion, on experienced anger and anger control following 
provocation by the experimenter. 
 
1.7. Overview of the current dissertation 
The general aim of the current thesis was to examine (neuro)cognitive factors that 
contribute to the aetiology and maintenance of a disposition towards anger. To this end, 
correlational and experimental designs in both clinical and nonclinical samples were used. 
Five studies, described in more detail in the upcoming chapters (chapter 2 to 6), are 
included in this thesis. Below we provide a short overview. 
  One of the first challenges we encountered during our research was that the Dutch 
version of the most often used instrument for measuring trait anger, the State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2)(Spielberger, 1999), was lacking. Therefore, we translated 
and backtranslated the STAXI-2 from English to Dutch and subjected it to a thorough 
psychometric evaluation, as described in Chapter Two. 
  In Chapters Three and Four, the neural substrate of response inhibition and error-
processing in relation to trait anger was investigated in order to build upon the integrative 
cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression. Importantly, based on the 
assumption that HTA individuals allow cognitive control processes to lay dormant under 
potentially hostile situations (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010), we employed an 
affective Go/NoGo task in order to examine whether response inhibition deficits would be 
more pronounced if anger was primed. In both studies, response inhibition was measured 
by behavioural performance (accuracy) as well as Event-Related Potentials (ERPs; N2 and 
P3). Numerous event-related potential studies have shown increased N2 and P3 amplitudes 
on NoGo trials compared to Go trials and these ERPs are generally assumed to reflect 
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inhibitory processing (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Luijten et al., 2014)19. 
Similarly, in both studies ERPs were used to assess error-processing. More specifically, error-
processing was indexed by the Error Related Negativity and the Positivity error (Bernstein, 
Scheffers, & Coles, 1995; Overbeek, Nieuwenhuis, & Ridderinkhof, 2005; Yeung, Botvinick, & 
Cohen, 2004)20. 
  In the study described in Chapter Three, we compared anger-primed inhibitory 
control and error-processing between high trait anger (HTA) and low trait anger (LTA) 
individuals using an “extreme groups” design. Here, we expected reduced inhibitory control 
in HTA compared to LTA as evidenced by reduced accuracy and N2 and P3 amplitudes on 
NoGo trials, especially for anger-related pictures (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010). With 
respect to error-processing, we expected to find either reduced ERN or Pe amplitudes in 
HTA compared to LTA (Robinson et al., 2012). In Chapter Four, we examined whether scores 
on trait anger in forensic psychiatric patients were associated with individual differences in 
anger-primed inhibitory control and error-processing using a correlational design. Here, we 
expected that higher scores on trait anger would be associated with more commission 
errors (i.e., lower accuracy) and reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes on NoGo trials. Furthermore, 
we expected the inverse relation between trait anger and inhibitory control to be more 
pronounced for anger-related pictures in support of the integrative cognitive model of trait 
anger and reactive aggression (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010). Finally, we expected 
higher scores on trait anger to be accompanied by reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes 
(Robinson et al., 2012). 
                                                     
 
19 The N2 signal is a negative-going stimulus locked component that arises shortly after 
stimulus presentation (200-350ms) and is proposed to measure response conflict 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003) or the signaling of deviant stimulus features (Fox et al., 2000). 
The P3 signal is a positive-going stimulus-locked component that arises after stimulus 
presentation (roughly 250 to 500 ms) and is proposed to reflect the actual inhibitory process 
with respect to the Go/NoGo task (Kok et al., 2004; Verleger et al., 2006).  
20 The ERN arises shortly after making error in reaction time tasks, such as the Go/NoGo 
task, and is thought to reflect action monitoring either through conflict monitoring (Yeung 
et al., 2004) or through automatic error detection (Bernstein et al., 1995). The Pe follows 
the ERN and is assumed to reflect the more conscious processing of an error (Luijten et al., 
2014; Overbeek et al., 2005).   
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  In Chapter Five we studied the impact of angry rumination, relative to distraction, on 
experienced anger and inhibitory control as measured with an affective Go/NoGo task. 
According to the multiple systems models of angry rumination (Denson, 2013), angry 
rumination results in reduced effortful control as a result of ego depletion. Hence, based on 
this model, we expected increased anger and reduced anger-primed inhibitory control (as 
evidenced by more commission errors on NoGo trials) following angry rumination as 
compared to distraction. If reduced effortful control is demonstrated following angry 
rumination, this would suggest that the relation put forward in the integrative cognitive 
model of trait anger and reactive aggression between rumination and effortful control is 
reciprocal rather than unidirectional. 
  In Chapter Six we examined the impact of a mentally fatiguing task (that should be 
unrelated to ego depletion) on experienced anger and anger control (cf. refusal to 
cooperate) following provocation by the experimenter. We expected that mentally fatigued 
participants would experience more intense anger following provocation compared to non-
fatigued individuals. Moreover, we expected that mentally fatigued individuals would more 
likely refuse to cooperate with the experimenter than the non-fatigued individuals. These 
hypothesis are in line with the integrative cognitive model of trait anger and reactive 
aggression, in which a causal relation between effortful control and anger expression is 
suggested. 
  Finally, in Chapter Seven, the main findings of this dissertation are summarized and 
discussed.  
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 Chapter Two 
 
 
Anger Assessment in Clinical and Nonclinical 
Populations: Further Validation of the State–Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has been published as: 
Lievaart, M., Franken, I.H.A., & Hovens, J.E. (2016). Anger Assessment in Clinical and 
Nonclinical Populations: Further Validation of the State–Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 72 (3), 263–278. DOI: 10.1002/jclp.22253  
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Abstract 
Objective: The most commonly used instrument for measuring anger is the State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999). This study further examines the validity 
of the STAXI-2 and compares anger scores between several clinical and nonclinical samples.  
Method: Reliability, concurrent, and construct validity were investigated in Dutch 
undergraduate students (N = 764), a general population sample (N = 1211), and psychiatric 
outpatients (N = 226). 
Results: The results support the reliability and validity of the STAXI-2. Concurrent validity was 
strong, with meaningful correlations between the STAXI-2 scales and anger-related 
constructs in both clinical and nonclinical samples. Importantly, patients showed higher 
experience and expression of anger than the general population sample. Additionally, 
forensic outpatients with addiction problems reported higher Anger Expression-Out than 
general psychiatric outpatients.  
Conclusion: Our conclusion is that the STAXI-2 is a suitable instrument to measure both the 
experience and the expression of anger in both general and clinical populations.  
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2.1. Introduction 
Spielberger (1988) pointed out that anger can be both understood as a momentarily state, 
i.e., how subjects feel at the moment, and as a trait, i.e., how subjects feel in general, and 
where it is expected that subjects with high trait anger show state anger more frequently 
and intensely. This distinction between state and trait anger, sometimes referred to as the 
State–Trait Anger Theory, has been repeatedly empirically validated (Deffenbacher, Oetting, 
Lynch, & Morris, 1996; Quinn et al., 2014). Moreover, Spielberger (1988) recognized the 
importance of how these angry feelings are expressed and controlled. For example, when 
angered, people may express their anger outwardly by physical or verbal assault or inwardly 
by suppressing anger. Knowing how people deal with their anger is important for 
understanding both the nature of anger and client problems and concerns (Deffenbacher, 
Oetting, Lynch, et al., 1996).  
  Importantly, anger is a clinically relevant emotion. Elevated levels of anger occur in a 
range of psychiatric disorders (Novaco, 2010) and a high number of anger-disordered clients 
present for treatment in private clinical settings (Lachmund, DiGiuseppe, & Fuller, 2005). 
More specifically, several disorders, including bipolar disorder, oppositional defiant 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), borderline, 
antisocial personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder, mention anger or 
irritation as a possible symptom or criterion in their diagnostic criteria (DiGiuseppe & 
Tafrate, 2010). Notably, elevated anger is also present in people with neurological 
impairments (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010) and intellectual disabilities (Willner, Jahoda, & 
Larkin, 2013) and in patients with other psychiatric disorders, such as depression (Koh, Kim, 
& Park, 2002), substance dependence (Shopshire & Reilly, 2013; Walfish, Massey, & Krone, 
1990), and psychotic disorders (Nederlof, Muris, & Hovens, 2011; Novaco & Whittington, 
2013). 
  At least a third to approximately half of the psychiatric outpatients show 
considerable feelings of anger (McDermut et al., 2009; Posternak & Zimmerman, 2002), and 
these feeling are associated with several adverse treatment outcomes. In individuals with 
social anxiety disorder, anger is associated with less satisfaction about their cognitive 
behavioral treatment and with premature termination from treatment (Erwin et al., 2003). 
Similarly, patients meeting criteria for PTSD with high levels of anger before treatment seem 
to benefit less from exposure therapy (Rizvi et al., 2009). Negative treatment effects due to 
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anger are not limited to anxiety and stress disorders and apply to other disorders as well 
(also see, Fassino, Abbate-Daga, Pierò, Leombruni, & Rovera, 2003; Fassino, Amianto, 
Abbate, & Leombruni, 2007; Mammen, Shear, Greeno, Wheeler, & Hughes, 1997; Rüsch et 
al., 2008). Finally, anger presumably interferes with common therapy factors, such as a 
strong therapeutic alliance (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010), motivation for treatment, 
resistance to change, and less collaboration on goal setting (Hubble, Duncan, & Miller, 
2004). Therefore, it may be valuable to enquire about anger difficulties in patients, and this 
requires validated anger measures.  
  The most commonly used instrument for measuring anger is Spielberger’s State–
Trait Anger Expression Inventory second edition (STAXI-2; 1999). The STAXI-2 has proven to 
be a reliable and valid instrument measuring the experience and management of anger 
(Eckhardt, Norlander, & Deffenbacher, 2004). Currently, the Dutch version of the STAXI-2 
has not been subjected to a thorough psychometric evaluation. Moreover, despite its 
widespread use, research about differences between several groups of clinical populations 
and nonclinical populations in the experience and management of anger using the STAXI-2 
has received little attention. One study of Cullari (1994) showed that psychiatric outpatients 
scored higher on the State and Trait anger scales compared with normal subjects, but it did 
not include the expression scales. Another study, by Etzler, Rohrmann, and Brandt (2014), 
showed higher scores on Anger Expression-In for inmates compared with the mean of the 
German standardization sample. Yet here it remains unclear how these inmates would score 
compared with other clinical samples. Finally, De-Moja and Spielberger (1997) showed 
higher scores on State Anger, Trait Anger, and ´ Anger Out and lower scores on Anger 
Control for heroin-dependent drug users compared with a nondrug-using matched control 
group using the STAXI. Although there are several studies showing higher experience and 
expression of anger for clinical patients compared with healthy nonclinical subjects (Barbour 
et al., 1998; Cullari, 1994; De-Moja & Spielberger, 1997; Etzler et al., 2014), most of them 
used the STAXI instead of the STAXI-2. Because the STAXI-2 is more detailed in measuring 
the control of anger, using the STAXI-2 might provide extra information about the 
differences in the control over anger between clinical populations and nonclinical 
populations.  
  Moreover, to our knowledge, no studies have yet been conducted in which the 
experience and management of anger of several patient groups are directly compared with 
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each other, which could provide important information about the usefulness of the STAXI-2 
in clinical settings. It would, for example, be interesting to compare general psychiatric 
patients with forensic patients regarding their experience and management of anger 
because we would expect forensic patients to deal with their anger in a less constructive 
way.  
  The present study was designed to further validate the STAXI-2. First, we provide 
initial evidence regarding the reliability and validity of the Dutch Translation of the STAXI-2. 
Second, we present information about the convergent and divergent validity in both 
nonclinical and clinical samples, by studying the associations with anger-related 
symptomatology and the personality traits of the big five. Finally, we provide information 
about the differences between several clinical patient samples and nonclinical populations 
regarding anger experience and anger management strategies.  
  We expected the STAXI-2 to be reliable (regarding both internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability). In addition, we expected the trait scales to be somewhat more stable 
than the State Anger Scale. Positive relationships were expected among the STAXI-2 
experience and anger expression scales with alternative measures of anger and anger-
related symptomatology (i.e., hostility, impulsiveness, and aggression), whereas negative 
associations were expected for the anger control scales.  
  Additionally, we expected the STAXI-2 scales to be associated with three of the big 
five personality traits: Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. More 
specifically, we expected positive correlations between the Trait Anger Scale and the anger 
expression scales with Neuroticism, and negative correlations with Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness (Kuppens, 2005; Martin et al., 1999; Pease & Lewis, 2015; Sanz, García-
Vera, & Magán, 2010; Whiteman, Bedford, Grant, Fowkes, & Deary, 2001). Because the links 
between the Trait Anger and anger expression scales on the one hand and Extraversion and 
Openness on the other hand are less well established, no specific hypotheses were 
formulated for these scales and the analyses can be regarded as exploratory. Importantly, 
we expected clinical populations to experience and express anger more frequently and to 
control anger less frequently than the general population sample. Finally, we expected 
forensic patients to experience and express anger more frequently compared with general 
psychiatric patients.  
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Anger Assessment in Clinical and Nonclinical Populations
40 
  
2.2. Method  
2.2.1. Ethics Statement 
This study was conducted according to the rules of the Helsinki Declaration on informed 
consent and confidentiality (World Medical Association, 2001). Approval for this study was 
obtained from the Ethical Committee of the department of psychology of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. For the psychiatric patients, we obtained approval from the Ethical 
Committee of Delta Psychiatric Hospital. Participants were informed about the study, after 
which they gave informed consent. Participation was based on a voluntary basis and 
participants were free to refrain from participation at any point in time. Information about 
the research was provided on the questionnaires or via a recruitment letter. 
 
2.2.2. Participants 
The data reported here were collected among both nonclinical and clinical samples. The 
nonclinical samples comprised samples from both undergraduate students (N = 764) and 
the general population (N = 1211). The group of students comprised psychology students at 
the Erasmus University Rotterdam (N = 564) and the Amsterdam University of Applied 
Sciences (N = 200), who took part in the annual screening for research purposes, for which 
they were rewarded with study credits. Of the students, 25% were men and 75% were 
women. Mean age was 20.4 years (standard deviation [SD] = 2.9), with an age range from 18 
to 46 years. The general population sample was a random representative sample drawn 
from the general population and the gender distribution was 49% men and 51% women. 
Mean age was 32.2 years (SD = 9.4), with an age range from 18 to 50 years. Both the 
students and the people from the general population completed the questionnaires online 
using Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics Labs, Provo, Utah). Test-retest reliability was 
estimated in a subgroup of psychology students (N = 217) and the general population (N = 
99).  
  The clinical samples were derived from several psychiatric treatment facilities in the 
Netherlands. The total group of patients comprised psychiatric outpatients from a general 
psychiatric hospital (N = 80), outpatients with addiction problems (N = 88) from an addiction 
clinic, and forensic outpatients with addiction problems (N = 58) from the forensic 
department of the same addiction clinic. Of the total patient group, 63% were men and 37% 
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were women. Their mean age was 42.9 years (SD = 11.6), with an age range from 19 to 79 
years.  
  Patients from the general psychiatric hospital were mostly diagnosed with major 
depression (n = 34) or bipolar disorder (n = 11), but other diagnoses were present as well, 
such as anxiety disorders (n = 2), alcohol dependency (n = 4), schizophrenia (n = 2), 
borderline (n = 3), and/or PTSD (n = 2). These diagnoses were based on clinical records. 
Gender distribution in this outpatient sample was 34.6% men. Mean age was 44.45 years 
(SD = 12.06), with an age range from 19 to 68 years. 
The outpatients with addiction problems were mostly polydrug users primarily 
diagnosed with a substance use disorder, ranging from alcohol, amphetamine, cannabis, 
cocaine, and heroin use disorders. Some of the patients with addiction problems had a 
gambling disorder. Comorbid psychopathology was not an exclusion criterion and was not 
recorded. Typically, this population has high levels of comorbidity, including major 
depression, PTSD, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, borderline personality disorder, 
and/or antisocial personality disorder. The outpatient sample with addiction problems 
mostly comprised male participants (68.2%). Mean age was 43.65 years (SD = 11.71) with an 
age range of 23 to 79 years.  
 The forensic outpatients with addiction problems were also mostly polydrug users 
and additionally convicted for violent and/or nonviolent offenses, such as theft, fraud, drug 
and alcohol-related crimes, assault and battery, domestic violence, and/or robbery. The 
forensic outpatient sample with addiction problems mainly comprised male participants 
(93.1%). Mean age was 39.79 years (SD = 10.39), with an age range from 22 to 61 years. All 
patients were individually tested in the presence of the research assistant and completed 
the questionnaires as paper-and-pencil tests.  
 
2.2.3. Materials 
STAXI-2 (Spielberger, 1999). The STAXI-2 measures the experience of anger, the tendency to 
express anger, and the tendency to control anger. Two bilingual translators independently 
translated all 57 items of the STAXI-2 from English into Dutch. Inconsistencies were 
discussed with the authors (ML and JEH) until consensus was reached and finally this version 
was back translated to English. Spielberger authorized this translation. The STAXI-2 is scored 
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on a 4-point Likert scale and comprises 57 items and six scales: State Anger, Trait Anger, 
Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, Anger Control-In, and Anger Control-Out.  
  The 15-item State Anger (S-Ang; range 15–60) scale assesses three distinctive 
components of the intensity of anger as an emotional state: Feeling Angry (S-Ang/F), Feel 
Like Expressing Anger Verbally (S-Ang/V), and Feel like Expressing Anger Physically (S-
Ang/P). Each subscale comprises five items.  
  The 10-item Trait Anger scale (T-Ang; range 10–40) assesses two distinctive 
components of the general tendency to experience more frequent, more intense, and 
longer episodes of anger: Angry Temperament (T-Ang/T), measuring the disposition to 
experience anger without provocation, and Angry Reaction (T-Ang/R), measuring the 
frequency that angry feelings are experienced in situations that involve frustration and/ or 
negative evaluations. Each subscale comprises four items.  
  Anger Expression-Out (AX-O) measures the outward expression of anger toward 
other people or objects either verbally or physically, while Anger Expression-In (AX-I) 
measures how often the participant experiences an angry feeling and suppresses it or holds 
it in instead of expressing it. Anger Control-Out (AC-O) measures how often a person 
controls the outward expression of angry feelings, while Anger Control-In (AC-I) measures 
how often a person controls his or her angry feeling by calming down or cooling off. All four 
expression scales comprise eight items.  
  The Dutch version of the Aggression Questionnaire (AVL; Buss & Perry, 1992; 
Meesters, Muris, Bosma, Schouten, & Beuving, 1996). The AVL measures self-reported 
aggression. The AVL comprises 29 items that are scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (entirely disagree) to 5 (entirely agree) (range = 29–145). The AVL comprises four 
subscales, i.e., Physical Aggression, Verbal Aggression, Anger, and Hostility, which have been 
confirmed by factor analyses (Meesters et al., 1996). Moreover, test-retest reliability for all 
four subscales is between .76 and .79 with a 6-week interval (Meesters et al., 1996). 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in the current samples indicate acceptable to good reliability 
according to Kline (2005), with values ranging from .63 to .85.  
  The Dutch Version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS11; Lijffijt & Barratt, 
2005; Patton et al., 1995). The BIS11 measures trait impulsivity. The BIS11 comprises three 
subscales: Attentional Impulsiveness, Motor Impulsiveness, and Non-planning 
Impulsiveness. The BIS11 comprises 30 items and is scored on a 4-point Likert scale ranging 
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from 1 (rarely/never) to 4 (almost always/always) (range 30–120). The original BIS11 shows 
good psychometric properties: the three-factor structure has consistently been replicated, 
the questionnaire is associated with other self-report measures of impulsivity, and test-
retest reliability for the total score is ρ = .83 (Patton et al., 1995; Stanford et al., 2009). 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in the current samples indicate acceptable to good reliability, 
with values ranging from .65 to .80.  
  The Symptom Checklist (SCL-90; Arrindell & Ettema, 1986). The SCL-90 comprises 90 
items and measures nine primary distress dimensions. For this study, we used only the 
Hostility scale, which comprises six items. Cronbach’s alpha in our patient sample was .81, 
indicating good reliability according to Kline (2005). The SCL-90 is scored on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Test-retest reliabilities range from r = .68 to 
.85 for the SCL-90 subscales. Additionally, psychiatric patients score higher on the SCL-90 
than people from the general population. Finally, construct validity was supported by factor 
analyses (Arrindell & Ettema, 1986; Evers, Vliet-Mulder, & Groot, 2000).  
  The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Hoekstra, Ormel, & 
De Fruyt, 1996). The NEO-FFI measures the five major dimensions of personality: 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. All subscales 
include 12 items measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (entirely disagree) to 5 
(entirely agree). The NEO-FFI shows good psychometric properties (Hoekstra et al., 1996). 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in our patient sample indicated good reliability for 
Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, with values above .76. The Extraversion 
and Openness scales had lower reliability with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .59 for 
Openness and .63 for Extraversion.  
  The NEO-FFI-3 that was administered in the general population sample is similar to 
the NEOFFI. The NEO-FFI-3 comprises 60 items as well and measures the same big five 
personality constructs. However, 15 items have been rewritten or replaced to improve 
readability and the psychometric properties (Hoekstra & De Fruyt, 2014). For the English 
version, Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ranged from .72 to .88 in adolescent and adult 
samples (McCrae & Costa, 2007). Moreover, the original five-factor structure for the NEO-
FFI-R was retained. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients in the population sample of the current 
study indicate good reliability, with all values above .70.  
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2.2.4. Procedure 
Each group completed the STAXI-2 along with several additional questionnaires. Students at 
the Erasmus University additionally completed the Aggression Questionnaire and a part of 
these students also completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. The psychiatric outpatients 
completed the AVL, the SCL-90, the BIS, and the NEO-FFI in addition to the STAXI-2. People 
from the general population completed only the NEO-FFI-3 in addition to the STAXI-2. 
 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Reliability, Stability, and Factor Structure of the Dutch Version of the STAXI-2  
Internal consistencies (Cronbach’s alpha) were satisfactory for all scales and subscales of the 
Dutch version of the STAXI-2 in the student, general population, and psychiatric outpatient 
samples (see Table 1).  
 The test-retest stability was computed in a subsample of students (retest after 7 to 
44 days; mean [M] = 23 days, SD = 6 days) and in a selection of the population responders 
(retest after 21 to 28 days; M = 24 days, SD = one day). All STAXI-2 scales showed a relative 
high stability, except for the State Anger Scale, as was expected (see Table 2). 
There was a high degree of (sub)scale intercorrelation that was generally in the 
expected direction for the general population sample (see Table 3). According to our 
expectation, the correlations between S-Ang with S-Ang/F, S-Ang/V, and S-Ang/P were high, 
with rs > .90. The intercorrelations between the three subscales were also high (all rs > .80). 
Although the intercorrelations are very high, it might still be clinically relevant to 
differentiate between the three subscales. T-Ang was highly correlated with both its 
subscales as well (both rs > .80). The intercorrelation among T-Ang/T and T-Ang/R was much 
lower, with r = .55, indicating that both subscales measure different aspects of T-Ang. AX-O 
showed a substantial correlation with T-Ang, T-Ang/T, and T-Ang/R, which suggests that 
Anger Expression-Out is more related to Trait Anger than initially expected. As expected, 
both AC-O and AC-I correlated negatively with T-Ang, T-Ang/T, T-Ang/R, and AX-O, and 
positively with AX-I, supporting the construct validity. However, AC-O and AC-I were also 
highly positively correlated with each other, r = .77, suggesting that both scales have much 
in common. 
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Table 1. Internal consistencies using Cronbach’s alpha among students, psychiatric patients, and a sample 
of the general population. 
 
 Students  
(N = 764) 
Psychiatric patients  
(N = 226) 
General population  
(N = 1211) 
S-Ang .91 .96 .96 
    S-Ang/F .81 .93 .90 
    S-Ang/V .84 .93 .91 
    S-Ang/P .79 .93 .91 
T-Ang .83 .92 .88 
    T-Ang/T .83 .92 .88 
    T-Ang/R .73 .83 .77 
AX-O .77 .84 .80 
AX-I .71 .72 .71 
AC-O .84 .83 .81 
AC-I .90 .82 .89 
Note: S-Ang = State Anger; S-Ang/F = Feeling Angry; S-Ang/V = Feel Like Expressing Anger verbally; S-
Ang/P = Feel like Expressing Anger Physically; T-Ang = Trait Anger; T-Ang/T = Angry Temperament; T-
Ang/R = Angry Reaction; AX-O = Anger Expression-Out; AX-I = Anger Expression-In; AC-O = Anger Control-
Out; AC-I = Anger Control-In. 
 
Table 2. Consistency of the STAXI-2 over time in students and a subsample of the general population. 
 
  Students (N = 217) Population (N = 99) 
S-Ang .32 .59 
    S-Ang/F .22 .41 
    S-Ang/V .34 .55 
    S-Ang/P .37 .53 
T-Ang .78 .82 
    T-Ang/T .72 .81 
    T-Ang/R .65 .76 
AX-O .76 .76 
AX-I .66 .70 
AC-O .70 .73 
AC-I .71 .66 
Note: S-Ang = State Anger; S-Ang/F = Feeling Angry; S-Ang/V = Feel Like Expressing Anger verbally; S-
Ang/P = Feel like Expressing Anger Physically; T-Ang = Trait Anger; T-Ang/T = Angry Temperament; T-
Ang/R = Angry Reaction; AX-O = Anger Expression-Out; AX-I = Anger Expression-In; AC-O = Anger Control-
Out; AC-I = Anger Control-In. 
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Table 3. Correlations between T-Ang, AX-O, AX-I, AC-O, and AC-I in the population sample (N = 1211). 
 T-Ang T-Ang/T T-Ang/R AX-O AX-I AC-O AC-I 
T-Ang        
    T-Ang/T .85       
    T-Ang/R .87 .55      
AX-O .58 .53 .43     
AX-I .28 .17 .32 .31    
AC-O -.26 -.28 -.14 -.31 .32   
AC-I -.21 -.23 -.11 -.25 .27 .77  
        
Note: All correlations: p < .001; T-Ang = Trait Anger; T-Ang/T = Angry Temperament; T-Ang/R = Angry 
Reaction; AX-O = Anger Expression-Out; AX-I = Anger Expression-In; AC-O = Anger Control-Out; AC-I = 
Anger Control-In. 
 
 
 Because Spielberger (1999) viewed the STAXI-2 as three questionnaires, i.e., a state 
(15 items), a trait (10 items), and an expression control questionnaire (32 items), we tried to 
replicate his findings in our general population sample with separate exploratory principal 
factor analyses on these scales using obligue rotations (PROMAX). We used factors with an 
initial eigenvalue >1.00 and Cattell’s’ scree plot inflexion point to determine the number of 
factors to retain. In these analyses, items with salient factor loadings equal to or greater 
than .40 are reported. In general, the construct validity of the Dutch STAXI-2 was supported 
by a factor structure close to Spielberger’s (1999) original conceptualization (see Tables 4 
and 5). The most striking difference between our results and those reported by Spielberger 
is that our factor analysis extracted one general anger control scale instead of two distinct 
anger control scales. As we considered it to be clinically and theoretically relevant to 
differentiate between the proposed expression and control scales of the STAXI-2, and for 
international comparisons, we adhered to Spielberger’s original conceptualization in our 
subsequent analyses. 
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Table 4. Principal factor analysis with promax rotation on T-Ang in the general population sample (N = 
1211). 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
T-Ang/T   
Am quick tempered .79  
Have a fiery temper .84  
Am a hotheaded person .90  
Fly off the handle .66  
   
T-Ang/R   
Get angry when slowed down by others’ mistakes  .52 
Feel annoyed when not given recognition for doing good work  .66 
Furious when criticized in front of others  .63 
Feel infuriated when do a good job and get poor evaluation  .81 
Say nasty things when mad  .44 
   
% Variance 44.43 7.67 
Eigenvalue 4.44 .77 
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Table 5. Principal factor analysis with promax rotation on AX-O, AX-I, AC-O, and AC-I in the general 
population sample (N = 1211). 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
AX-O    
Express anger   .72 
Is someone is annoying, apt to tell him or her   .64 
Lose temper    
Make sarcastic remarks to others  .40  
Do things like slam doors    
Argue with others   .49 
Strike out at whatever is infuriating  .40 .42 
Say nasty things   .45 
    
AX-I    
Keep things in    
Pout or sulk   .48 
Withdraw from people  .43  
Boil inside, but don’t show it  .49  
Tend to harbor grudges that don’t tell anyone about  .54  
Am secretly quite critical of others  .49  
Am angrier than willing to admit  .53  
Irritated a great deal more than people are aware of  .60  
    
AC-O    
Control temper .50   
Am patient with others .50   
Control urge to express angry feelings  .41  
Keep cool .65   
Control behavior .67   
Can stop from losing temper    
Try to be tolerant and understanding .62   
Control my angry feelings  .60   
    
AC-I    
Take a deep breath and relax .73   
Try to calm down as soon as possible .80   
Try to simmer down .85   
Try to soothe angry feelings .77   
Endeavor to become calm again .82   
Reduce anger as soon as possible .65   
Do something relaxing to calm down .67   
Try to relax  .84   
    
% Variance 24.63 11.33 3.74 
Eigenvalue 7.88 3.62 1.20 
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2.3.2. Correlates of Anger in Nonclinical Samples and a Psychiatric Outpatient Sample  
Looking at Table 6, we find that the STAXI-2 demonstrates strong convergent and divergent 
validity, with statistically significant correlations in the expected direction for the normal 
samples as well as the total psychiatric outpatient sample. In general, the anger experience 
and anger expression scales were positively associated with self-reported anger, aggression, 
and hostility. Moreover, in general, both anger control scales were negatively related to 
self-reported anger, aggression, and hostility. Importantly, the strongest correlations were 
found among the STAXI-2 subscales and the Anger Scale of the AVL. Moreover, the Anger 
Expression-In subscale was not associated with Verbal and Physical Aggression, whereas the 
Anger Expression-Out scale was moderately to strongly positively associated with Verbal 
and Physical Aggression, supporting the concurrent validity.  
  The correlations with the STAXI-2 subscales and the BIS11 scales were also as 
expected (see Table 6). Attentional Impulsiveness was weakly to moderately positively 
correlated with anger experience and expression in both students and psychiatric 
outpatients. Moreover, Attentional Impulsiveness was weakly to moderately negatively 
correlated with both anger control scales in students. In psychiatric patients, we found only 
a moderate negative correlation for AC-I with Attentional Impulsiveness. Motor 
Impulsiveness did not correlate with the STAXI-2 scales in students, whereas in psychiatric 
patients Motor Impulsiveness was weakly positively correlated with T-Ang and AX-O, and 
moderately, negatively correlated with AC-O. Nonplanning Impulsiveness had weak to 
moderate negative correlations, with both anger control scales in both students and 
psychiatric outpatients. Further, Nonplanning Impulsiveness was also weakly, positively 
associated with anger experience, and AX-O in psychiatric patients. Finally, Nonplanning 
Impulsiveness was positively related only to T-Ang in students.  
 Last, the STAXI-2 scales showed meaningful correlations in the expected directions 
with the big five personality constructs of the NEO-FFI. The correlations are presented in 
Table 7. As expected, positive correlations were found between T-Ang and Neuroticism and 
negative correlations were found among T-Ang with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. 
AX-O was negatively associated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness as well, but it 
was positively associated only with Neuroticism in the general population sample. Further, 
AX-I was positively correlated with Neuroticism and negatively correlated with 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion. Moreover, both anger control scales correlated 
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positively with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness in both samples, whereas anger 
control was positively associated only with Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness in the 
general population sample. S-Ang correlated positively with Neuroticism and negatively with 
Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness in the general population 
sample. The association between S-Ang with Openness and Conscientiousness, however, 
was not found in the patient sample.  
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Table 7. Correlations of the NEO-FFI with the STAXI-2 in the populations and in psychiatric outpatients. 
NEO-FFI  S-Ang T-Ang AX-O AX-I AC-O AC-I 
Neuroticism Population1 .30*** .36*** .27*** .39*** -.19*** -.15*** 
 Patients2 .19** .31*** .10 .42*** -.08 -.14 
Extraversion Population -.17*** -.13*** -.06 -.23*** .13*** .18*** 
 Patients -.19** -.11 .08 -.32*** -.01 .05 
Openness Population -.10*** -.04 -.05 .07* .17*** .19*** 
 Patients -.08 .02 .06 .02 .05 .10 
Agreeableness Population -.29*** -.36*** -.43*** -.09*** .32*** .34*** 
 Patients -.36*** -.47*** -.44*** -.12 .29*** .23*** 
Conscientiousness Population -.27*** -.22*** -.26*** -.18*** .25*** .27*** 
 Patients -.09 -.25** -.19** -.22*** .21** .15* 
Notes: *** p <.001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; State Anger; T-Ang = Trait Anger; AX-O = Anger Expression-Out; 
AX-I = Anger Expression-In; AC-O = Anger Control-Out; AC-I = Anger Control-In. 
1N = 1211. 
2N ranges, due to missing values, from 199-205. 
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2.3.3. Differences in Experience and Management of Anger Between Clinical and 
Nonclinical Samples 
In general, we expected psychiatric outpatients to experience and express anger more 
frequently and be inclined to control anger less frequently than the respondents from the 
general population. Therefore, we compared all the mean scale scores of the psychiatric 
outpatients and the respondents from the population using one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs). As expected the psychiatric patients experienced and expressed more anger than 
the population respondents (see Table 8). More specifically, the patients reported to 
experience anger more intensely and more frequently compared with the population 
sample. Moreover, they reported to be more inclined to express their anger both outwardly 
toward individuals or objects through physically or verbally aggressive behavior and 
inwardly by suppressing anger or holding it in. Contrary to our expectation, we found no 
group differences on the anger control scales between patients and the general population.  
 
Table 8. Anger, anger expression, and anger control in respondents from the population and psychiatric 
outpatients. 
 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; S-Ang = State Anger; S-Ang/F = Feeling Angry; S-Ang/V = Feel Like 
Expressing Anger verbally; S-Ang/P = Feel like Expressing Anger Physically; T-Ang = Trait Anger; T-Ang/T = 
Angry Temperament; T-Ang/R = Angry Reaction; AX-O = Anger Expression-Out; AX-I = Anger Expression-
In; AC-O = Anger Control-Out; AC-I = Anger Control-In. 
 
  
 Population sample 
(N = 1211) 
Psychiatric sample  
(N = 224) 
F (Patients versus Population) 
 
 M SD M SD  
S-Ang 18.72 7.08 19.99 8.35 7.36** 
    S-Ang/F 6.48 2.50 7.09 3.11 14.20*** 
    S-Ang/V 6.23 2.61 6.56 3.04 4.15* 
    S-Ang/P 6.01 2.41 6.34 2.88 3.31 
T-Ang 16.37 5.03 18.39 6.21 28.53*** 
    T-Ang/T 5.63 2.18 6.52 2.61 29.61*** 
    T-Ang/R 7.61 2.44 8.17 2.82 11.25*** 
AX-O 14.76 3.90 15.47 4.83 4.63* 
AX-I 17.48 3.89 18.93 4.39 28.04*** 
AC-O 20.96 4.62 20.67 5.11 .81 
AC-I 21.23 5.03 20.88 5.44 1.11 
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  In order to investigate differences in the experience and management of anger 
among the patient groups, we also compared all the mean scale scores of the STAXI-2 using 
one-way ANOVAs with Patient Group (general psychiatric outpatients, outpatients with 
addiction problems, forensic outpatients with addiction problems) as the between-subjects 
factor. Results revealed no differences between the patient groups regarding State Anger, 
Trait Anger, and Anger Control. Interestingly, we did find main effects of Patient Group on 
Anger Expression-Out and Anger Expression-In (see Table 9). Post hoc tests using Bonferroni 
correction revealed that the forensic outpatients with addiction problems, as expected, 
were more inclined to express their anger outwardly compared with the two other groups 
(both ps < .05). Moreover, patients from the general psychiatric hospital reported higher 
Anger Expression-In compared with the outpatients with addiction problems, whereas the 
general psychiatric outpatients did not differ significantly from the forensic outpatients.  
 
Table 9. Anger experience and anger management per patient group. 
 General Psychiatric 
Outpatients  
(N = 80) 
Addicted 
Outpatients  
(N = 88) 
Forensic Addicted 
Outpatients  
(N = 58) 
F (Patients versus 
Population) 
 
 M SD M SD M SD  
S-Ang 21.30 .96 18.47 .91 21.26 1.15 2.876 
    S-Ang/F 7.68 .91 6.65 .34 7.22 .43 2.182 
    S-Ang/V 7.04 .35 5.99 .33 7.02 .42 2.976 
    S-Ang/P 6.58 .33 5.84 .32 7.02 .42 2.982 
T-Ang 19.06 .70 17.52 .67 19.24 .84 1.781 
    T-Ang/T 6.60 .30 6.33 .28 6.89 .36 .760 
    T-Ang/R 8.73 .32 7.76 .30 8.22 .38 2.384 
AX-O 15.14 .54 14.72 .52 17.33 .65 5.362** 
AX-I 20.06 .49 17.95 .47 19.20 .59 4.872** 
AC-O 20.49 .59 20.89 .56 20.70 .71 .887 
AC-I 21.09 .61 20.52 .58 20.74 .72 .790 
Note: *** p <.001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; S-Ang = State Anger; S-Ang/F = Feeling Angry; S-Ang/V = Feel Like 
Expressing Anger verbally; S-Ang/P = Feel like Expressing Anger Physically; T-Ang = Trait Anger; T-Ang/T = 
Angry Temperament; T-Ang/R = Angry Reaction; AX-O = Anger Expression-Out; AX-I = Anger Expression-
In; AC-O = Anger Control-Out; AC-I = Anger Control-In. 
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2.4. Discussion 
The main goal of this study was to further validate the STAXI-2 by (a) providing initial 
information about the reliability and validity of the Dutch version of the STAXI-2, (b) 
providing additional support for the concurrent validity of the STAXI-2 in general by 
investigating convergent and divergent validity in both normal and clinical samples, and (c) 
informing about differences between several clinical patient samples and a nonclinical 
population sample regarding anger experience and anger management strategies. On the 
whole, our results indicate adequate psychometric properties of the Dutch version of the 
STAXI-2.  
  To begin with, we expected this STAXI-2 to be reliable in terms of both internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability. In addition, we expected the trait scales to be 
somewhat more stable than the State Anger Scale, given that state anger is defined as being 
a transient emotional state, whereas the trait scales are conceptualized as stable personality 
traits (Spielberger, 1999). As predicted, the internal consistency of the STAXI-2 was 
adequate, with alpha coefficients for the STAXI-2 scales all above .70. Moreover, the test-
retest reliabilities were fairly stable and similar to previous studies using a translation of the 
STAXI-2 (e.g., Rohrmann et al., 2013). Importantly, lower test-retest stabilities were found 
for State Anger compared with the trait scales, supporting the State–Trait Anger Theory 
(Deffenbacher, Oetting, Thwaites, et al., 1996).  
  Second, the construct validity of the Dutch STAXI-2 was supported by a factor 
structure close to Spielberger’s (1999) original conceptualization. Whereas we found partial 
evidence for the construct validity of the anger expression and anger control scales, we 
found sufficient support for the construct validity of the State Anger and Trait Anger scales. 
The most striking difference between our results and those reported by Spielberger is that 
our factor analysis extracted one general anger control scale instead of two distinct anger 
control scales. One possible explanation could be that the cultural difference between 
Europe and the United States account for these results, as a one-factor solution for both 
control scales was also found for the German version of the STAXI-2 (Rohrmann et al., 
2013). Alternatively, conceptual nuances might as well have been lost in the translation 
process, despite our fairly stringent translation process. In future research consideration 
should be given to scoring the anger control items as either one factor or two separate 
factors.   
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  Although there were some minor differences between our results and Spielbergers 
data, we still consider it to be clinically and theoretically relevant to differentiate between 
the proposed expression and control scales of the STAXI-2. For example, clients high on 
Anger Control-Out frequently monitor their own anger and work to prevent angry 
expression, which might take a lot of energy and can result in passivity and withdrawal in 
situations where expressing anger assertively might be better (Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002). 
On the contrary, clients high on Anger Control-In work to calm down and reduce 
experienced anger, which might be more adaptive. Our finding that Anger Control-Out was 
associated with physical aggression and motor impulsiveness, whereas Anger Control-In was 
not in our total patient sample may be taken as further proof of the potential importance of 
differentiating between Anger Control-In and Anger Control-Out. In short, these results 
altogether show that the Dutch version of the STAXI-2 demonstrates good validity.  
  Importantly, in support of the validity of the STAXI-2 in general, we found support 
for the concurrent validity in both nonclinical and clinical samples. First, positive correlations 
were found for the anger experience and anger expression scales with the AVL Anger 
subscale and with measures of anger-related symptomatology (i.e., hostility, [attentional] 
impulsiveness, and aggression) in both samples. Interestingly, the Anger Expression-In 
subscale was not associated with Verbal and Physical Aggression, whereas the Anger 
Expression-Out scale was moderately to strongly positively associated with Verbal and 
Physical Aggression. Furthermore, as expected, negative associations were found for the 
anger control scales with anger and anger-related symptomatology. Finally, in line with the 
State–Trait Anger theory (Deffenbacher, Oetting, Thwaites, et al., 1996), trait anger was 
more strongly related to anger constructs than to other constructs.  
  Moreover, our results were in line with previous research showing positive 
correlations between Trait Anger and the anger expression scales with Neuroticism (Sanz et 
al., 2010; Whiteman et al., 2001), and inverse relationships with Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness (Kuppens, 2005; R. Martin et al., 1999; Pease & Lewis, 2015; Sanz et al., 
2010; Whiteman et al., 2001). Additionally, the anger control scales were positively related 
to Agreeableness and Conscientiousness in both samples. Finally, we also found small 
negative associations between Extraversion and the Trait Anger and anger expression scales 
on the one hand and small positive associations between Extraversion and the anger control 
scales on the other hand in the population sample. As Extraversion is positively related to 
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positive affect (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and social commitment, a negative correlation 
between Extraversion and anger is not unexpected. The finding that these relations were 
significant in the population sample but not in the patient sample may be explained by 
differences in the sample size, because the effect sizes found in the population were small. 
Importantly, the results of our study suggest that the convergent and divergent validity is 
supported in both nonclinical as well as clinical samples.  
  Finally, our study provides information about differences between clinical and 
nonclinical samples regarding the experience and management of anger. First, our study 
replicates previous studies showing that patients tend to experience anger more intensely 
and more frequently than people from the general population and are more inclined to 
express their anger both outwardly by means of physically and verbally aggressive behavior 
and inwardly by suppressing anger or holding anger in (Barbour et al., 1998; Cullari, 1994; 
De-Moja & Spielberger, 1997; Etzler et al., 2014; Spielberger, 1999). Notably, no differences 
were found between patients and the general population sample regarding the control of 
anger. This finding is in line with the study of Etzler et al. (2014) who have found no 
differences in anger control between prison inmates and the German standardization 
sample, but it is in contrast with the results from Spielberger (1999), who found less anger 
control both inwardly and outwardly for patients compared with normal subjects. Perhaps 
the patients in our samples try to control anger equally often but are less effective in doing 
so, resulting in a higher tendency to experience and express anger.  
  Further, our study showed that forensic outpatients with addiction problems tend to 
express their anger more outwardly, whereas they do not seem to differ regarding the 
frequency and intensity of their anger experience compared with general psychiatric 
patients. These results add further support to the predictive validity of the STAXI-2 because 
we would expect forensic patients to deal with their anger in a less constructive way. 
Further, these results imply that forensic patients might benefit from targeted treatments in 
which they learn how to deal with their anger in more adaptive, non-expressive ways 
because the way patients deal with their anger seems more important than the frequency 
at which it occurs. Last, our study showed that the general psychiatric patients were 
somewhat more inclined to suppress their anger or hold it in compared with the outpatients 
with addiction problems. This result implies that clinicians should be extra aware of hidden 
anger in their psychiatric outpatients in order to prevent negative treatment effects.  
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2.5. Limitations  
Although our study benefitted from the use of a large, nationally, representative sample as 
well as a large psychiatric outpatient sample, specific limitations and recommendations for 
future work should be noted. First, to better assess the construct validity of the scales and 
subscales of the STAXI-2, future studies might benefit from including a sample (with 
subgroups) of patients that primary sought treatment because of anger-related problems. 
Perhaps, the subscales and scales can be better differentiated from each other when using a 
diverse sample of angry clients. For example, while some clients might express their anger 
mostly verbally, other clients might express their anger mostly physically, leading to a better 
discrimination between the Anger State subscales. Moreover, while people from the general 
population might control their anger both outwardly and inwardly, leading to one factor, 
angry clients might use one control strategy more over the other, leading to a better 
discrimination of the two anger control scales. Second, prospective designs demonstrating 
that the STAXI-2 predicts the frequency, intensity, and duration of anger and observed 
aggressive behavior and other negative consequences would further add to the validity of 
this measure.  
 
2.6. Conclusion  
Mindful of these limitations, we can conclude from our study that the STAXI-2, including the 
Dutch version of the STAXI-2, provides a reliable, valid measure of the experience, 
expression, and control of anger, making it a valuable assessment tool for clinicians to 
conduct a proper anger evaluation. Moreover, this study adds further support to the 
usefulness of the STAXI-2 because we found meaningful differences between clinical and 
nonclinical samples regarding their anger experience and management. 
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 Chapter Three 
 
 
Trait Anger in Relation to Neural and Behavioral 
Correlates of Response Inhibition and Error-Processing 
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Abstract 
Effortful control is considered to be an important factor in explaining individual differences in 
trait anger. In the current study, we sought to investigate the relation between anger-primed 
effortful control (i.e., inhibitory control and error-processing) and trait anger using an 
affective Go/NoGo task. Individuals low (LTA; n = 45) and high (HTA; n = 49) on trait anger 
were selected for this study. Behavioral performance (accuracy) and Event-Related 
Potentials (ERPs; i.e., N2, P3, ERN, Pe) were compared between both groups. Contrary to our 
predictions, we found no group differences regarding inhibitory control. That is, HTA and LTA 
individuals made comparable numbers of commission errors on NoGo trials and no 
significant differences were found on the N2 and P3 amplitudes. With respect to error-
processing, we found reduced Pe amplitudes following errors in HTA individuals as compared 
to LTA individuals, whereas the ERN amplitudes were comparable for both groups. These 
results indicate that high trait anger individuals show deficits in later stages of error-
processing, which may explain the continuation of impulsive behavior in HTA individuals 
despite its negative consequences.  
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3.1. Introduction 
Anger is a universal, and in general an adaptive emotion that people experience regularly 
(Averill, 1983; Kassinove et al., 1997). Some individuals, however, experience anger with 
such an excessive frequency and intensity that their anger starts to interfere with daily life 
and becomes dysfunctional. For instance, high trait anger (HTA) is associated with a diversity 
of adverse outcomes, including aggressive behaviour (Bettencourt et al., 2006; Tafrate et al., 
2002), domestic violence (Barbour et al., 1998), poor psychosocial functioning (McDermut 
et al., 2009), health problems (T. Smith et al., 2004), and interpersonal problems (Baron et 
al., 2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). Given the dysfunctional nature 
of HTA, several studies have been conducted to gain a deeper understanding of the factors 
underlying this harmful personality trait (for reviews, see Owen, 2011; Wilkowski & 
Robinson, 2008b, 2010).  
 
3.1.1.  Trait anger and effortful control 
Studies on individual differences in trait anger have identified reduced effortful control as 
one of the key cognitive factors involved (Bresin & Robinson, 2013; Denson, 2015; 
Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010). Effortful control (cf. cognitive control; Luna et al., 
2004) refers to “the efficiency of executive attention — including the ability to inhibit a 
dominant response and/or to activate a subdominant response, to plan, and to detect 
errors” (Rothbart & Bates, 2006, p. 129). Effortful control is proposed to mitigate anger 
through several means. For example, it allows individuals to reinterpret hostile 
interpretations in favor of non-hostile interpretations, to disengage from hostile 
information, and to suppress angry expressions and aggressive behaviour tendencies 
(Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). According to the theory of Wilkowski and Robinson (2010) 
individuals low in trait anger (LTA) recruit effortful control resources in potential hostile 
situations, whereas individuals high in trait anger allow these resources to lay dormant. 
Importantly, effortful control is underlain by several separate but interacting 
subcomponents, including (but not restricted to) inhibitory control, and performance 
monitoring (Luna et al., 2004). The current study focuses on these two effortful control 
processes (i.e. response inhibition and performance monitoring; cf. error-processing) with 
respect to trait anger.  
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3.1.2. Trait anger and inhibitory control 
The first process, inhibitory control, refers to the ability to suppress automatic, 
inappropriate, goal-incompatible behavior (such as aggression) in favor of adaptive, 
deliberate, goal-oriented behaviour (Luijten et al., 2014; Luna et al., 2004). A series of 
studies conducted by Wilkowski et al. (Wilkowski et al., 2010; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2007, 
2008a; Wilkowski, 2011) have shown that high trait anger individuals (HTA) demonstrate 
lower inhibitory control compared to low trait anger individuals (LTA), especially following 
exposure to hostile stimuli, such as hostile words and angry expressions, on behavioral tasks 
(e.g., Stop Signal Task and Flanker Task). To our knowledge, there is only one study that 
assessed inhibitory control in HTA and LTA individuals with the inclusion of recording 
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity. Including electroencephalographic measures (e.g., 
Event-Related Brain potentials, ERPs) is important as they may provide information about 
the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms and can additionally inform about the time 
course of response inhibition. In this particular study, Liu et al. (2014) found faster reaction 
times and a decreased P3 component using difference waveforms for HTA individuals 
compared to LTA individuals, which is consistent with the idea of impaired response 
inhibition in HTA individuals. Notably, however, no differences were found between LTA and 
HTA individuals on the N2 component and the P3 component on NoGo trials, which are both 
event-related potentials often proposed to reflect inhibitory control related changes in brain 
activity (Luijten et al., 2014). Since effortful control deficits seem to become especially 
apparent when anger is primed at the behavioural level (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 
2010), perhaps inhibitory deficits on the neurophysiological level for NoGo trials remained 
undetected as the study of Liu and colleagues included an affectively neutral Go/NoGo task. 
That is, given that HTA are hypothesized to allow effortful control processes to lay dormant 
under potentially hostile situations, whereas LTA do not (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010),  
inhibitory control deficits for HTA on the neurophysiological level should also become more 
apparent following the activation of hostile thoughts. To test this idea, we sought to 
compare anger primed inhibitory control in HTA and LTA individuals using an affective 
Go/NoGo task with the inclusion of an electrophysiological measure. 
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3.1.3.  Trait anger and error-processing 
The second process, error-processing, refers to the optimization of goal-directed behaviour 
by monitoring and evaluating ongoing behaviour (Luijten et al., 2014). Error-processing is 
vital in order to adapt behaviour to situational demands and in order to optimize goal-
directed behaviour (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). As such, deficits in error-processing are 
hypothesized to lead to the continuation of inappropriate behavior (e.g., outward 
expressions of anger), despite its negative consequences (Luijten, van Meel, & Franken, 
2011). Indeed, several studies have found reduced error-processing, as indexed by both 
reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes, while using different tasks in populations with externalizing 
psychopathology that are characterized by impulse control problems. However, mixed 
results have been obtained as to what component drives these error-processing deficits. 
Whereas some studies found evidence for both reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes (Franken, 
van Strien, Franzek, & van de Wetering, 2007; Luijten, van Meel, et al., 2011; Ruchsow, 
Spitzer, Grön, Grothe, & Kiefer, 2005), other studies either found evidence for reduced ERN 
amplitudes both in community (Dikman & Allen, 2000; J. Hall, Bernat, & Patrick, 2007; 
Heritage & Benning, 2012; Potts, George, Martin, & Barratt, 2006) and patient samples 
(Munro et al., 2007b; Vilà-Balló, Hdez-Lafuente, Rostan, Cunillera, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 
2014; Von Borries et al., 2010) or for reduced Pe amplitudes in patient samples (Brazil et al., 
2009; Chen, Tien, Juan, Tzeng, & Hung, 2005; Maurer et al., 2015). Interestingly, studies that 
found evidence for reduced Pe amplitudes have been mostly conducted in impulsive violent 
patient samples, such as female incarcerated psychopaths (Maurer et al., 2015), violent 
offenders with psychopathy (Brazil et al., 2009), and impulsive-violent offenders (Chen, 
Muggleton, & Chang, 2014). Error-processing deficits on the neurophysiological level in HTA 
individuals have not yet been investigated, even though there are reasons to expect that 
impaired error-processing may be present in high trait anger individuals as well (Robinson et 
al., 2012). Hence, to our knowledge this would be the first study to compare error-
processing in HTA and LTA individuals on the neurophysiological level. 
 
3.1.4. The present study 
In short, the goal of the present study was to investigate effortful control (i.e. inhibitory 
control and error-processing) in HTA and LTA individuals on both the behavioral level and 
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the neurophysiological level, because there is a need to better understand the 
(neuro)cognitive processes associated with trait anger. To this end, we recorded EEG activity 
while participants high or low on trait anger performed an affective Go/NoGo task including 
both anger-related pictures and neutral pictures. Go/NoGo tasks are frequently used to 
measure inhibitory control as well as error-processing (Luijten et al., 2014). Regarding 
inhibitory control, event-related potential studies have repeatedly shown increased N2 
amplitudes in the frontal region and increased P3 amplitudes in the frontocentral region on 
NoGo trials compared to Go trials (Falkenstein et al., 1999; Luijten et al., 2014; Rietdijk, 
Franken, & Thurik, 2014). With respect to error-processing, two error-related brain waves 
are of interest, namely the Error-Related Negativity (ERN), and the error positivity (Pe). The 
ERN arises shortly after making commission errors and reflects initial error detection 
(Bernstein et al., 1995). The Pe follows the ERN, and reflects the more conscious processing 
or awareness of the motivational significance of an error (Luijten et al., 2014; Overbeek et 
al., 2005). Based on the literature, we expected HTA individuals to demonstrate less 
inhibitory control as reflected in more commission errors on NoGo trials, especially for 
anger-primed NoGo trials. Moreover, we expected reduced N2 and P3 NoGo amplitudes for 
HTA compared to LTA individuals; with more pronounced effects on trials including anger-
related pictures. Finally, we explored whether HTA individuals showed deficits in error-
processing as reflected by reduced amplitudes on the ERN and the Pe compared to LTA 
individuals. 
 
3.2. Methods and materials 
3.2.1.  Participants 
In total, 133 undergraduate students were recruited to take part in our experiment in return 
for course credits or a financial compensation of 10 euros. From this group, 94 participants 
were selected as high or low in trait anger. HTA participants scored 21 or higher and LTA 
scored 15 or lower on the Dutch version of the Trait Anger Subscale (TAS) from the State-
Trait Anger-Expression Inventory-2 (Hovens et al., 2014) respectively at the time of testing. 
The TAS has adequate psychometric qualities (Hovens et al., 2014; Spielberger, 1999) and 
similar cut-off criteria have been used in previous studies to select subclinical angry samples 
(e.g., Eckhardt & Cohen, 1997; Honk et al., 2001). The resulting LTA group consisted of 45 
participants (71.7% women; M age = 20.76, SD = 2.44) with a mean score of 13.13 (SD = 
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1.42) on the TAS. The HTA group (79.6% women; M age = 20.88, SD = 3.11) consisted of 49 
participants with a mean score of 24.57 (SD = 3.23), reflecting high scores (above the 85th 
percentile) on the TAS. One participant was excluded from the analyses on the Go/NoGo 
task because he failed to comprehend the instructions. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. This study was conducted according to the rules of the Helsinki 
Declaration on informed consent and confidentiality (World Medical Association, 2001). All 
procedures were carried out with adequate understanding and written informed consent of 
the participants and with permission of the local ethics committee. 
 
3.2.2.  Instruments 
The Dutch version of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 
1999; Dutch translation: Hovens et al., 2014) measures the experience, expression, and 
control of anger. The STAXI-2 contains 57 items that are scored on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 
“almost never”, 2 = “sometimes”, 3 = “often”, 4 = “almost always”). The measure comprises 
six distinct scales, i.e. State Anger, Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, 
Anger Control-In, and Anger Control-Out. In the current study we focused on the Trait Anger 
scale (T-Ang; range 10–40), which assesses the general tendency to experience frequent, 
intense, and longer episodes of anger. The STAXI-2 has adequate psychometric properties 
(Hovens et al., 2014; Spielberger, 1999). 
 
3.2.3. Anger-related Go/NoGo task 
An anger-related version of a Go/NoGo task, adapted from Luijten et al. (2011), was used. In 
this task, participants viewed a series of pictures with an anger-related or neutral content. 
Each picture was displayed for 200 ms and had a blue or yellow frame. The frame color 
indicated whether a stimulus was a Go or a NoGo trial. Response assignments were 
randomized across participants. Each stimulus was followed by a black screen for a 
randomly varying duration between 1020 ms and 1220 ms. Participants were explicitly 
instructed to respond as fast and as accurately as possible to the pictures in Go trials by 
pressing a button with their index finger, and to withhold their response for the NoGo trials. 
The task consisted of 112 different anger related pictures and 112 neutral pictures selected 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and 
Google Images. Anger-related pictures displayed scenes of angry and/or fighting people, 
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whereas neutral pictures showed similar scenes of people engaged in non-angry behavior. 
Both picture types were matched for color, gender and number of people displayed on the 
pictures. Each picture was presented four times, resulting in a total of 896 trials, of which 
25% were NoGo and 75% were Go trials. The amount of NoGo trials was equally divided 
over picture categories (i.e., 112 NoGo trials and 336 Go trials). We used a blocked design 
with four blocks consisting of 224 trials each. The first two blocks consisted of neutral 
pictures and the last two blocks consisted of anger-related pictures. This fixed order was 
chosen to prevent priming and carry-over effects of the anger-related pictures onto the 
neutral pictures. After each block, participants were given the opportunity to take a short 
break. The order of Go and NoGo trials was quasi randomized such that at most two NoGo 
trials were presented consecutively. Before starting the actual task participants performed 
23 practice trials involving additional neutral pictures. Total task duration was about 22 min.  
  The accuracy rates for Go and NoGo trials as well as the median reaction times (RT) 
for the Go trials only were used as performance measures for the Go/NoGo task. The 
reaction time data for the Go trials were calculated after the deletion of incorrect responses 
and outliers for each individual, i.e., reaction times below 150 ms or above 1500 ms.  
 
3.2.4. Procedure 
Each patient was tested individually in a silent, secluded room. Participants were seated in a 
comfortable chair, and received a brief general introduction on the EEG measurements and 
the procedures. Next, electrodes were placed and participants were instructed to sit relaxed 
and to minimize eye-blinks and body movements during the experiment. Following these 
instructions, participants completed the Go/NoGo task along with two other tasks during 
EEG recording. E-Prime software (Version 2.0; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburg, PA) was 
used to administer the tasks. Task instructions were provided before the start of each task. 
After completion of the three tasks, electrodes were removed and participants were seated 
behind a computer to complete the questionnaires21. After having completed the 
                                                     
 
21 The Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(Patton et al., 1995), the Anger Rumination Scale (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001), and the 
Ambiguous Hostile Stories Task were also administered for different research purposes, but 
are not reported here as they go beyond the goals of the present study. 
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experiment, participants were thanked for their participation. In total, testing lasted 
approximately 1h and 45 min. 
 
3.2.5. EEG recording and data reduction 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using the Biosemi Active-Two amplifier 
system (Biosemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) from 34 scalp sites mounted in an elastic 
cap according to the international 20/10 system (ACNS, 2006), and with two additional 
electrodes at FCz and CPz. Six additional electrodes were placed for offline referencing and 
for recording horizontal (HEOG) and vertical electro oculogram (VEOG) to correct for eye-
movements and blinks. The reference electrodes were attached to the left and right 
mastoids. The other electrodes were placed on the outer canthi of both eyes (HEOG), and 
the infraorbital and supraorbital regions of the right eye (VEOG). BrainVision Analyzer 2 
(Brain products GmbH, Munich, Germany) was used to process the offline data. All signals 
were digitized with a sample rate of 512 Hz and 24-bit A/D conversion with a bandpass of 0–
134 Hz, and were filtered offline. Data were offline-referenced to the average of the left and 
right mastoids. Off-line, EEG and EOG activity was filtered using phase shift-free Butterworth 
filters (24 dB/Octave roll off) with a bandpass of .15 Hz to 30 Hz. The Go/NoGo task EEG 
data were segmented in epochs from 200 ms before stimulus presentation to 1450 ms after 
stimulus presentation and 100 ms before the response onset to 600 ms after the response 
onset. Ocular correction was applied using the Gratton and Coles algorithm (Gratton, Coles, 
& Donchin, 1983). The mean 100 ms pre-stimulus period served as baseline. Artifacts were 
rejected by excluding epochs exceeding ±75 μV from the average.  
  For the N2 and P3 components the average ERP waves were calculated for artifact 
free trials for neutral Go, neutral NoGo, anger-related Go, and anger-related NoGo stimuli 
separately. Moreover, for calculating these components segments with incorrect responses 
(miss for Go trials or false alarms for NoGo trials) were excluded from the analyses. The N2 
was defined as the average activity within the 200–300 ms time interval after stimulus onset 
and was studied at a cluster of frontocentral electrodes, including FC1, Fz, FC2, FCz, and Cz 
(Luijten, Littel, et al., 2011) as the N2 is predominantly examined and observed over anterior 
scalp sites (Falkenstein et al., 1999). The P3 was defined as the average value within the 
300–500 ms time interval after stimulus onset and was studied at C3, Cz, C4, FCz, and CPz 
(Luijten, Littel, et al., 2011; Rietdijk et al., 2014). The mean number of analyzable Go and 
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NoGo epochs for the N2 and P3 components after removal of the artifacts was 270 and 68 
for anger-related pictures and 278 and 73 for neutral pictures respectively. Eight 
participants (3 LTA and 5 HTA individuals) in total were excluded from these ERP analyses 
because of less than 20 artifact free ERP epochs in at least one of the task conditions, which 
is required to obtain a reliable N2 and P3 (Rietdijk et al., 2014).  
  For the ERN and Pe components the average ERP waves were calculated for artifact 
free trials for correct Go trials (hits for Go trials) and for incorrect NoGo trials (false alarms 
for NoGo trials). The ERN was defined as the average value in the 0–100 ms range after 
response onset (e.g., Ladouceur, Dahl, Birmaher, Axelson, & Ryan, 2006; Vocat, Pourtois, & 
Vuilleumier, 2008). The Pe was defined as the average value in the 150–350 ms range after 
response onset (Alexopoulos et al., 2007; Rollnik et al., 2004). Both the ERN and the Pe were 
studied at FCz, Cz, and CPz as these midline electrodes are typically examined (Luijten, van 
Meel, et al., 2011; Rietdijk et al., 2014). To obtain reliable information for the ERN and Pe at 
least 6 trials are needed. In total, five participants were excluded from these ERP analyses 
because of fewer than 6 artifact free ERP epochs due to too few errors or due to too many 
artifacts. The mean number of analyzable epochs for the ERN and Pe components after 
removal of the artifacts was 591 for correct Go trials and 45 for incorrect NoGo trials. 
 
3.2.6. Statistical analyses 
Data were analyzed using SPSS 22.0. Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance (RM-ANOVA 
with Greenhouse–Geisser adjusted p-values) were used to analyze the accuracy rates and 
reaction time data on the Go/NoGo task, as well as the ERP indices of response inhibition 
(i.e., N2 and P3) and error monitoring (i.e., ERN and Pe). The between-subjects factor in all 
RM-ANOVAs was Group (HTA versus LTA). Several two-level within-subjects factors were of 
interest, specifically (a) Inhibition (Go versus NoGo), (b) Picture (Anger-related versus 
Neutral), and (c) Accuracy (Correct Go versus Incorrect NoGo). An Inhibition RM-ANOVA was 
conducted to analyze behavioral accuracy on the Go/NoGo task and a Picture RM-ANOVA 
was performed to analyze reaction time data in order to investigate general performance. 
Moreover, a Group × Picture RM-ANOVA was chosen to analyze group differences with 
respect to the behavioral accuracy on the NoGo trials, and a Group × Picture RM-ANOVA 
was conducted to analyze group differences regarding the reaction time data on Go trials. A 
Group × Inhibition × Picture × Electrode (FC1, Fz, FC2, FCz, and Cz for N2; C3, Cz, C4, FCz, and 
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CPz for P3) RM-ANOVA was performed for the stimulus-locked ERP analyses, and a Group × 
Accuracy × Electrode (FCz, Cz, and CPz) was conducted to analyze the response-locked ERP 
waves. Picture type was not included as a within subject variable in the analyses of the 
response-locked ERPs due to too few segments for each category. Post-hoc tests for 
interactions using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons were conducted only for 
interactions that included the between-subject factor Group.  
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Behavioral data: general performance 
As expected, participants performed less accurate on NoGo trials than on Go trials (75.6% 
versus 98.3% respectively), F(1, 92) = 349.97, p < .001, 2pη  = .79. 
 
3.3.2. Behavioral data: trait anger and performance on the anger-related Go/NoGo task 
Results show that the reaction times did not differ between both groups nor was there a 
significant Group × Picture interaction, both Fs < 1 (see Table 1). With regard to accuracy, 
participants were less accurate on anger-related NoGo trials than on neutral NoGo trials, 
F(1,91) = 27.81, p < .001, 2pη  = .23. However, in contrast to predictions, no group differences 
were found on accuracy, F(1, 91) < 1, and there was also no significant Group × Picture 
interaction, F(1, 91) = 1.35, p = .248, 2pη  = .02. 
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Table 1. Accuracy rates (in proportions) and reaction times (in ms) for both groups on the anger-related 
Go/NoGo task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3.  N2 amplitudes 
Fig. 1 shows the grand average waveforms for neutral and anger-related pictures at Fz and 
Cz for the HTA and LTA groups. As expected, a robust main effect was found for Inhibition, 
F(1, 83) = 17.53, p < .001, 2pη  = .17, on the N2 component at the frontocentral electrode 
cluster, meaning that on average the N2 amplitude elicited by  NoGo stimuli was larger than 
by Go stimuli22. Moreover, there was a main effect for Picture, F(1, 83) = 14.96, p < .001, 2pη  
= .15, indicating that the N2 amplitudes were larger for neutral pictures than for anger-
related pictures. The main effect for Electrode was also significant, F(4,332) = 31.38, p < 
.001, 2pη  = .27, with the largest N2 (−7.44 μV) at Fz. The Electrode × Inhibition interaction 
effect was significant as well, F(4, 322) = 12.58, p < .001, 2pη  = .13. Follow-up analyses 
showed that for each electrode the difference in N2 amplitudes for Go and NoGo trials was 
significant, all ts > 3.08 and all ps < .003, although this difference was somewhat smaller for 
the Electrode FC1. The Picture x Inhibition interaction effect, however, was not significant, 
F(1, 83) = 3.64, p = .060, 2pη  = .04. Importantly, contrary to expectations, no Group main or 
interaction effects were found, meaning groups did not differ regarding the N2 amplitude, 
all Fs < 3.36 and all ps > .070. 
 
  
                                                     
 
22 Peak measures yielded similar results regarding the N2, P3, ERN, and Pe. 
 LTA (N = 44) HTA (N = 49) 
 M SD M SD 
Acc Go Agr .98 .02 .98 .03 
Acc Go Neutr .98 .02 .99 .02 
     
Acc NoGo Agr .74 .16 .73 .14 
Acc NoGo Neutr .78 .12 .78 .12 
     
RT (ms) Go Agr 304 66 306 70 
RT (ms) Go Neutr 307 63 305 52 
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3.3.4. P3 amplitudes 
The P3 waveforms for anger-related and neutral pictures in both groups are displayed in Fig. 
2. Again, a robust main effect was found for Inhibition, F(1, 83) = 194.05, p < .001, 2pη  = .70, 
indicating that the P3 amplitudes were on average larger for NoGo trials than for Go trials. 
No main effect of Picture was found, F(1, 83) = 1.81, p =.182, 2pη  = .02, although the Picture 
× Inhibition interaction was significant, F(1, 83) = 15.87, p < .001, 2pη  = .16. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that the P3 amplitudes on Go trials were larger for neutral Pictures (1.11 
μV) than for anger-related pictures (0.14 μV), F(1, 84) = 20.33, p < .001, 2pη  = .20, whereas 
no differences were found with respect to picture content on NoGo trials (5.07 μV and 5.45 
μV for neutral and anger-related NoGo trials, respectively), F(1, 84) = 1.61, p = .209, 2pη  = 
.02. Moreover, a main effect for Electrode was found, F(4, 332) = 15.35, p < .001, 2pη  = .16, 
with the largest P3 at Cz and CPz (3.52 μV and 3.51 μV, respectively). Again, a significant 
Electrode × Inhibition interaction effect was found, F(4, 332) = 50.51, p < .001, 2pη  = .38. 
Follow-up analyses showed that for each electrode the difference in P3 amplitudes for Go 
and NoGo trials was significant, all ts > 10.58 and all ps < .001, whereby this difference was 
somewhat smaller for the Electrode C4. Finally, although a Group × Electrode interaction 
was found, F(4, 332) = 50.51, p < .001, 2pη  = .38, and the P3 on NoGo trials seemed lower in 
HTA individuals compared to LTA individuals yet not statistically significant (F [1, 83] = 2.76, 
p = .100), no other significant  interaction or main effects including Group were found for 
the P3 amplitudes, all Fs < 2.76 and all ps ≥ .100. Follow-up analyses regarding the Group × 
Electrode interaction revealed no group differences on each electrode separately, all Fs < 
2.376 and all ps > .14. In short, these results indicate that HTA individuals did not 
significantly differ from LTA individuals with respect to the P3 amplitude. 
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3.3.5. ERN 
The response-locked ERP waveforms at FCz for correct Go and incorrect NoGo trials for both 
groups are depicted in Fig. 3. As expected, the ERN was larger for errors than for correct 
responses, F(1, 86) = 258.40, p < .001, 2pη  = .75. There was also a main effect of Electrode, 
F(2, 172) = 50.51, p < .001, 2pη  = .38, with the largest ERN at FCz (−2.52 μV). The Electrode × 
Accuracy interaction effect was significant as well, F(2, 172) = 9.57, p < .001, 2pη  = .10. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that the difference in ERN amplitudes between accurate and 
incorrect trials was significant for each electrode, all ts > 15.37 and all ps < .001, whereby 
the difference was slightly smaller on CPz. Most importantly, no main or interaction effects 
including Group were found for the ERN, meaning that HTA individuals and LTA individuals 
did not differ regarding the ERN, all Fs < 1.05 and all ps > .309. 
 
3.3.6. Pe 
Similar to the ERN, the Pe amplitudes were larger for errors than for correct responses, F(1, 
86) = 82.31, p < .001, 2pη  = .49. There was also a main effect for Electrode, F (2, 172) = 15.71, 
p < .001, 2pη  = .15, with the largest Pe at Cz (9.18 μV), and a significant Electrode × Accuracy 
interaction effect, F(2, 172) = 17.98, p < .001, 2pη  = .17, whereby the difference in Pe 
amplitudes between accurate and incorrect trials was smallest for the electrode FCz, t = 
6.82, p < .001. No main effect was found for Group, F(1, 86) = 3.61, p = .061, 2pη  = .04, nor 
was there a significant Group × Accuracy × Electrode interaction, F(2, 172) = 3.01, p = .079, 
2
pη  = .03. Most importantly, there was a significant Group × Accuracy interaction, F(1, 86) = 
4.34, p = .040, 2pη  = .05. 
  Follow-up analyses indicated that the Pe amplitudes for errors, but not for correct 
responses, were significantly reduced in HTA individuals as compared to LTA individuals, F(1, 
86) = 4.97, p = .028.  
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Figure 1. Grand-average stimulus-locked waveforms for Neutral and Anger-Related pictures 
at Fz for correct Go and NoGo trials in high (HTA) and low trait anger individuals (LTA).  
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Figure 2. Grand-average stimulus-locked waveforms for Neutral and Anger-Related pictures 
at Cz for correct Go and NoGo trials in high (HTA) and low trait anger (LTA) individuals.  
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Figure 3. Grand-average reponse-locked waveforms at FCz for correct Go and incorrect 
NoGo trials in high (HTA) and low trait anger individuals (LTA). 
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3.4. Discussion 
The main goal of the current study was to compare anger-primed inhibitory control and 
error-processing in HTA and LTA individuals. An affective Go/NoGo task was used to assess 
both processes in the HTA and LTA group. Based on prior research, we expected reduced 
inhibitory control in HTA individuals compared to LTA individuals as reflected in more 
commission errors and reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes on NoGo trials, especially for anger-
related trials. Regarding error-processing, we explored whether reduced ERN and Pe 
amplitudes could be found for HTA individuals as compared to LTA individuals. Contrary to 
our predictions, we found no group differences regarding inhibitory control. That is, HTA 
and LTA individuals made comparable numbers of commission errors on NoGo trials and no 
significant differences were found on the N2 and P3 amplitudes. We did find consistently 
larger N2 and P3 amplitudes across groups for NoGo trials compared to Go trials, indicating 
that the affective Go/NoGo task showed the typical Go/NoGo effect. With respect to error-
processing, we found reduced Pe amplitudes following commission errors on NoGo trials in 
HTA individuals as compared to LTA individuals, whereas the ERN amplitudes were 
comparable for both groups.  
  Given that the Pe is supposed to reflect motivational salience to errors (Overbeek et 
al., 2005), whereas the ERN is thought to reflect a more automatic process of error 
detection (Bernstein et al., 1995; Yeung et al., 2004), it seems that HTA and LTA individuals 
do not differ in automatic error detection. In contrast, HTA individuals show deficits in later 
stages of error-processing (i.e., the Pe component) compared to LTA individuals. In other 
words, the current study is the first study to indicate that HTA individuals show diminished 
motivational salience to errors compared to LTA individuals. Importantly, these deficits in 
later stages of error-processing, may provide an explanation for the continuation of 
impulsive behavior in HTA individuals despite its negative consequences. The combination 
of reduced Pe amplitudes and intact ERN amplitudes found in HTA individuals is in 
accordance with previous ERP studies showing error-processing deficiencies related to the 
more conscious and later processing of errors in populations characterized with 
externalizing psychopathology, including dysfunctional anger (Brazil et al., 2009; Chen et al., 
2005; Maurer et al., 2015). Moreover, our results are in line with several fMRI studies 
showing reduced activation in brain regions related to error-processing (i.e., the anterior 
cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex) in dysfunctional angry populations (Blair, 2012; 
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Coccaro, McCloskey, Fitzgerald, & Phan, 2007; Davidson, 2000; Fulwiler, King, & Zhang, 
2012; Siever, 2008). This study adds to this literature by showing that error-processing 
deficits in later stages of processing are related to dysfunctional anger in healthy 
populations as well. However, it should be noted that, we found no group differences on the 
ERN, which is in contrast with previous studies that did find reduced ERN amplitudes in 
impulsive, externalizing populations (Dikman & Allen, 2000; J. Hall et al., 2007; Heritage & 
Benning, 2012; Munro et al., 2007b; Potts et al., 2006; Vilà-Balló et al., 2014; Von Borries et 
al., 2010). Although there is no straightforward explanation for these contradictory findings, 
it should be noted that the Pe seems to be more consistently identified as a marker in 
impulsive dysfunctional angry samples (Brazil et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2005; Maurer et al., 
2015). Moreover, it seems that our finding on the Pe was not confounded by an overall 
reduced cognitive ability (e.g., deficits in earlier perceptual or attentional memory 
processes) as groups did not differ on the stimulus-locked N2 and P3 components. 
  Our finding that HTA and LTA individuals performed equally well on our task 
measuring inhibitory control was in contrast with previous studies that showed reduced 
hostility-primed inhibitory control in HTA individuals (Bresin & Robinson, 2013; Wilkowski & 
Robinson, 2008b, 2010), but in line with the study of Hull et al. (2003) who found no relation 
between trait anger and inhibitory control. Interestingly, studies conducted with individuals 
high on trait aggressiveness, a concept distinct from but closely related to trait anger 
(Bettencourt et al., 2006; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010), have also shown mixed results 
(Denny & Siemer, 2012; Krämer, Kopyciok, Richter, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Münte, 2011; 
Pawliczek et al., 2013). One explanation could be that the anger-related pictures used in the 
current study were not salient enough to elicit sufficient recruitment of effortful resources 
in contrast to previous studies (Bresin & Robinson, 2013; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 
2010). For instance, one difference between our study and these previous studies is that we 
used anger-related pictures instead of anger-related words to prime anger. Perhaps 
individuals are more likely to ruminate on anger in response to processing personally 
relevant anger-related words compared to anger-related pictures. Thus, perhaps stronger 
effects are to be found when relevant threat-related words are used instead of general 
hostile pictures (also see Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002; Verona & 
Bresin, 2015). However, in contrast to this explanation, we did find reduced accuracy rates 
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and N2 amplitudes for anger-related pictures compared to neutral pictures, indicating 
reduced response inhibition for anger-related pictures compared to neutral words. 
  The findings regarding the N2 and P3 components were in line with a previous study 
from Liu et al. (2014), who also failed to find reduced N2 and P3 components for HTA 
individuals compared to LTA individuals. The current study adds by showing that the N2 and 
P3 component were comparable in HTA and LTA individuals, even under conditions when 
anger is primed. Although response inhibition (i.e., accuracy, N2, and P3 amplitudes) 
seemed somewhat reduced when anger was primed, this effect was evident for both groups 
and not specific for HTA individuals. Interestingly, Munro et al. (2007b) employed a 
Go/NoGo task in violent offenders and found that violent offenders did not differ from 
healthy controls regarding the N2 and P3 components as well, although there seemed to be 
some evidence for reduced N2 NoGo effects in impulsive violent offenders low in 
psychopathy. Notably, Chen et al. (2005) did find lower N2 amplitudes in impulsive-violent 
offenders compared to offenders without an impulsive-violent criminal record. Moreover, 
studies conducted in juvenile violent offenders without psychopathy also revealed reduced 
N2 and P3 amplitudes compared to controls (Guan et al., 2015; Vilà-Balló et al., 2014). 
Hence, one potential explanation for these mixed findings is that, whereas neural indicators 
of response inhibition are related to impulsive aggressive behavior, they are not specifically 
related to trait anger or to instrumental aggressive behavior. Finally, one could argue that 
our task was not sensitive enough to detect individual differences in inhibitory control. We 
consider this explanation unlikely, however, since there was considerable interindividual 
variance in this study and prior studies have shown effects with the same task (Luijten, 
Littel, et al., 2011). Interestingly, using the same task, we did find trait anger to be inversely 
related with performance accuracy as well as error-processing in a forensic psychiatric 
sample, although no relation was found between trait anger and the N2 and P3 components 
(see chapter 4). Hence, an interesting avenue for future research would be to test the 
boundary conditions regarding the relation between inhibitory control, trait anger, and 
aggression. For instance, further research is warranted that takes in account related factors 
such as impulsive violent behavior and anxiety, and by specifying subgroups.  
  An important strength of the current study is that it allowed us to investigate 
underlying processes of trait anger, without addressing confounding comorbid 
psychopathology that is often present in violent samples, such as substance abuse. 
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However, extension of the present study to clinical samples, including samples with 
problematic anger, should provide further insight regarding anger-related response 
inhibition and error-processing on the neurophysiological level. Future studies should also 
investigate the moderating impact of motivation on the relation between trait anger on the 
one hand and response inhibition and error-processing on the other hand (J. Hall et al., 
2007). Furthermore, studies might benefit from including trait anger as a covariate rather 
than dichotomizing into two groups, as this approach may be less susceptible to being 
influenced by confounds (e.g., anxiety). Another interesting avenue for future research 
would be to induce state anger and to investigate its impact on high and low trait anger 
individuals while performing tasks measuring inhibitory control. Finally, the reduced N2 and 
P3 amplitudes as well as the diminished performance on anger-related trials may be due to 
stimulus-order effects, given that participants always received the neutral blocks first. Other 
outcomes may have been obtained if the neutral and hostile pictures were presented using 
a random design (i.e., if picture type had been varied trial-by-trial). 
  In summary, our hypothesis that high trait anger individuals demonstrate impaired 
hostility-primed inhibitory control on both the behavioral level as well as the 
neurophysiological level could not be confirmed. Importantly, we did find initial evidence for 
impaired conscious error-processing in high trait anger individuals. This deficit may shed 
light on the neurobiological underpinnings of trait anger and may explain the continuation 
of inappropriate behavior (e.g., outward expressions of anger), despite its negative 
consequences. Future studies are needed to evaluate whether anger management results in 
reduced error-processing deficits. Another interesting avenue for research would be to 
investigate whether these error-processing deficits may predict treatment effects.  
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Abstract 
Inhibitory control is considered to be one of the key factors in explaining individual 
differences in trait anger and reactive aggression. Yet, only a few studies have assessed 
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity with respect to response inhibition in high trait anger 
individuals. The main goal of this study was therefore to investigate whether individual 
differences in trait anger in forensic psychiatric patients are associated with individual 
differences in hostility-primed inhibitory control using behavioral and electrophysiological 
measures of response inhibition. Thirty-eight forensic psychiatric patients who had a medium 
to high risk of recidivism of violent and/or non-violent behavior performed an affective 
Go/NoGo task while EEG was recorded. On the behavioral level, we found higher scores on 
trait anger to be accompanied by lower accuracy on NoGo trials, especially when anger was 
primed. With respect to the physiological data we found, as expected, a significant inverse 
relation between trait anger and the Error Related Negativity (ERN) amplitudes. Contrary to 
expectation, Trait anger was not related to the stimulus-locked Event Related Potentials (i.e., 
N2/P3). The results of this study support the notion that in a forensic population trait anger 
is inversely related to impulse control, particularly in hostile contexts. Moreover, our data 
suggest that higher scores on trait anger are associated with deficits in automatic error-
processing which may contribute the continuation of impulsive angry behavior despite its 
negative consequences.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Anger is seen as a negative approach-related emotion (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009) that 
typically entails the action tendency to counter or redress perceived wrongdoings 
(Fernandez, 2013). Anger can occasionally lead to positive outcomes, such as eliciting 
compliance and co-operation from others (e.g., van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 
2014), gaining a stronger sense of control, and signaling the desire to change the 
problematic nature of a situation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Moreover, diary studies show 
that people experience anger regularly and mostly solve their anger in nonaggressive, 
prosocial ways (Averill, 1983; Kassinove et al., 1997). Anger can thus be considered as a 
basic and adaptive emotion which may not necessarily be problematic, if regulated properly. 
However, anger can also lead to less desirable outcomes. For instance, uncontrolled anger 
can make people say hurtful things they later regret and serves as a proximate cause of 
violent offending and aggressive behavior (Novaco, 2011). Anger becomes especially 
dysfunctional when regulated improperly or when it becomes part of someone’s 
personality, such that it starts to interfere with daily functioning and becomes excessive in 
its frequency, intensity, duration, and expression (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010; Spielberger, 
1999). For instance, high trait anger is a robust predictor of aggressive behavior 
(Bettencourt et al., 2006; Tafrate et al., 2002), and is associated with domestic violence 
(Barbour et al., 1998), poorer psychosocial functioning (McDermut et al., 2009), and 
interpersonal problems (Baron et al., 2006). Given the negative outcomes associated with 
anger combined with society’s disapproval of angry disruptions (Stearns & Stearns, 1989), 
people are frequently motivated to regulate and control their angry impulses (Tice & 
Baumeister, 1993). Accordingly, brain regions corresponding with controlled top-down 
emotion regulation and inhibitory control, such as the lateral and medial prefrontal cortices, 
show increased activity after being provoked (Denson, Pedersen, Ronquillo, & Nandy, 2009; 
Krämer, Büttner, Roth, & Münte, 2008). Following this, it seems likely that anger-prone 
individuals lack the ability to override these angry impulses and control themselves 
(Davidson, 2000; Denson, 2015).  
  Inhibitory control is considered to be one of the key factors in explaining individual 
differences in trait anger and reactive aggression (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010). 
More specifically, Wilkowski and Robinson (2008b, 2010) propose in their integrative 
cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression that effortful control, the ability to 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
The Relation between Trait Anger and Impulse Control in Forensic Psychiatric Patients
86 
  
override dominant cognitive tendencies in favor of subdominant tendencies, mitigates 
tendencies toward anger and reactive aggression by (a) fostering reappraisal in favor of a 
non-hostile interpretation, (b) allowing individuals to disengage from hostile ruminative 
thoughts, and (c) suppressing angry expressions and aggressive behavior tendencies. Of 
further importance, they propose that effortful control is best conceptualized in terms of a 
flexible resource that can be exerted in specific contexts, such that individuals low in trait 
anger recruit sufficient effortful control resources in potential hostile situations in order to 
keep their cool, whereas high trait anger individuals do not. These assumptions concerning 
effortful control are in line with studies highlighting the impaired top-down control of the 
prefrontal cortex over limbic and subcortical regions in aggressive samples (Blair, 2012; 
Davidson, 2000; Siever, 2008) and with theories proposing that the cognitive control system 
is particularly activated under circumstances where individuals are motivated to override 
their automatic response tendencies (Lieberman, 2007). In line with the integrative 
cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression, convincing evidence has shown that 
high trait anger individuals demonstrate lower effortful control on implicit cognitive tasks, 
especially when anger is primed. For instance, using implicit cognitive tasks, Wilkowski and 
Robinson (2008a) have shown that low trait anger individuals demonstrated reduced 
interference compared to high trait anger individuals when primed with aggression-related 
words. Moreover, individuals high on trait anger showed slower response-inhibition 
processes for angry expressions and not for neutral expressions on a stop-signal task 
(Wilkowski, 2011). Finally, hostility-primed inhibitory control fostered forgiveness in both 
laboratory and real-life settings subsequently reducing anger and aggressive behavior 
(Wilkowski et al., 2010).   
  Despite these important insights, most studies using these implicit cognitive tasks 
were conducted within healthy subjects high on trait anger. Hence, there is a need for 
investigating the inverse relation between effortful control and trait anger in forensic 
patient samples, such as violent offenders. In addition, only a few studies have assessed 
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity while performing tasks that require effortful control. 
One study found reduced attentional control and diminished behavioral inhibition in high 
trait anger offenders on a continuous performance task as evidenced by fewer hits, more 
false alarm rates, and reduced relative right frontocortical activity compared to a control 
group (Jaworska et al., 2012). Another study found faster reaction times and a decreased P3 
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component using difference waveforms (NoGo minus Go) on a Go/NoGo task in high trait 
anger individuals compared to low trait individuals, suggesting impaired response inhibition 
(Liu et al., 2014). Notably, they found no differences between low and high trait anger 
individuals on the N2 component and the P3 component on NoGo trials. As both these 
studies used affectively neutral tasks, little is known about the time course of hostility-
primed inhibitory control in high trait anger individuals. The current study was set up with 
these caveats in mind.    
  The main goal of the current study was to investigate whether individual differences 
in trait anger in violent offenders are associated with individual differences in hostility-
primed inhibitory control using behavioral and electrophysiological measures of response 
inhibition. For this purpose a novel Go/NoGo task was developed including anger-related 
pictures and neutral pictures. Go/NoGo tasks are often used measures to measure the 
ability to inhibit motor responses. Event-related potentials measured in Go/NoGo tasks 
show increased N2 amplitudes in the frontal region and increased P3 amplitudes in the 
frontocentral region on NoGo trials compared to Go trials (Falkenstein et al., 1999). 
Although both components are generally assumed to reflect inhibitory processing, there is 
still ongoing debate about what these components reflect precisely and which component 
best reflects inhibitory processing. For instance, the N2 signal has also been proposed to 
reflect response conflict (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003), 
and the signaling of deviant stimulus features (Fox, Michie, Wynne, & Maybery, 2000), 
whereas the P3 has been proposed to reflect the actual inhibitory process itself (Kok, 
Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2004; Verleger, Paehge, Kolev, Yordanova, & 
Jaśkowski, 2006). As trait anger is negatively related to impulse control, we expected higher 
scores on trait anger to be associated with reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes. Importantly, in 
line with the view that high trait anger individuals recruit less cognitive control resources in 
hostile situations, we expected these associations to be more pronounced for Anger-Related 
pictures. On the behavioral level, we expected higher scores on trait anger to be associated 
with more mistakes on the infrequent NoGo stimuli, in particular for the Anger-Related 
pictures.  
  A second important aspect of cognitive control is error-processing, which allows 
individuals to select the appropriate behavior, to optimize goal-directed behavior, and to 
subsequently adapt their behavior (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, et al., 
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2004). As deficits in error-processing may contribute to the maintenance of impulsive angry 
behavior despite its negative consequences, we additionally explored whether high scores 
on trait anger were accompanied by more prominent deficits in error-processing as 
reflected by reduced amplitudes on the Error Related Negativity (ERN) and the error 
positivity (Pe). The ERN is a negative-going response-locked component that arises shortly 
after making commission errors in reaction-time tasks and has traditionally been proposed 
to reflect online-monitoring of performance either through automatic error detection 
(Bernstein et al., 1995) or through conflict monitoring (Yeung et al., 2004). The Pe is a 
positive-going response locked component after commission errors that follows the ERN 
and appears to reflect the more conscious processing or awareness of the motivational 
significance of an error (Luijten et al., 2014; Overbeek et al., 2005). Based on previous 
research showing that externalizing psychopathology is associated with impaired error- 
processing (Hall et al., 2007; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008), we expected higher scores on trait anger 
to be accompanied by reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes.  
 
4.2. Methods and Materials 
4.2.1.  Participants 
Participants were 40 Dutch speaking psychiatric inpatients from a forensic department of a 
psychiatric hospital in Belgium. Two participants were discarded from the data analyses as 
they failed to comprehend the instructions during the experiment, leaving a total of 38 
participants (25 males and 13 females). The mean age of this sample was 41 years (SD = 9.2) 
with an age range from 23 to 58 years. The sample consisted of patients with complex 
psychiatric disorders and various comorbidities who had a medium to high risk of recidivism 
of violent and/or non-violent behavior related to their psychopathology, such as theft, 
arson, robbery, drug and alcohol-related crimes, aggravating assault and battery, domestic 
violence, and murder. Patients with sexual offenses, primary psychopathy, paraphilias, or 
exclusive addiction problems are not treated in this forensic hospital and were thus not 
included in this study. This study was conducted according to the rules of the Helsinki 
Declaration on informed consent and confidentiality. Informed consent was obtained from 
all individual participants included in the study. Approval was obtained in writing by the 
coordinating Ethical Committee of the “Broeders van Liefde” hospitals. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the demographic variables, Observed Aggressive Behavior, and Trait 
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Anger for the total inpatient forensic psychiatric sample. Notably, the mean Trait Anger 
score of our sample was in the 52nd percentile of the standardized sample (Hovens et al., 
2014).  
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Demographic variables, Observed Aggressive Behavior, and Trait Anger for 
the Forensic Psychiatric Inpatient Sample.  
 M SD 
Demographic variables   
     Age 41.00 9.20 
     Males (%) 65.8%  
   
Anger-Related Measures*   
     TAS 17.45 4.71 
     OSAB-Agg 13.11 3.64 
*Note. TAS = Trait Anger Scale; OSAB-Agg = OSAB Aggressive Behavior.  
 
 
4.2.2. Instruments 
The Dutch version of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 
1999; Dutch translation: Hovens et al., 2014) measures the experience, expression, and 
control of anger. The STAXI-2 contains 57 items that are scored on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 
“almost never”, 2 = “sometimes”, 3 = “often, 4 = “almost always”). The measure comprises 
six distinct scales, i.e. State Anger, Trait Anger, Anger Expression-In, Anger Expression-Out, 
Anger Control-In, and Anger Control-Out. In the current study we only focused on the Trait 
Anger scale (T-Ang; range 10 - 40), which assesses the general tendency to experience more 
frequent, more intense, and longer episodes of anger. The STAXI-2 has adequate 
psychometric properties (Hovens et al., 2014; Spielberger, 1999).  
  The Observation Scale for Aggressive Behavior (OSAB; Hornsveld, Nijman, Hollin, & 
Kraaimaat, 2007) measures observed ward behavior, and includes the subscales 
Irritation/anger, Anxiety/gloominess, Aggressive behavior, Antecedent (to aggressive 
behavior), Sanction (for aggressive behavior), and Social behavior. The OSAB comprises of 
40 items. The staff scores the behavior of inpatients on the ward that has taken place in the 
preceding week on a four-point Likert scale (from 1 = “no” to 4 = “frequently”). The 
psychometric properties of the OSAB were evaluated in 220 violent forensic psychiatric 
inpatients and turned out to be good with sufficient internal consistency, adequate test-
retest-reliability, and good inter-rater reliability (Hornsveld et al., 2007).  
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4.2.3. Task paradigm 
E-Prime software (Version 2.0; Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburg, PA) was used to 
administer the tasks. Participants completed all tasks on windows based computers.  
 
4.2.3.1. Aggression-related Go/NoGo Task 
An aggression-related version of a Go/NoGo task adapted from Luijten, Littel, and Franken 
(2011) was used. In this task, participants viewed a series of pictures with an Anger-Related 
or Neutral content. Each picture was displayed for 200 ms and had a blue or yellow frame. 
The frame color indicated whether a stimulus was a Go or a NoGo trial. Response 
assignments were randomized across participants. Each stimulus was followed by a black 
screen for a randomly varying duration between 1020 ms and 1220 ms. Participants were 
explicitly instructed to respond as fast and as accurate as possible to the pictures in Go trials 
by pressing a button with their index finger, and to withhold their response for the NoGo 
trials. The task consisted of 112 different Anger-Related pictures and 112 Neutral pictures 
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008) and Google Images, that were matched for color, gender and number of people 
displayed on the pictures. Anger-Related pictures displayed scenes of angry and/or fighting 
people, whereas Neutral pictures showed similar scenes of people engaged in non-angry 
behavior. Each picture was presented four times, resulting in a total of 896 trials, of which 
25% were NoGo and 75 % were Go trials. The amount of NoGo trials were equally divided 
over picture categories (i.e., 112 NoGo trials and 336 Go trials). We used a blocked design 
with four blocks consisting of 224 trials each. The first two blocks consisted of Neutral 
pictures and the last two blocks consisted of Anger-Related pictures. This fixed order was 
chosen to prevent priming and carry-over effects of the Anger-Related pictures onto the 
Neutral pictures. After each block, participants were given the opportunity to take a short 
break. The order of Go and NoGo trials was quasi randomized such that at most two NoGo 
trials were presented consecutively. Before starting the actual task participants performed 
23 practice trials involving additional Neutral pictures. Total task duration was about 22 
minutes.  
  The accuracy rates for Go and NoGo trials as well as the median reaction times (RT) 
for the Go trials only were used as performance measures for the Go/NoGo task. The 
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reaction time data for the Go trials were calculated after the deletion of incorrect responses 
and outliers for each individual, i.e., reaction times below 150ms or above 1500ms.  
 
4.2.4. Procedure 
Each patient was tested individually in a silent, secluded room. Participants were seated in a 
comfortable chair, and received a brief general introduction on the EEG measurements and 
the procedures. Next, electrodes were placed and participants were instructed to sit relaxed 
and to minimize eye-blinks and body movements during the experiment. Following these 
instructions, the experimenter explained the first task. Participants first completed an 
Emotion Recognition task, followed by an emotional Stroop task, and finally the Go/NoGo 
task during EEG recording. Task instructions were provided before the start of each task. 
After completion of the three tasks, electrodes were removed and participants completed 
the STAXI-2 along with additional measures. For sake of brevity only the results for the 
Go/NoGo Task and the STAXI-2 are reported in this study. After having completed the 
experiment, participants were thanked for their participation and were given their financial 
compensation. In total, testing lasted approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes. Finally, the 
same week in which the participants completed the experiment, the staff was asked to 
judge the behavior of the patient on the ward in the preceding week using the OSAB.  
 
4.2.5. EEG Recording and data reduction 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded using the BrainAmp MR Plus amplifier 
system (Brainproducts GmbH) with a 32 channel Acticap with Ag\AgCl electrodes (Fp1, Fp2, 
F7, F3, F2, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, C2, C4, T8, TP9, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, TP10, P7, 
P3, P2, P4, P8, O1, Oz, O2, EOG1, EOG2) according to the international 10/20 system. Two 
electrodes were placed to an infraorbital and a supraorbital region of the right eye for 
recording vertical electro-oculogram (VEOG) to correct for eye-movements and blinks. All 
signals were digitized with a sample rate of 500 Hz and 24-bit A/D conversion, and were 
filtered offline. BrainVision Recorder (Brain products GmbH, Munich, Germany) was used to 
process the offline data. Data were offline-referenced to the average reference on two 
electrodes attached to left and right mastoids. Off-line, EEG and EOG activity was filtered 
using phase shift-free Butterworth filters (24 dB/ Octave roll off) with a bandpass of .15 Hz 
to 30 Hz. The Go/NoGo task EEG data were segmented in epochs from 200ms before 
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stimulus presentation to 1450 ms after stimulus presentation and 100 ms before the 
response onset to 600ms after the response onset. Ocular correction was applied using the 
Gratton and Coles algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983). The mean 100 ms pre-stimulus period 
served as baseline. Artefacts were rejected by excluding epochs exceeding ± 100 μV from 
the average.  
  For the N2 and P3 components the average ERP waves were calculated for artifact 
free trials for Neutral Go, Neutral NoGo, Anger-Related Go, and Anger-Related NoGo stimuli 
separately. Moreover, for calculating these components segments with incorrect responses 
(miss for Go trials or false alarms for NoGo trials) were excluded from the analyses. The N2 
was defined as the average activity within the 225-325 ms time interval after stimulus onset 
(based on visual inspection) and was studied at the midline frontal electrode site Fz as the 
N2 is predominantly examined and observed over anterior scalp sites (Falkenstein et al., 
1999). The P3 was defined as the average value within the 350-550 ms time interval after 
stimulus onset (based on visual inspection). The P3 was studied at the midline central 
electrode site Cz as the P3 in this task is typically observed at midline electrodes (e.g., 
Rietdijk, Franken, & Thurik, 2014). The mean number of analyzable Go and NoGo epochs for 
the N2 and P3 components after removal of the artifacts was 268 and 73 for Anger-Related 
pictures and 275 and 75 for Neutral pictures respectively. Three participants in total were 
excluded from these ERP analyses; one because of less than 10 artifact free ERP epochs in at 
least one of the task conditions and two participants as a result of their low performance 
accuracy on the behavioral data (accuracy rate below 50% on Go trials).  
  For the ERN and Pe components the average ERP waves were calculated for artifact 
free trials for correct Go trials (hits for Go trials) and for incorrect NoGo trials (false alarms 
for NoGo trials). The ERN was defined as the average value in the 25-75 ms range after 
response onset (e.g., Luijten, van Meel, & Franken, 2011; Rietdijk et al., 2014). The Pe was 
defined as the average value in the 200-400 ms range after response onset (Rietdijk et al., 
2014). Both the ERN and the Pe were most clearly visible at the midline electrode Cz, 
therefore these electrodes were chosen in the response-locked analyses (Easdon, Izenberg, 
Armilio, Yu, & Alain, 2005; Herrmann, Römmler, Ehlis, Heidrich, & Fallgatter, 2004). To 
obtain reliable information for the ERN and Pe at least 6 trials are needed (Olvet & Hajcak, 
2009; Pontifex et al., 2010). In total, 6 participants were excluded from these ERP analyses; 
four participants because of fewer than 6 artifact free ERP epochs due to too few errors or 
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due to too many artefacts and two participants as a result of their low performance 
accuracy (<75% correct on Go trials). The mean number of analyzable epochs for the ERN 
and Pe components after removal of the artifacts was 598 for correct Go trials (300 and 298 
for Neutral and Anger-Related Go trials respectively) and 47 for incorrect NoGo trials (25 
and 27 for Neutral and Anger-Related NoGo trials respectively).  
 
4.2.6. Statistical analyses 
Data were analyzed using SPSS 22.0. Missing values on the STAXI-2 and the OSAB were 
replaced with the individual participant's series mean. A Repeated Measures Analysis of 
Variance (RM-ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p-values) was used to analyze the 
accuracy rates on the Go/NoGo task with Inhibition (Go versus NoGo) as within subjects 
variable as well as for the reaction time data on Go trials with Picture (Anger-Related versus 
Neutral) as within-subjects factor. Further, Repeated-Measure Analyses of Covariance (RM-
ANCOVA; with Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p-values) were used to analyze the accuracy 
rates on the Go/NoGo task with Picture as within-subjects variable and Trait Anger as 
covariate. Finally, RM-ANCOVA’s were used to analyze the ERP indices of response inhibition 
with Inhibition and Picture as within-subjects variables and Trait Anger as covariate for the 
N2 and P3 component, and with Accuracy (Correct Go versus Incorrect NoGo) as within-
subjects variables for the ERN and Pe component. In order to prevent the covariate from 
altering the main effect of the repeated measure while running the ANCOVA, Trait Anger 
scores were centered using the method of Delaney and Maxwell (1981), i.e. using the 
individual Trait Anger score minus the mean Trait Anger score of all participants so that the 
mean of the covariate trait anger was by definition equal to zero. Pearson correlation 
coefficients were calculated for the accuracy on the Go/NoGo task and ERP indices on the 
one hand and Trait Anger on the other hand.  
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Behavioral Data: Trait anger and performance on inhibition 
Table 2 presents the accuracy and reaction time data on the Go/NoGo task. On average 
participants were less accurate on NoGo trials than on Go trials (77.7% versus 95.5% 
respectively), F(1,35) = 71.82, p < .001, 2pη  = .67. With regard to the reaction time data, no 
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differences were found between Anger-Related Go trials (M = 371.78, SD = 83.28) and 
Neutral Go trials (M = 372.93, SD = 77.04), F < 1.  
 
 
Table 2. Accuracy rates (in proportions) and reaction times (in ms) on the anger related Go/NoGo task  
 M SD 
Acc Go Agr .95 .07 
Acc Go Neutr .96 .06 
   
Acc  NoGo Agr .76 .17 
Acc  NoGo Neutr .79 .14 
   
RT (ms) Go Agr 372 83 
RT (ms) Go Neutr 373 77 
 
 One goal of this study was to examine whether Trait Anger was negatively associated 
with performance on inhibition (i.e., the NoGo trials), in particular for the Anger-Related 
pictures. Results show that on average the accuracy of responding on NoGo trials did not 
differ for Anger-Related pictures and Neutral pictures, F(1,34) = 3.38, p = .075, 2pη = .09. 
Importantly, Trait Anger was significantly associated with the accuracy of responding, 
F(1,34) = 7.89, p = .008, 2pη = .19. Moreover, a significant Trait Anger x Picture interaction, 
F(1,34) = 4.50, p = .041, 2pη = .12, indicated that higher scores on trait anger were 
accompanied by even lower accuracy for Anger-Related pictures than for Neutral pictures. 
To follow-up on these results, correlations between the Trait anger scale and the accuracy 
rates on the NoGo trials were calculated. As expected, higher trait anger scores were 
associated with lower accuracy on both Neutral (r = -.36, p =.034) and Anger-Related NoGo 
trials (r = -.47, p =.004). Moreover, accuracy was indeed lower for Anger-Related pictures 
than for neutral pictures.  
  To examine whether these effects of trait anger were specific for NoGo trials, we 
additionally explored whether trait anger influenced accuracy of responding on Go trials in a 
similar fashion. Results revealed that, similar to the accuracy of responding on NoGo trials, 
accuracy for the Go trials on average did not differ for Anger-Related pictures and Neutral 
pictures, F(1,34) = 3.78, p = .060, 2pη = .10. More importantly, trait anger was not related to 
the accuracy of responding on Go trails and neither showed an interaction with Picture 
content, both Fs < 1. 
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4.4.2. ERP Data: Trait Anger and ERP indices of response inhibition 
Another goal of this study was to investigate whether higher scores on trait anger were 
accompanied by decreased N2, P3, ERN, and Pe amplitudes and whether this effect was 
more pronounced for Anger-Related pictures.  
  Figure 1 depicts the grand-average stimulus locked waveforms for Neutral and 
Anger-Related pictures at Fz for both correct Go and NoGo trials. Contrary to expectation, 
the N2 amplitudes on Go and NoGo trials in general did not differ, F(1, 33) = 2.61, p = .116, 
2
pη = .07, and there was also no significant Picture x Inhibition interaction, F < 1. We did find 
a main effect of Picture on the N2 component, F(1, 33) = 8.10, p = .008, 2pη = .20, showing a 
less negative wave on the N2 component for the Anger-Related pictures compared to 
Neutral pictures. Importantly, Trait Anger was not related to the N2 amplitude, F < 1. As a 
general inhibition effect on the N2 amplitude was not found, no follow up analyses were 
conducted regarding the N2 component.  
 The P3 amplitudes for Anger-Related and Neutral pictures at Cz for correct Go and 
NoGo trials can be seen in Figure 2. As expected, the P3 amplitudes were generally larger for 
NoGo trials than for Go trials, F(1,33) = 67.46, p < .001, 2pη = .67. However, the P3 amplitudes 
did not significantly differ for Anger-Related trials and Neutral trials, F(1,33) = 3.17, p = .084, 
2
pη = .09. Moreover, the Inhibition x Picture interaction was not significant, F(1,33) = 1.00, p = 
.323, 2pη = .03. Importantly, Trait Anger was not related to the P3 component, F(1,33) = 3.72, 
p = .062, 2pη = .10, and no significant interaction effects of Trait Anger were found, all Fs <1. 
In sum, these results seem to suggest that Trait Anger is not associated with the inhibition 
associated P3 amplitude.  
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Figure 1. Grand-average stimulus-locked wavevorms for Neutral and Anger-Related pictures at Fz for 
correct Go and NoGo trials 
 
.  
Figure 2. Grand-average stimulus-locked wavevorms for Neutral and Anger-Related pictures at Cz for 
correct Go and NoGo trials.  
 The grand-average response-locked waveforms at Cz for correct Go and incorrect 
NoGo trials are depicted in Figure 3. According to expectation, the ERN was larger for errors 
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than for correct responses, F(1,30) = 20.27, p < .001, 2pη = .40. There was no main effect of 
Trait Anger, F(1,30) = 2.04, p =.164, 2pη = .06. In line with our hypothesis, we did find a 
significant Accuracy x Trait anger interaction, F(1,30) = 4.75, p = .037, 2pη = .14, indicating 
that higher scores on trait anger were associated with reduced ERN amplitudes23,24.  
 Similar to the ERN, the Pe amplitudes were larger for errors than for correct 
responses, F(1,30) = 22.82, p < .001, 2pη = .43 (see Figure 3). However, no main or interaction 
effect of Trait Anger was found for the Pe, both ps > .80, indicating that Trait Anger was not 
significantly related to the Pe.  
 
 
Figure 3. Grand-average response-locked wavevorms for Neutral and Anger-Related pictures at Cz for  
correct Go and incorrect NoGo trials.  
                                                     
 
23 A reviewer suggested that since trait anger is related to accuracy, accuracy may have 
accounted for the ERN effects (as there may be more errors and therefore more segments 
to average together with the possibility of attenuated amplitudes). In order to rule out this 
possibility, we performed a partial correlation between trait anger and the ERN controlling 
for accuracy, which remained significant (r = .424, p = .018). Moreover, the ERN was not 
significantly related to accuracy.  
24 Importantly, peak measures yielded similar results. Moreover, the significant Accuracy x 
Trait Anger interaction was retained when both Fz and Cz were included in the Repeated 
Measures ANOVA.  
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4.5 Discussion 
The main goal of the present study was to investigate whether individual differences in trait 
anger in violent offenders are associated with individual differences in hostility-primed 
inhibitory control using behavioral and electrophysiological measures of response inhibition. 
On the behavioral level, we expected higher scores on trait anger to be associated with 
more mistakes on the infrequent NoGo stimuli, in particular for the Anger-Related pictures. 
Consistent with these predictions, higher scores on trait anger were accompanied by lower 
accuracy on NoGo trials, and even lower accuracy for Anger-Related pictures. On the 
neurophysiological level, we expected higher scores on trait anger to be associated with 
reduced NoGo N2 and P3 amplitudes and with reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes. Contrary to 
our expectations, analyses of the stimulus locked ERP waves revealed that both the N2 and 
the P3 components were not related to trait anger. With respect to the response locked ERP 
waves, we did find a significant inverse relation between trait anger and the ERN amplitudes 
for incorrect NoGo trials, but not between trait anger and the Pe.  
  Previous behavioral studies have shown that inhibitory control is related to trait 
anger and reactive aggression, particularly in hostile contexts (Wilkowski et al., 2010; 
Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008a; Wilkowski, 2011). Most of these studies were conducted 
within healthy subjects high on trait anger and used a flanker task, leaving the question to 
what extent these results could be generalized to more pathological samples, such as 
violent offenders, and different measures of cognitive control. The current study shows that 
also in violent forensic psychiatric patients inhibitory control is inversely related to trait 
anger. Moreover, we found the same inverse relation among trait anger and hostility-
primed inhibitory control with a new measure of response inhibition: an affective 
Go/NoTask. Hence, the current study adds further support to the integrative cognitive 
model of trait anger and reactive aggression (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010) and 
converges with theories emphasizing the situation-specificity of self-control (Kerns et al., 
2004). Finally, results are also in line with other models highlighting the importance of self-
control with respect to aggression and violence, such as the I3 theory (Finkel, 2007) and the 
General Aggression Model (DeWall et al., 2011). 
   Analyses of the stimulus locked ERP waves revealed that both the N2 and the P3 
components were not related to trait anger. Given that individual differences in trait anger 
in violent offenders are related to deficits in impulse control on a behavioral level, these 
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relations are not easily explained by deficits in neural processes involved in response 
inhibition. The absence of an inverse relation between trait anger and the N2 and P3 in the 
current study seems in line with the results of the study of Liu and colleagues (2014), who 
also found no differences on the N2 and P3 components between low and high trait anger 
healthy participants on NoGo trials in a visual Go/NoGo paradigm, and with results from 
Munro and colleagues (2007b) who found that violent offenders with psychopathy made 
more errors of commission on NoGo trials, but did not differ from healthy controls 
regarding the N2 and P3 components. On the contrary, our results are not in line with those 
of Chen, Tien, Juan, Tzeng, and Hung (Chen et al., 2005), who found lower N2 amplitudes in 
impulsive-violent offenders compared to matched offenders that did not commit offenses 
of an impulsive-violent nature. These contrasting findings can possibly be ascribed to 
differences in the difficulty level and nature of the tasks that were used as well as by 
differences in the subtypes of violent offenders that were included. For instance, although 
trait anger is associated with the degree of clinical significant anger problems (DiGiuseppe & 
Tafrate, 2004), Davey, Day, and Howells (2005) showed that some violent offenders may be 
characterized by ‘over-control’ of anger whereas others may be better characterized by 
under-controlled anger. Furthermore, there are indications that especially impulsive violent 
offenders low in psychopathy demonstrate reduced NoGo N2 effects whereas violent 
offenders high in psychopathy do not (Munro et al., 2007; but also see Kiehl, Smith, Hare, & 
Liddle, 2000). Another possible explanation lies in the difference between the numbers of 
reactive and instrumental aggressors in the various research samples. Whereas reactive 
aggression is closely related to impulsivity, instrumental aggression is assumed to be more 
cold-blooded and thus less impulsive (Barratt, Stanford, Dowdy, Liebman, & Kent, 1999). As 
the study by Chen et al. (2005) in a sample of impulsive violent offenders, is the only one 
that found reduced N2 effects it seems likely that especially impulsive aggressive behavior is 
related to neurophysiological indices of response inhibition. Altogether, we propose that 
whereas reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes may be present in violent offenders, they are not 
related to the severity of problematic anger and are perhaps better explained by the degree 
of impulsive aggressive behavior exhibited. Future studies that take these subtypes into 
account should be conducted in order to test this idea. In doing so, these studies might 
benefit from including affective tasks instead of affective-neutral tasks as we found different 
results for hostility-primed inhibitory control compared to neutral inhibitory control.  
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  With respect to the response locked ERP waves, we did find a significant inverse 
relation between trait anger and the ERN amplitudes, but not between trait anger and the 
Pe. Whereas the ERN is proposed to reflect the automatic stage of error detection or 
conflict monitoring (Bernstein et al., 1995; Yeung et al., 2004) or may also reflect attentional 
control to unexpected events (van Noordt et al., 2015), the Pe appears to reflect the more 
conscious reflection or awareness of the motivational salience of an error (Overbeek et al., 
2005). Accordingly, the current study results suggest that individual differences in trait 
anger in violent offenders are related to individual differences in deficits in automatic error-
processing, but not to deficits in more conscious stages of error-processing. It seems likely 
that these deficits in automatic error-processing contribute to the continuation of impulsive 
angry behavior in dispositionally angry people despite its negative consequences. However, 
it should be noted that the current study design does not allow drawing conclusions on 
causality. For example, it might also be that reduced error-processing predisposes 
individuals to impulsive behavior, including aggressive behavior, or that impulsive behavior 
leads to less error-processing in the long run. Moreover, the relation between trait anger 
and reduced error-processing may also be explained by an underlying externalizing factor as 
previous studies have shown impaired error monitoring to be associated with externalizing 
psychopathology (J. Hall et al., 2007; Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). 
  An important prerequisite for the current study was that the Go/NoGo task worked 
as intended given that we used a clinical sample as well as that the neurological indices 
reflected the proposed underlying processes. With respect to accuracy of responding, task 
performance was similar to the pattern that is usually obtained in Go/NoGo tasks, i.e. lower 
accuracy on NoGo trials than on Go trials (71.4% versus 95.6% respectively). Moreover, both 
the ERN and the Pe were significantly enhanced on incorrect NoGo trials compared to 
correct Go trials converging with the view these ERP’s reflect error-processing. Interestingly, 
the P3 was significantly enhanced on NoGo trials compared to Go trials whereas the N2 was 
not. A possibility may be that the N2 does reflect inhibitory processing, but was not more 
pronounced on NoGo trials in the current study because we used a clinical violent sample 
who are proposed to have weakened NoGo N2 amplitudes and intact P3 amplitudes 
(Davidson, 2000). In line with this reasoning the N2 amplitudes were smaller for anger-
related pictures than for neutral pictures, which could indicate that our violent offenders 
recruited less inhibitory control in hostile contexts. Moreover, we did find the general N2 
 
101 
 
Nogo effect in undergraduate students using the same task (see chapter 3). In short, we can 
conclude that the patients in the current study performed the task reasonably well and that 
the data obtained from this study are reliable.  
  While our study benefitted from the use of a forensic psychiatric sample and the 
inclusion of affective cognitive task allowing to examine neutral and anger-primed inhibitory 
control, the present study has some limitations that are important to address. One obvious 
limitation is the absence of a control group. However, our main focus was to investigate 
whether individual differences in impulse control are associated with individual differences 
in trait anger. Second, one could question the use of self-report data in forensic samples as 
forensic patients are sometimes inclined to minimize their experience of anger and 
aggression (McEwan, Davis, MacKenzie, & Mullen, 2009). However, even if this would be the 
case in the current study this would most likely lead to an underestimation of the actual 
effects and therefore have little impact on our main conclusions. Finally, our sample was 
relatively small.  
   In conclusion, the results of the current study showed that individual differences in 
trait anger in forensic psychiatric patients can be related to individual differences in impulse 
control on a behavioral level and reduced automatic error-detection on a neurophysiological 
level. However, the hypothesis that higher trait anger is associated with lower N2 and P3 
amplitudes could not be confirmed. These results suggest that high trait anger forensic 
patients have difficulties with inhibitory control and error detection, which could explain the 
initiation and continuation of angry impulsive behavior despite its negative consequences.  
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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Recent research suggests that angry rumination augments 
aggressive behavior by depleting self-control resources. Yet, few studies have been 
conducted to empirically support this proposal. In the present study, we therefore sought to 
investigate the effects of angry rumination, relative to distraction, on self-reported anger 
and a behavioral indicator of self-control. 
Methods: Seventy-two participants recalled and imagined an anger-inducing 
autobiographical memory and were instructed to engage in either angry rumination (n = 37) 
or distraction (n = 35). Following these emotion regulation instructions, participants 
performed an affective Go/NoGo task in order to assess behavioral self-control along with 
several questionnaires to assess anger related constructs. 
Results: As expected, results revealed that angry rumination augmented anger, whereas 
anger decreased in the distraction condition. Contrary to predictions, we found no 
differences between both groups in performance on the affective Go/NoGo task. 
Limitations: A potential limitation is we instructed our participants on how to regulate their 
emotions rather than letting angry rumination occur spontaneously. 
Conclusions: The findings indicate that whereas angry rumination results in heightened 
anger, it does not seem to result in lower self-control as measured with a behavioral task 
that requires cognitive control. More research is needed to test the boundary conditions 
regarding the role of self-control in understanding rumination-induced aggression.  
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5.1. Introduction 
People differ in how they deal with provoking situations. These differences can to a certain 
degree be explained by individual differences in cognitive processes. For instance, whereas 
some individuals easily distract themselves from a provoking event and move on, others 
keep dwelling and mentally rehearsing upon the provocation and fantasize on how to get 
back. This dwelling and revenge planning process is known as angry rumination 
(Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001). More narrowly defined, angry rumination refers to 
“perseverative thinking about a personally meaningful anger-inducing event” (Denson, 
2013, p. 1). Angry rumination is typically initiated when there is a discrepancy between 
one’s desired goal and one’s actual state (L. Martin & Tesser, 1996), especially when there is 
a lack of perceived control over the discrepancy (Wänke & Schid, 1996). Angry rumination is 
often considered to be a key factor in explaining trait anger and aggression and can easily be 
incorporated in the main theories explaining dispositional anger and aggressive behavior 
(Denson, DeWall, et al., 2012; Denson, 2013; Wilkowski et al., 2010). Numerous studies have 
shown that people who ruminate on anger maintain or intensify their angry feelings 
(Bushman, 2002; Denson, Moulds, et al., 2012; Ray et al., 2008; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1998). Moreover, ample research has shown that both state and trait angry rumination 
facilitate aggressive behavior (Anestis, Anestis, Selby, & Joiner, 2009; Bushman, 2002; 
Collins & Bell, 1997; Denson et al., 2011; Pedersen et al., 2011), including displaced 
aggression towards innocent victims after a seemingly minor anger-provoking event 
(Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Denson et al., 2011). Conversely, 
distracting oneself from ruminating (Konecni, 1974) or distancing oneself during ruminating 
(Mischkowski et al., 2012) decreases anger, aggressive thoughts, and aggressive behavior. 
Another cognitive factor that takes a central role in main theories on trait anger and 
reactive aggression is self-control (Denson, DeWall, et al., 2012; Denson, 2013; Wilkowski et 
al., 2010). Self-control refers to “the capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to 
bring them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social expectations, 
and to support the pursuit of long-term goals” (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007, p. 1). A 
concept closely related to self-control is cognitive control, given that exerting self-control 
requires cognitive control. Cognitive control refers to the ability to flexibly, voluntarily, and 
adaptively coordinate behavior in the service of goal-directed behavior, and is underlain by 
several distinct, but interacting, components, including working memory, attentional 
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control, response inhibition, and error-processing (Luna et al., 2004). Self-control can be 
both regarded as a temperament based trait (i.e. the capacity to control ones impulses 
across time and situations) or as a capacity-limited commodity that can become depleted 
after repeated use (Baumeister et al., 2007). Both state and trait self-control deficits have 
been repeatedly related to aggression (DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006; Tice 
& Baumeister, 1993; Wilkowski et al., 2010; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b). Furthermore, 
patients with deficits in brain regions related to cognitive control, such as the inferior frontal 
cortex, often lack the ability to override their angry impulses and more often show 
aggressive behavior (Blair, 2012; Davidson, 2000; Siever, 2008). Adding further support to 
the causal relation between self-control and aggression, recent studies have shown that 
enhancing self-control reduces aggressive behavior (Denson, 2015; Wilkowski et al., 2015). 
In sum, both angry rumination and self-control deficits can be considered to be important 
cognitive risk-factors for anger and aggression.  
  Several lines of research provide indirect evidence that angry rumination and self-
control may be related. Using self-report White and Turner (2014) showed that effortful 
control, a concept closely related to cognitive control, mediated the association between 
angry rumination and reactive aggression. Moreover, a recent study that used both self-
report and behavioral tasks found that a disposition towards angry rumination was 
associated with deficient inhibition of related but at that time irrelevant information in long 
term memory (Whitmer & Banich, 2010). Another study conducted by Whitmer and Banich 
(2007) failed to find an association between a tendency towards rumination on anger and 
deficient inhibition in working memory, but did find angry rumination to be associated with 
difficulties switching to a new task set. Finally, evidence from neuroimaging research shows 
that angry rumination increases activity in regions related to cognitive control, including the 
(ventro)lateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, and the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (Denson et al., 2009; Ray et al., 2005).  
  Aside from these empirical studies suggesting that angry rumination and self-control 
may be related, several researchers have theorized that high self-control mitigates angry 
rumination (Denson, 2013; Finkel, 2007; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010). Interestingly, 
Denson further proposes that angry rumination may lead to the loss of self-control and 
subsequent aggression by depleting self-control resources (also see Denson, DeWall, et al., 
2012; Denson, 2009; DeWall et al., 2007). More specifically, he posits that stopping angry 
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rumination is challenging and depletes self-control resources as it requires individuals to 
down-regulate the intensity of their anger, to inhibit their angry thoughts, and to inhibit 
aggressive urges (Denson et al., 2011; Denson, 2013). Note that this account is based on ego 
depletion models of self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 2007), in which angry rumination is 
proposed to consume self-regulatory resources subsequently contributing to self-control 
failures, such as aggression, “in the same manner as refraining from eating a tempting 
donut” (Denson, 2009, P. 236). In order to answer this “causal question”, experimental 
studies are needed. To our knowledge, the only direct investigation of the impact of angry 
rumination on self-control is a series of studies by Denson, Pedersen, Friese, Hahm, and 
Roberts (2011). In one study, these researchers showed that inducing angry rumination 
following provocation resulted in higher aggression and lower self-control (as measured via 
self-report) compared to distraction (2011; study 2), and that the reduction in self-control 
mediated the association between angry rumination and aggressive behavior. Moreover, 
another study (2011; study 4) found indirect support by demonstrating that glucose, which 
proposedly replenishes the ability to exercise self-control (Gailliot et al., 2007), improved 
performance on a Stroop task relative to placebo following angry rumination but not 
following distraction.  
  Our main goal was to conceptually replicate and further extend knowledge on the 
impact of angry rumination on self-control. In order to do so, we sought to investigate the 
effects of angry rumination on anger and using a behavioral indicator of a cognitive aspect 
of self-control. More specifically, we investigated whether angry rumination influenced 
experienced anger and performance on an anger-primed Go/NoGo task. An affective 
Go/NoGo task has been repeatedly used as a measure of response inhibition (e.g., Luijten, 
Littel, & Franken, 2011; Maurer et al., 2015; Munro et al., 2007), which is considered to be 
an important aspect of both cognitive control (e.g., Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 
2004) and self-control (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Based on the work of Denson et al. 
(2011), we expected lower inhibitory control following angry rumination relative to 
distraction as evidenced by more commission errors on the Go/No Go task.  
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5.2. Materials and Methods 
5.2.1. Participants 
Seventy-three undergraduate psychology students took part in our study in return for 
course credits or a financial compensation of 10 euros. We randomly assigned the 
participants to one of two experimental conditions (Angry Rumination vs Distraction), such 
that approximately equal numbers of men and women were assigned to each condition. 
One participant was not able to come up with an autobiographical event in which he 
became very angry and was therefore excluded from our data analyses, leaving a total of 72 
participants. Thirty-seven participants (28 women [75.7%]; M age = 19.97, SD = 1.95) were 
in the Angry Rumination condition, and 35 participants (26 women [74.3%]; M age = 20.46, 
SD = 2.20) were in the Distraction condition. The study was conducted according to the rules 
of the Helsinki Declaration on informed consent and confidentiality (World Medical 
Association, 2001) and all procedures were carried out with adequate understanding and 
written informed consent of the participants.   
 
5.2.2.  Materials and procedure 
All participants were tested individually. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants 
received general instructions regarding the experiment. Participants were then seated 
behind the computer screen to start with the baseline mood measure using Qualtrics Survey 
Software (Qualtrics Labs, Provo, Utah). 
 
5.2.2.1.  Baseline Mood 
To measure baseline mood, participants were asked to rate their current emotional state on 
a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; from 0 = “a little bit/ not at all” on the left end to 100 = “very 
much” on the right end) for 21 emotions. Eighteen emotions were derived from the Positive 
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and three emotions 
(angry, afraid, and happy) were added by the first author. The items “angry”, “hostile”, 
“irritated” were averaged to obtain a single measure of anger-hostility (α = .81). The 
remaining items were used as filler items to help disguise the experiment’s focus on anger. 
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5.2.3.  Anger induction: Recalling an anger-inducing memory  
Next, participants were given 5 minutes to write down in detail on a piece of paper three 
events in which they became very angry at another person. Moreover, they were instructed 
to indicate how angry they were at the time they experienced the anger-inducing event 
(from 1 “not at all angry” to 10 “extremely angry”) and to what extent each situation had 
been solved (from 1 “completely unsolved” to 10 completely solved”). From these three 
reported events, the experimenter chose the least solved, most anger inducing event to 
discuss in more detail with the participant during an anger-inducing semi-structured 
interview. The interview took approximately 5 minutes. Participants received the following 
instructions: “In a moment we shall discuss one of the events you have written down, in 
which you were really angry, during an interview. During this interview you should try to 
relive the memory as vividly as possible. It is important for this interview that you picture the 
surroundings and the situation you were in as clearly as you can. Picture the people and the 
objects again, hear the sounds, and let yourself relive the experience as it was. Discuss 
during this interview as best as you can the thoughts and feelings that you actually felt and 
experienced. Everything you say will stay between us, so try to answer the interview as 
honestly as you can”. The semi-structured nature allowed the interviewer to activate and 
encourage the subject to go into more detail about the anger-inducing event to evoke 
strong feelings of anger. This method has been shown to effectively induce anger 
(Lobbestael, Arntz, & Wiers, 2008). Directly after the anger-induction, participants rated 
their current emotional state for the second time using the VAS scales.  
 
5.2.2.2. Emotion regulation manipulation: Angry rumination versus distraction 
Following the anger induction, participants were assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions: Angry Rumination versus Distraction. Specifically, both groups received a set of 
instructions presented on their computer screen for 45 seconds followed by six statements 
that were presented for 30 seconds each. Participants in the Angry Rumination condition 
were instructed to think back about the anger inducing memory and to focus on the 
emotional aspects. The specific instructions were taken from Fabiansson, Denson, Moulds, 
Grisham, and Schira (2012). Participants in the distraction condition were instructed to think 
about what the campus looks like (see Appendix A for materials).  
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5.2.2.3. Mood measure and emotion regulation manipulation check 
After the experimental manipulation, participants were once more instructed to rate their 
current emotional state using the VAS scales. In addition, participants filled in some emotion 
regulation manipulation checks (e.g., Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 100 what 
percentage of the time during the past 5 minutes you thought about the angry memory you 
have discussed”; see Appendix B).  
 
5.2.2.4. Anger-related Go/NoGo task 
After filling in the questionnaires, participants performed a shortened version of an anger-
related Go/NoGo Task (Lievaart et al., 2016)25. In this particular task, participants viewed a 
series of pictures with an Anger-Related or Neutral content. Each picture was displayed for 
200 ms and had a blue or yellow frame. The frame color indicated whether a stimulus was a 
Go or a NoGo trial. Response assignments were randomized across participants. Each 
stimulus was followed by a black screen for a randomly varying duration between 1020 ms 
and 1220 ms. Participants were explicitly instructed to respond as fast and as accurate as 
possible to the pictures in Go trials by pressing a button with the right index finger, and to 
withhold their response for the NoGo trials. The task consisted of 56 different Anger-Related 
pictures and 56 Neutral pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and Google Images, that were matched for color, 
gender and number of people displayed on the pictures. Anger-Related pictures displayed 
scenes of angry and/or fighting people, whereas Neutral pictures showed similar scenes of 
people engaged in non-angry behavior. Each picture was presented four times, resulting in a 
total of 448 trials, of which 25% were NoGo and 75 % were Go trials. The amount of NoGo 
trials were equally divided over picture categories (i.e., 56 NoGo trials and 168 Go trials). We 
used a blocked design with two blocks consisting of 224 trials each. The first block consisted 
of Neutral pictures and the last block consisted of Anger-Related pictures. This fixed order 
                                                     
 
25 After completing the Go/NoGo task, participants also performed an Emotional Stroop task 
and an Ambiguous Hostile Stories Task. The results of these tasks are beyond the scope of 
this paper as both tasks do not measure inhibitory control and because of the time delay 
between the experimental manipulation and performing these tasks. 
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was chosen to prevent priming and carry-over effects of the Anger-Related pictures onto 
the Neutral pictures. After the first block, participants were given the opportunity to take a 
short break. The order of Go and NoGo trials was quasi randomized, such that at most two 
NoGo trials were presented consecutively. Before starting the actual task participants 
performed 23 practice trials involving additional Neutral pictures. Total task duration was 
about 15 minutes. The accuracy rates for NoGo trials was used as performance measure for 
the Go/NoGo task. One participant was excluded from the Go/NoGo task analyses as this 
participant failed to comprehend the instructions. This participant was included in all 
remaining data analyses. 
 
5.2.2.5. Personality questionnaires  
Lastly, participants filled in some personality questionnaires to ascertain that there were no 
important trait differences between the groups that could affect the results. The Dutch 
version of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Hovens, Lievaart, & 
Rodenburg, 2014; Spielberger, 1999) was used to measure the tendency to experience, 
express, and control anger. The Dutch version of the Aggression Questionnaire (AVL; Buss & 
Perry, 1992; Meesters, Muris, & Bosma, 1996) was used to measure trait aggressiveness. 
Finally, the Dutch Version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS-11; Lijffijt & Barratt, 
2005; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) was used to measure trait impulsivity. All the above 
mentioned questionnaires show good psychometric properties.  
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1.  Preliminary analyses 
5.3.1.1. Personality questionnaires and baseline assessments 
One-way ANOVAs with Group (Angry Rumination, Distraction) as the independent variable 
revealed that the groups did not differ regarding their anger at baseline, F <1, nor were 
there group differences in how angry participants reported to feel during the recalled event, 
F(1, 70) = 1.11, p = .296, and the extent to which the recalled event had been solved, F <1. 
Lastly, there were no group differences in trait aggressiveness, F(1, 70) = 2.14, p = .148, trait 
impulsivity, F < 1, and their disposition to experience, express, and control anger, all ps 
>.124. Together, these data suggest that random assignment was successful. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
The Impact of Angry Rumination on Anger-Primed Cognive Control
112 
  
5.3.1.2.  Effectiveness of the anger induction 
To examine the effectiveness of the anger induction on experienced anger, we conducted a 
2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Group (Angry Rumination, Distraction) as between-subjects 
variable and Time (baseline, after the anger induction) as within-subjects variable. This 
analysis, yielded a main effect of Time, F(1, 70) = 133.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .66, indicating that 
participants felt more angry after the anger induction (M = 35.81, SD = 21.12) than they did 
at baseline (M = 7.81, SD = 10.21; see Figure 1). Importantly, there were no differences in 
experienced anger across the two conditions, nor was the Time x Group interaction 
significant (both Fs <1). These data imply that the anger induction was successful and had 
the same effect on both groups.  
 
5.3.1.3.  Effects of the Emotion Regulation Manipulation onto rumination and anger 
To assess whether the participants from the Angry Rumination Condition ruminated more 
than participants in the Distraction condition, we performed one-way ANOVAs with Group 
as the independent variable and the emotion regulation manipulation checks as the 
dependent variables. As can be seen from Table 1, participants that were instructed to 
ruminate reported (a) to be more focused on their angry thoughts, their anger towards 
others, and their emotional response to the event, (b) to think about the angry memory 
more often and intensively, and (c) to have more difficulties to stop thinking about the 
angry memory than participants in the Distraction Condition.  
  To examine whether the groups differed in their anger experience after receiving the 
emotion regulation instructions, we conducted a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Group (Angry 
Rumination, Distraction) as between-subjects variable and Time (after the anger induction, 
after the emotion regulation manipulations) as within-subjects variable. The analysis yielded 
a main effect of Time, F(1, 70) = 23.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, and Group, F(1, 70) = 12.09, p = 
.001, ηp2 = .15, that was qualified by a significant Time x Group interaction, F(1, 70) = 73.20, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .51. As can be seen in Figure 1, this indicates that rumination and distraction 
had different effects on experienced anger. Follow-up paired t-tests within each condition, 
showed that rumination increased participants’ anger, t(36) = 2.72, p = .010, d = .91, 
whereas distraction decreased participants’ anger, t(34) = 9.20, p < .001, d = 3.15.  
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Table 1. Means (and Standard Deviations) of the Emotion Manipulation Check Questions per Condition. 
 
 Rumination 
(n =37)  
 
Distraction 
(n =35)  
 
Main effect of 
Condition 
 M (SD) M (SD)  
Focused on angry thoughts 65.54 (17.74) 28.00 (25.73) F(1, 70) = 52.44*** 
Focused on anger toward others 55.59 (25.81) 23.29 (24.77) F(1, 70) = 29.32*** 
Focused on emotional response 66.30 (18.62) 35.29 (28.44) F(1, 70) = 30.29*** 
Considered the positive aspects 16.92 (23.11) 16.00 (21.33) F(1, 70) < 1 
Considered how to deal with 36.81 (28.54) 22.37 (27.17) F(1, 70) = 4.82* 
Reconsidered the event from another 
perspective 
31.97 (26.08) 19.51 (21.00) F(1, 70) = 4.95* 
Thought back about the angry memory 75.24 (14.70) 31.80 (26.62) F(1, 70) = 74.54*** 
How strong/intense thought back about 
the anger-inducing event 
63.78 (18.42) 38.23 (26.06) F(1, 70) = 23.29*** 
Could not stop thinking about the angry 
memory # 
4.86 (2.42) 2.94 (2.74) F(1, 70) = 9.98** 
Considered the situation from someone 
else’s perspective 
2.59 (2.39) 2.17 (2.42) F(1, 70) < 1 
# The last two questions were scored on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 whereas the other questions were 
scored on a scale ranging from 1 to 100. 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, and *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Experienced anger during the experiment per condition. 
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5.3.1.4.  Associations between rumination and experienced anger 
Interestingly, increased anger from time 2 (after the anger induction) to time 3 (after the 
emotion regulation manipulations) was associated with increased focus on the angry 
thoughts (r = .533, p < .001), anger towards others (r = .386, p = .001), and the emotional 
response to the event (r = .446, p < .001). Moreover, increased anger was associated with an 
increased tendency to think about the angry memory more frequently (r = .628, p < .001) 
and intensively (r = .495, p < .001), and with having difficulties to stop thinking about the 
angry memory (r = .395, p = .001). Finally, increased anger was not associated with 
questions related to re-appraisal, nor were angry rumination checks associated with anger 
reported at time 1 and time 2 (all ps > .115).   
 
5.3.1.5. General performance on the anger-related Go/NoGo task 
A 2 (Inhibition; NoGo versus Go) x 2 (Picture Content; Anger-Related versus Neutral) 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was conducted to assess whether the Go/NoGo task worked as 
supposed to by means of lower accuracy for NoGo Trials than for Go trials. As expected, 
there was a main effect of Inhibition, meaning that accuracy was lower for NoGo trials (79%) 
than for Go trials (98%), F(1, 70) = 212.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .75. There was also a main effect of 
Picture Content, F(1, 70) = 34.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .33, meaning that accuracy was lower for 
anger-related pictures than for neutral pictures. These effects were qualified by a significant 
Inhibition x Picture Content interaction, F(1, 70) = 20.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, meaning that 
accuracy was lowest for anger-related No-Go trials. In short, the typical Go/NoGo effect was 
demonstrated, indicating the task worked as intended.  
 
5.4. Main analyses 
5.4.1.  Effects of rumination and distraction on response inhibition  
To determine whether rumination resulted in lower accuracy on NoGo trials on the affective 
Go/NoGo task compared to distraction, and whether this effect was more pronounced for 
Anger-Related Pictures compared to Neutral pictures, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA was conducted 
with Group as between-subjects variable and Picture Content (Anger-related, Neutral) as 
within-subjects variable for the NoGo trials. The analysis yielded a main effect of Picture 
Content, F(1, 69) = 27.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, meaning that accuracy on NoGo trials was 
lower for anger-related pictures (77%) than for neutral pictures (82%). However, contrary to 
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expectation, the analysis yielded no main effect of Group, F(1, 69) = 1.89, p = .173, ηp2 = .03, 
nor a Picture Content x Group interaction, F < 1, indicating that inhibitory performance was 
not differentially affected by rumination and distraction instructions (see Table 2). This was 
also true for the first 122 neutral trials, t(69) =1.22, p = .226, indicating that shortly after the 
induction similar results were obtained with regard to inhibitory performance (suggesting 
that the duration of the task or the opportunity for ‘replenishing breaks’ during the task did 
not alter the results)26. Finally, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA revealed the groups did not differ in 
reaction time on Go trials, F(1, 69) < 1. In other words, both groups performed equally well 
on the affective Go/NoGo task.  
 
 
Table 2. Accuracy rates (in proportions) and reaction times (in ms) per condition on the anger-related 
Go/NoGo task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5. Secondary analyses: Are rumination and anger associated with performance on 
inhibition? 
To explore if the extent to which participants ruminated and felt angry after receiving the 
emotion regulation manipulations, regardless of which condition participants were in, was 
associated with inhibition performance, we examined the correlations among the accuracy 
rates on the NoGo trials on the one hand, and the rumination checks as well as anger at 
time 3 on the other hand. In general these correlations were weak and not significant (see 
Table 3), indicating that the degree to which participant ruminated or felt anger after the 
emotion regulation manipulations was not associated with performance on the Go/NoGo 
task
                                                     
 
26 A reviewer suggested that the task is quite long and potentially depleting or distracting 
(with breaks), which could have weakened the effects and muddled the interpretation of 
the study. Interestingly, a recent meta-analyses indicates that these sort of tasks do not 
result in ego depletion (Carter et al., 2015).  
 Distraction (N = 34) Angry Rumination (N = 37) 
 M SD M SD 
Acc NoGo Agr .80 .12 .75 .14 
Acc NoGo Neutr .84 .11 .81 .14 
     
RT (ms) Go Agr 256 36 276 70 
RT (ms) Go Neutr 262 31 276 56 
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5.6.  Discussion 
Recent research suggests that angry rumination may lead to the loss of self-control and 
subsequent aggression by depleting self-control resources (Denson, DeWall, et al., 2012). 
However, few studies have investigated whether this is indeed the case (Denson et al., 
2011). The present study sought to investigate the effects of angry rumination on anger and 
a behavioral indicator of a cognitive aspect of self-control (i.e., Go/NoGo task). Based on 
previous work (Denson et al., 2011), we expected lower inhibitory control following angry 
rumination relative to distraction. More specifically, we expected more commission errors 
on the Go/No Go task. However, contrary to our expectation, we found no group differences 
in the number of commission errors on the Go/NoGo task, indicating that inhibitory 
performance was not differentially affected by rumination and distraction instructions. This 
finding suggests that there are boundary conditions regarding the role of self-control as a 
mediator of the effect of angry rumination on aggression (Denson, 2013). Given that the 
present study differed in some aspects from the work of Denson et al. (2011) the current 
finding could help in identifying moderators of this relationship. 
  First, in the current study we used a behavioral indicator of a cognitive aspect of state 
self-control (i.e., Go/NoGo task), whereas Denson and colleagues used a self-report measure 
of state self-control (i.e., the State Self-Control Capacity Scale). As such, it could be the case 
that whereas the phenomenological experience of self-control is influenced by angry 
rumination (i.e., no longer feeling able to control oneself), angry rumination does not 
influence self-control as measured with behavioral tasks that require inhibitory control (note 
that the effects of angry rumination were marginally significant, p = .06 (one-tailed) on the 
Stroop task in the placebo condition of study 4 of Denson et al., 2011). Perhaps someone’s 
perception of one’s ability to control oneself (self-efficacy of self-control) is more important 
in explaining aggression than someone’s actual self-control abilities. That is, if people no 
longer feel able or not motivated to contain themselves they may subsequently exert less 
self-control than they actually could. Alternatively, it may be that certain aspects of self-
control are affected whereas other aspects of self-control are not, given that we specifically 
focused on inhibitory control in the current study as a measure of self-control. Perhaps the 
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cognitive restraint of aggression or cognitive modulation of the emotion anger may be 
affected by angry rumination whereas motoric inhibition of aggression is not. Hence, future 
studies should disentangle what kinds of self-control processes are affected by angry 
rumination and what processes are not. Moreover, there is a need of studies that distinguish 
between the effects of angry rumination on aggression via motivational processes (i.e., shifts 
in motivation orientation and attentional focus undermining self-control (Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012)) versus ego depletion accounts (failures in self-control as a result of 
exerting self-control resources from a limited resource (Baumeister et al., 2007)).  
  Second, in the current study anger was induced by means of reliving an interpersonal 
provocation instead of using an actual provocation. Anger inductions in which participants 
are directly insulted may elicit stronger inhibitory and emotion regulatory processes 
compared to inductions wherein anger is relived based on autobiographical memories. For 
instance, one could argue that because participants were instructed to think about an anger-
inducing event rather than actually being provoked, participants were less inclined to adopt 
resource-depleting strategies (i.e., less downregulation of the anger experience, less 
suppression of angry thoughts, and fewer needs to control aggressive urges) making it less 
likely that self-control was reduced by means of resource depletion. If so, we suggest that 
self-control reductions can be better explained by attempts to stop angry rumination rather 
than angry rumination itself. However, note that in clinical practice angry rumination best 
accounts for aggressive acts that were conducted over long time periods, and are most likely 
initiated by reliving and thinking about an angering event (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). As such, 
letting participants relive an anger-inducing event and ruminate about this in the lab has 
good external validity and should theoretically result in less self-control as well. For instance, 
given that anger is a negatively valenced affect (Fernandez, 2013), it is still very likely that 
participants attempted to down-regulate their anger and tried to suppress their angry 
thoughts following our angry rumination instructions. Indeed, subjects in the rumination 
condition reported to have difficulties stopping to think about the angry memory to a bigger 
extent than participants in the distraction condition. Moreover, most studies that have 
found effects of angry rumination on aggressive behavior used instructions to induce angry 
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rumination as well (Bushman et al., 2005; Bushman, 2002; Denson et al., 2009; Pedersen et 
al., 2011). Given that angry rumination in these studies was also not characterized by its 
spontaneous and uncontrollable aspects, additional studies are needed that investigate to 
which extent self-control is affected when these different kinds of anger inductions are used. 
For instance, future studies are needed in which the effects of angry rumination on past 
angering events are compared with the effects of angry rumination on more recent events 
regarding anger, aggression, and self-control.  
  Importantly, results showed that the manipulations led to the expected outcomes. 
Both groups reported higher levels of anger directly after the anger-inducing interview 
compared to baseline, indicating that recalling an angering event is an effective way to 
induce anger (Lobbestael et al., 2008). Moreover, participants in the Angry Rumination 
condition seemed to ruminate to a bigger extent than participants in the distraction 
condition. Additionally, consistent with previous studies showing angry rumination amplifies 
angry feelings, whereas distraction decreases angry feelings (Bushman, 2002; Rusting & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), participants in the Angry Rumination condition reported increased 
levels of anger, whereas participants in the Distraction condition reported decreased levels 
of anger after the emotion regulation manipulation. More specifically, the angry rumination 
condition was a mixture of provocation-focused and experiential rumination and adds 
support to Denson’s suggestion that provocation-focused rumination most likely heightens 
angry feelings (Denson, 2013). In further support of this suggestion our study showed that 
higher scores on the angry rumination check questions were associated with higher levels of 
anger reported right after the emotion regulation manipulations, indicating that the degree 
to which participants adopted these types of angry rumination was associated with the 
amount of anger felt. In sum, our angry rumination manipulation was successful, 
corroborating the conclusions drawn from our study.  
   There are some methodological issues of the current study and suggestions for future 
research worth addressing. First, the participants in the current study were nonclinical 
undergraduate students who differ from clinical populations characterized by dysfunctional 
anger. For example, it is very likely that patients with dysfunctional anger ruminate more 
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intensively and are more frequently characterized by a loss of self-control following angry 
rumination. Hence, future studies are needed that investigate the causal relation between 
angry rumination and self-control failure in more dysfunctional angry samples. Second, the 
increases in angry feelings may be partly explained by demand characteristics as we used 
self-report measures of anger. Note however that experimental research has suggested that 
effects of mood inductions using explicit instruction (i.e., not masking the true purpose) are 
not solely artifacts of demand characteristics and can indeed lead to changes in affect (Polivy 
& Doyle, 1980). Third, one could argue that the effects of the angry rumination induction 
were negated because participants first indicated their mood before starting the cognitive 
control tasks. However, we consider this explanation unlikely as participants indicated to still 
feel anger while filling in these questions. Moreover, previous studies have demonstrated 
effects of angry rumination on aggressive behavior from 8 hours up to 24 hours after initial 
provocation (Bushman et al., 2005; Bushman & Gibson, 2010). Finally, we instructed our 
participants on how to regulate their emotions rather than letting rumination occur 
spontaneously. Future studies may benefit from the latter approach as spontaneous 
rumination may implicate different processes.  
 In conclusion, our study shows that whereas provocation-focused angry rumination 
resulted in heightened anger, it did not result in lower cognitive control as measured with an 
affective Go/NoGo. This finding has implications for understanding rumination-induced 
aggression. As previous research has shown that the phenomenological experience of self-
control is influenced by angry rumination (Denson et al., 2011), it could be that someone’s 
perceived ability to control oneself is more important than one’s actual self-control abilities. 
Alternatively, it may be that rumination-induced aggression is more affected by certain types 
of anger inductions than others. Future research is needed to explore the boundary 
conditions of rumination-induced aggression.  
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Appendix A. Distraction manipulation.  
I want you to think about how the campus looks like in your mind and how you would 
describe the campus to someone who has never been on the campus before. Try to focus on 
the details in your mind’s eye.  
1. Think about how the campus looks like generally. 
2. Think about which building you can find at the campus. 
3. Think about the campus routes you normally walk. 
4. Think about the facilities you can find at the campus. 
5. Think about what makes the campus unique. 
6. Think about what you would tell others about the campus. 
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Appendix B. Emotion regulation manipulation checks:  
1. Specify to what extent during the past five minutes:  
- You reconsidered the event from another perspective. 
- You focused on your angry thoughts.   
- You focused on your anger toward others.  
- You considered the positive aspects of the event. 
- You focused on your emotional response to the event. 
- You considered how to deal with anger-inducing events. 
 
All the above questions were scored on a VAS scale with a label of 0 = “Not at all” on the left 
end and a label of 100 = “Extremely” on the right end.  
 
2. Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 100 what percentage of the time during the past 5 
minutes you thought about the angry memory that you have discussed during the 
interview (Percentage of time: ranging from 0 = “Not at all” to 100 = “Very often”). 
 
3. Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 100 how strong/intense you thought back about the 
anger inducing event (Intensity: ranging from 0 = “Not at all” to 100 = “Very intense”).  
 
4. Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 to what extent during the past five minutes you 
could not stop thinking about the angry memory (ranging from 0 = “Very easy” to 10 = 
“Difficult to stop”).  
 
 Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 to what extent you tried to consider the 
situation from someone else’s perspective (ranging from 0 = “Own perspective” to 10 
= “Someone else’s perspective”). 
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 Chapter Six 
 
 
Does Mental Fatigue Have an Impact on Anger and 
Refusal to Cooperate Following Provocation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is submitted for publication as: 
Lievaart, M., Veen, F.M. van der, Huijding, J., Franken, I.H.A., & Hovens, J.E. Does Mental 
Fatigue Have an Impact on Anger and Prosocial Behavior Following Provocation? Manuscript 
submitted for publication. 
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Abstract 
In the present study, we investigated whether fatigue caused by demanding mental activity 
leads to more anger and refusal to cooperate following provocation. Healthy participants 
either performed a mentally fatiguing 2-back task (n = 51) or watched a neutral documentary 
(n = 53) after which they were provoked by the experimenter. After participants believed the 
experiment to be finished, the experimenter asked participants a small request. Results 
showed that the manipulations led to the expected outcomes: higher fatigue after 
performing the 2-back task and higher anger following the provocation. However, fatigued 
participants did not report more anger compared to control subjects following the 
provocation. Moreover, most participants (>80%) cooperated with the experimenter 
regardless of the condition they were in. Based on the high compliance rates in this study, it 
seems to be the case that people can maintain control over their anger despite being 
mentally fatigued and provoked when motivation to do so is high.  
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6.1. Introduction 
A driver who intentionally takes the parking spot you were about to take. Being insulted by a 
reviewer on your work. Potential provocations are common, and often evoke feelings of 
anger. Diary studies show that most people experience mild to moderate anger from several 
times daily to several times a week (Averill, 1983; Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002; Meltzer, 1933). 
Although anger can occasionally be positive (for instance, it can elicit compliance and 
cooperation from others (e.g., van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2014; Van Kleef & 
Côté, 2007), it is typically viewed as undesirable. Especially in situations where the 
experienced and expressed anger is disproportional to the event that took place. For 
instance, anger is associated with the desire to harm the transgressor (Rubin, 1986; Tedeschi 
& Nesler, 1993), refusal to cooperate (Eckhardt & Deffenbacher, 1995), and can make people 
say hurtful things to the ones they like, love or rely on, subsequently damaging their social 
relationships (Baron et al., 2006). Anger is also related to workplace problems (Douglas & 
Martinko, 2001), health problems (T. Smith et al., 2004), and often precedes aggressive and 
violent behaviors (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010; Novaco, 2011). As a result of these negative 
consequences, people are frequently motivated to regulate and control the expression of 
anger in order to behave prosocially (Denson, DeWall, et al., 2012; Stearns & Stearns, 1989).  
  Fortunately, most of the times people are quite capable of regulating their anger. For 
instance, Averill (1983) showed that, although angry people often feel like being verbally 
aggressive (82% of the times) or physically aggressive (40% of the times), people resolve 
their anger mostly in nonaggressive, prosocial ways (also see Kassinove, Sukhodolsky, 
Tsytsarev, & Solovyova, 1997; Meltzer, 1933). Yet, people seem not always capable of 
regulating their anger, sometimes resulting in harmful consequences, including domestic 
violence, aggressive behaviors, and even murder. Therefore, detailed knowledge of the 
factors that determine whether people are able to control their anger and maintain prosocial 
behaviors is needed. 
  Evidently numerous factors determine whether someone is capable of controlling his 
anger following provocation. One important factor that is relevant for controlling anger is 
fatigue caused by poor sleep. Poor sleep is associated with greater irritability and short-
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temperedness, and is found to be a potential risk factor for impulsive reactive aggression 
(Kamphuis, Meerlo, Koolhaas, & Lancel, 2012). Another factor is temporary reduced self-
control as a result of ego depletion. Ego depletion refers to a state of diminished self-control 
due to previous acts of exerting self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000). The act of exerting self-control is assumed to deplete self-control resources from a 
limited reservoir of self-control, leading to decreased performance of subsequent acts of 
self-control. Several studies have shown that participants in an ego depleted state show less 
anger control following provocation than non-depleted participants, such as decreased 
willingness to respond constructively to negative partner behavior (Finkel & Campbell, 2001), 
forcing a partner to maintain painful bodily poses for longer durations (Finkel et al., 2009), 
and more aggressive responding on laboratory aggression paradigms than controls following 
provocation (DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). Interestingly, experimental 
ego depletion manipulations appear to coincide with subjective and physiological effort and 
feelings of fatigue (Hagger et al., 2010). Indeed, subjective reports of fatigue are often used 
as a manipulation check to see if the ego-depletion was successful. This raises the question 
to what extent effects of such ego depletion manipulations are caused specifically by 
engaging in acts of self-control (i.e., ego depletion) or may also be caused by a more general 
state of mental fatigue (Hagger et al., 2010; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). In 
particular because, similar to “ego depletion”, mental fatigue can result in diminished 
executive control as a result of previous demanding activity (van der Linden, Frese, & 
Meijman, 2003). The main difference, however, between the concepts “ego depletion” and 
“mental fatigue” is that ego depletion specifically refers to a state of diminished self-control 
as a result of engaging in acts of self-control (Baumeister et al., 2007), whereas mental 
fatigue can be more broadly applied as it results from demanding (cognitive) activity in 
general and is not restricted to acts of exerting self-control (Christodoulou, 2005; DeLuca, 
2005). 
  One way to examine this issue would be to examine the effects of mental fatigue on 
anger control in conditions that do not tax self-control, and therefore should be unrelated to 
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main goal of this study was therefore to investigate whether fatigue caused by using a 
demanding, mentally fatiguing task that does not deplete self-control results in a heightened 
anger prone state and anger control following provocation. For this purpose, we used a 2-
back task that has been previously used to induce mental fatigue (Hopstaken, van der 
Linden, Bakker, & Kompier, 2015). We chose to use the 2-back task because this measure 
requires updating of working memory representations and subsequently leads to mental 
fatigue (Hopstaken et al., 2015; Schmeichel, 2007), but requires little active inhibition or 
suppression of automatic tendencies and impulses (Miyake et al., 2000; Young et al., 2009), 
and therefore should not result in ego depletion. We expected that individuals who 
performed the fatiguing mental task would experience more anger following provocation 
than the non-fatigued individuals. Furthermore, we expected that the mentally fatigued 
individuals would be more likely to refuse to cooperate with the experimenter than the 
control group, given that anger is associated with refusal to cooperate (Eckhardt & 
Deffenbacher, 1995).  
 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Participants and design 
One hundred and ten participants (undergraduate students) took part in our study in return 
for course credits. One participant was not able to complete the study due to illness and was 
therefore removed from our dataset. Moreover, 5 participants were excluded from our 
dataset due to expressed suspicion about the provocation procedure. This left a total of 104 
participants (67 women and 37 men; M age = 21, SD = 3.45). We randomly assigned the 
participants to one of two experimental conditions (Mental Fatigue Condition versus Neutral 
Condition)27, such that approximately equal numbers of men and women were assigned to 
                                                     
 
27 Initially, this study had a 2 (Fatigue) x 2 (Reward) design. Given that the effect of the 
reward manipulation was insignificant and participants in the Mental Fatigue Condition or 
Neutral Condition followed the exact same procedure (performing a 2 back task versus 
watching a documentary) until the last part of the experiment where the experimenter 
requested participants for help, data was combined for both groups in the Mental Fatigue 
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each condition, χ² (1) = 0.03, p =.953. Fifty-one participants (33 women [64.7%]; M age = 
20.96, SD = 3.83) were in the Mental Fatigue Condition and fifty-three participants (34 
women [64.2%]; M age = 21.06, SD = 3.07) were in the Neutral Condition. There were no 
differences in age, trait anger, and agreeableness (all Fs < 1), indicating random assignment 
was successful.  
  Approval for this study was obtained from the Ethical Committee of the department 
of psychology of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Participation was based on a voluntary 
basis and participants were free to refrain from participation at any point-in-time. 
 
6.2.2. Materials and procedure 
All participants were tested individually. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants received 
general instructions regarding the experiment and were asked to hand in their mobile 
phones and watches to make sure they could not keep track of the time during the 
experiment. Participants were then seated behind the computer screen to start with the 
baseline mood measure using Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics Labs, Provo, Utah).  
 
6.2.3.  Baseline mood 
Baseline mood was measured using the shortened version of the Dutch Profile of Mood 
States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971; Mellenbergh & Wald, 1990). The POMS 
comprises 32 items divided over five scales measuring general affective mood states, i.e. 
tension-anxiety, depression-dejection, anger-hostility, vigor-activity, fatigue-inertia. This five-
factor model shows a good fit (Wicherts & Vorst, 2004). For each item participants were 
instructed to indicate their current mood state on a visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 
0 to 100 with two opposite words on each end (for example, 0 = “active” on the left end and 
100 = “passive” on the right end). The subscales were formed by reverse scoring each item 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Condition as well as for both groups in the Neutral Condition (i.e., Mental Fatigue Condition 
vs Neutral Condition). 
Chapter Six
 130 
  
each condition, χ² (1) = 0.03, p =.953. Fifty-one participants (33 women [64.7%]; M age = 
20.96, SD = 3.83) were in the Mental Fatigue Condition and fifty-three participants (34 
women [64.2%]; M age = 21.06, SD = 3.07) were in the Neutral Condition. There were no 
differences in age, trait anger, and agreeableness (all Fs < 1), indicating random assignment 
was successful.  
  Approval for this study was obtained from the Ethical Committee of the department 
of psychology of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Participation was based on a voluntary 
basis and participants were free to refrain from participation at any point-in-time. 
 
6.2.2. Materials and procedure 
All participants were tested individually. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants received 
general instructions regarding the experiment and were asked to hand in their mobile 
phones and watches to make sure they could not keep track of the time during the 
experiment. Participants were then seated behind the computer screen to start with the 
baseline mood measure using Qualtrics Survey Software (Qualtrics Labs, Provo, Utah).  
 
6.2.3.  Baseline mood 
Baseline mood was measured using the shortened version of the Dutch Profile of Mood 
States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971; Mellenbergh & Wald, 1990). The POMS 
comprises 32 items divided over five scales measuring general affective mood states, i.e. 
tension-anxiety, depression-dejection, anger-hostility, vigor-activity, fatigue-inertia. This five-
factor model shows a good fit (Wicherts & Vorst, 2004). For each item participants were 
instructed to indicate their current mood state on a visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 
0 to 100 with two opposite words on each end (for example, 0 = “active” on the left end and 
100 = “passive” on the right end). The subscales were formed by reverse scoring each item 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Condition as well as for both groups in the Neutral Condition (i.e., Mental Fatigue Condition 
vs Neutral Condition). 
 
131 
 
and computing the mean of the items for each subscale (see Table 1). For this study only the 
anger-hostility, vigor-activity, and fatigue-inertia subscales were used.  
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6.2.4. Manipulation of mental fatigue 
Participants were then randomly assigned to either a Mental Fatigue Condition or a Neutral 
Condition. Participants were told that we were developing a new intelligence test and that 
we wanted to study if we could influence results by priming the participants. We told them 
that we primed their intelligence by (a) performing a mentally challenging test, or by (b) 
watching an informative documentary, depending on which condition the participant was in.  
  Participants in the Mental Fatigue Condition then performed a visual letter 2-back 
task to induce a state of mental fatigue. They were asked to decide whether the letter 
presented on the screen was a target or non-target stimulus. In the 2-back task a stimulus is 
a target when the presented letter is the same as the letter presented 2 letters before. The 
stimuli were presented in the center of the screen and consisted of the letters B, C, D, E, G, J, 
P, T, V, and W in the font Palatino Linotype point size 40. In the Dutch language these letters 
are phonologically similar in order to prevent sound-related retrieval strategies. The letters 
were presented randomly with a target rate of 25%. The task lasted approximately one hour.  
  Participants in the Neutral Condition watched a documentary to induce a neutral, 
non-fatigued state. They could choose from four BBC documentaries, chosen as they had the 
same duration as the 2-back task and for their neutral contents. Participants were given 
choice out of the documentaries to make sure they were interested and to increase external 
validity (e.g., watching television to rest after an intensive day at work). A similar design has 
successfully been used in previous studies on mental fatigue (Marcora, Staiano, & Manning, 
2009). After the fatigue induction participants rated their current emotional mood state 
using the POMS. This was followed by an anger induction. 
 
6.2.5. Anger induction: the Trivial Pursuit task 
Participants had to perform a frustrating task while being harassed by the experimenter. 
Participants received the following instructions: “Soon a few questions appear on your 
screen, with two possible answer categories. You can answer the questions by pressing the 
corresponding button on your keyboard. You will receive feedback whether your answer is 
correct or not. This task is a new intelligence measure that appears to be reliable and doesn’t 
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take as much time as other intelligence measures, such as the WAIS (Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale). At the end of this task, you will receive your score and corresponding IQ. 
To make sure you will do your best, you can earn 25 euros if you reach the top twenty 
percent of the general population. Most undergraduate students think the test is doable and 
score above average to high. So give it your best shot”. However, the questions in this task 
were trivial pursuit type of questions and the feedback was manipulated in such a way that 
all participants made 17 errors and received a corresponding IQ of 107, so that they were 
not able to reach the bonus score. Moreover, from the 17 answers that were displayed as 
wrong, four questions were easy to answer and obviously not wrong, which were included to 
induce a sense of injustice. The experimenter harassed the participant in multiple ways. At 
the start of the task, the experimenter stood closely behind the participant while smacking 
on his chewing gum. After the participant made a predetermined mistake (after one minute), 
the experimenter walked back towards his computer and made the following remark: “You 
should try better otherwise this will come to nothing”. After two minutes the experimenter 
let a phone ring three times in a row, before picking it up and leaving the room, saying: “Hi. 
Can I call you back later? I am in the middle of an experiment. Ok, bye”. When re-entering 
the room the experimenter monitored the participant shortly until the participant made 
another mistake, making a final remark: “Well, I think you can forget about those 25 euros”. 
At the end of the test, participants were given the following feedback: “Okay, let’s take a 
look at your IQ. You have made 17 errors; hence you score an IQ of 107. This score falls 
within the sixtieth percentile, which is an average score. In itself it is not so bad, but if you 
compare your score to the average IQ of undergraduate students, it is not so good either. 
You probably saw this coming, but you scored too low to get the extra reward”. This method 
was adapted from Lobbestael, Arntz, and Wiers (2008) and has previously shown to 
effectively induce anger. After the anger induction participants were asked to rate their 
current emotional state on the POMS once more before they were told they were finished.  
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6.2.6.  Request 
As the participants were about to leave the room and thought the experiment was finished, 
the experimenter asked all participants for a small favor, to see whether participants were 
still willing to cooperate after being provoked by the experimenter. Participants received the 
following request: “Before you leave. Can I ask you something? For my own master thesis I 
need to test participants as well. My deadline is next week already and I still need to test 10 
subjects. It concerns a task on the computer that takes 15 minutes. Would you like to help 
me?”. Half of the participants received the same request with the addition of a promise of a 
reward: “I will give you a half hour of course credits in return”. The response of the 
participant was coded categorically as “1 = Yes” or “0 = No”. After participants gave a 
response to the request, they were debriefed about the actual goal of the study. During this 
debriefing we also checked for suspicion. Next, participants were scheduled for session 2 to 
fill in two questionnaires to control for potential confounds on experienced anger and 
helping behavior: the Dutch version of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2, 
Hovens, Lievaart, & Rodenburg, 2014; Spielberger, 1999) measuring trait anger and the 
Dutch version of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Hoekstra, 
Ormel, & De Fruyt, 1996) measuring agreeableness. Session 2 was scheduled around a week 
later to avoid carry over effects of the anger induction while filling in the questionnaires.  
 
6.2.7. Data analyses 
An α of .05 was adopted for all analyses. Mixed ANOVAs were performed to test the 
hypotheses. Pearson’s r is reported for the follow up t-tests and planned contrasts as a 
measure of effect size. 
 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Manipulation check: Fatigue and Vigor-activity 
In order to test whether our manipulation led to a state of mental fatigue, mixed ANOVAs 
with ratings of fatigue and vigor-activity as the dependent variables were conducted. The 
baseline and post mental fatigue manipulation mood ratings are provided in Table 1.  
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  A 2x2 (Group x Time) mixed ANOVA on the fatigue ratings revealed a main effect of 
Time, F(1, 102) = 82.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .45 , Group, F(1, 102) = 10.40, p =.002, ηp2 = .09, and 
the expected Group x Time interaction, F(1, 102) = 23.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Because we 
expected no increase in ratings of fatigue from baseline to after watching the documentary 
for the Neutral Condition and an increase in ratings of fatigue from baseline to after 
performing the 2-back task for the Mental Fatigue Condition, we conducted follow-up tests 
within each group. These tests examined whether fatigue ratings following the manipulation 
(2-back versus documentary) were increased from baseline. There was an increase in ratings 
of fatigue from baseline to after the mental fatigue manipulation in both the Neutral 
Condition and Mental Fatigue Condition, respectively t(52) = 3.72, p < .001, r = .46 and t(50) 
= 8.40, p <.001, r =.77. Importantly, participants in the Mental Fatigue Condition reported 
higher ratings of fatigue compared to the participants in the Neutral Condition right after the 
Mental Fatigue manipulation, t(102) = 5.24, p < .001, r = .46, whereas groups did not differ 
on baseline, t(102) = = .707, p = .481, r = .07. Similar results were found for the vigor-activity 
subscale (see Table 1)28. In summary, these data suggest the mental fatigue manipulation 
was successful.           
 
6.3.2. Manipulation check: anger experienced during the experiment 
A 2x3 (Group x Time) mixed ANOVA was conducted to assess whether our anger induction 
resulted in more experienced anger and to see whether the effects of the anger induction 
were different for both groups. This analysis yielded a main effect of Time, F(2, 204) = 27.73, 
p < .001, ηp2= .21, Group, F(1, 102) = 8.35, p = .005, ηp2 = .08, and the expected Group x Time 
interaction, F(2, 204) = 15.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Next, we conducted a planned contrast 
comparing anger on baseline with reported anger at time 2 (after watching documentary or 
performing the 2-back task), and reported anger at time 3 (after the anger induction). As 
expected, planned contrast revealed an increase in anger from baseline to time 2 (after 
                                                     
 
28 For brevity the specific results are not reported here. Results can be obtained from the 
first author. 
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watching documentary or performing the 2-back task), F(1, 102) = 28.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .22 
as well as an expected increase in experienced anger from time 2 to time 3 (after the anger 
induction), F(1, 102) = 6.62, p = .011, ηp2 = .06. Importantly, follow up paired t-tests showed 
that the participants in the Neutral Condition, according to expectation, reported no 
increase in their experienced anger after watching the documentary, t(52) = 1.08, p = .285, r 
= .15, whereas the anger induction in this group resulted in more experienced anger, t(52) = 
4.14, p < .001, r = .50, indicating that the anger induction was successful. Moreover, the 
participants in the Mental Fatigue Condition experienced more anger directly after 
completing the 2-back task compared to baseline, t(50) = 6.12, p < .001, r = .65, whereby, 
although participants stayed angry, the anger induction had no additional effect on the 
experienced anger, t(50) = 0.57, p = .574, r = .08, indicating that performing the fatiguing 
task resulted in higher anger that remained till after the anger induction. Finally, numerically 
the participants from the Mental Fatigue Condition (M = 36.64, SD = 21.79) reported more 
anger after the anger induction than the participants from the Neutral Condition (M = 28.88, 
SD = 18.39); however, this difference was not statistically significant (t(102) = 1.96, p = .052, r 
= .19).  
 Importantly, the effect of both manipulations (mental fatigue manipulation and 
anger induction) resulted in the expected outcomes, participants in the Mental Fatigue 
Condition were more fatigued and reported less vigor than participants in the Neutral 
Condition, and after the anger induction all participants were angrier than at baseline. 
However, contrary to expectation the participants in the Mental Fatigue Condition did not 
experience more anger following provocation than the non-fatigued individuals. 
 
6.4. Refusal to cooperate with the experimenter in response to provocation  
To examine whether demanding mental activity leads to a higher likelihood of refusing to 
cooperate with the experimenter following provocation, we performed a Pearson Chi-Square 
test with Group and Cooperation as variables. We expected participants in the Mental 
Fatigue Condition to refuse to cooperate with the experimenter more often compared to the 
Neutral Condition. Unexpectedly, there was no significant association between the condition 
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participants were in and whether or not participants refused to cooperate, χ² (1) = 0.32, p = 
.858. Interestingly, in both conditions more than eighty percent of the participants were 
willing to cooperate with the experimenter despite the previous provocations (83.0% and 
84.3% for the Neutral Condition and Mental Fatigue Condition respectively).  
 
6.3.3. Mood state in relation to refusal to cooperate with the experimenter following 
provocation 
To explore whether the participants who were not willing to cooperate with the 
experimenter (n = 17), differed in their mood state from the helping participants, we 
performed three separate independent sample t-tests with cooperation as the independent 
variable and ratings of fatigue, vigor, and anger reported right after the anger induction as 
the dependent variables. The cooperating participants did not differ from the refusing 
participants in their emotional states, all ts (102) < 1.  
 
6.4. Discussion 
The main goal of this study was to investigate whether fatigue caused by using a demanding 
mentally fatiguing task that does not deplete self-control results in a heightened anger prone 
state and more refusal to cooperate following provocation.  
First of all, the results of our study show that performing a mentally demanding task - 
that does not deplete self-control - results in more subjective feelings of fatigue and 
experienced anger compared to watching a neutral documentary. This finding concurs with 
previous studies that found feelings of mental fatigue to be accompanied by heightened 
irritability (Lorist et al., 2000; Thackray, Bailey, & Touchstone, 1979). This seems to indicate 
that mental fatigue comes along with heightened anger. However, whether these angry 
feelings are associated with mental fatigue or are associated with the nature of these 
specific repetitive tasks deserves further attention.  
 Second, the results of the present study show that participants in the mental fatigue 
condition were not more susceptible to the anger induction and did not differ from the 
participants from the neutral condition with respect to cooperation. Overall, most 
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participants (more than 80 percent) cooperated regardless of the condition they were in, 
and regardless of the emotions they felt right after the provocation. Importantly, these 
results suggest that although mental fatigue is accompanied by a negative mood state, it 
does not necessarily result in higher angry reactivity following provocation as fatigued 
participants were not angrier in response to the anger induction than non-fatigued 
participants and also did not show less control over their anger (i.e., more refusal to 
cooperate).  
  The current study is somewhat in line with two previous studies who also found no 
effects of mental fatigue on emotional reactivity, although these studies did find effects on 
emotion regulation. More specifically, Schmeichel (2007) found that performing a working 
memory task reduced the ability to inhibit facial expressions of emotions in response to an 
emotional film clip, although they found no effects on self-reported emotional reactivity. 
Similarly, Grillon, Quispe-Escudero, Mathur, and Ernst (2015) found no differences in 
emotional reactivity in response to the pictures as measured with startle-reflex, although 
they did find support for reduced down regulation of aversive states after performing a 
working memory task compared to the control session. Our results, however, differ from 
studies showing that exerting self-control reduces capability to control their anger following 
insults (Denson et al., 2011; DeWall et al., 2007; Finkel et al., 2009; Stucke & Baumeister, 
2006). As our study had the main focus on mental fatigue and not on ego depletion, this is 
the first study to indicate that whereas the exertion of self-control may lead to less anger 
control, mental fatigue seems not. These results are interesting as they suggest that self-
control deficits following ego depletion with respect to anger control cannot easily be 
accounted for by mental fatigue effects. Yet, before such a firm conclusion can be drawn 
future studies should try to directly compare the effects of ego depletion tasks and 
demanding mental fatiguing tasks that do not require self-control on anger control.  
  Several alternative explanations for these results also deserve consideration. First, 
whereas all previous experiments have focused on aggressive responding following 
provocation, our study measured aggressive behavior indirectly by focusing on refusal to 
cooperate. It may be that the effects of mental fatigue differ for cooperative behavior in 
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response to provocation compared to aggressive responses in reaction to provocation (also 
see McGinley & Carlo, 2006). Finally, it may be that our anger induction did not elicit a 
sufficient amount of anger needed to evoke less constructive responding. Perhaps more 
intense feelings of anger are necessary in order to lose control over anger and to show more 
destructive behavioral responses (Potegal & Qiu, 2010). Note however, that we used a 
validated anger induction (Lobbestael et al., 2008) of which the effects on anger are 
comparable to previous studies that did find an effect of induced anger on aggressive (e.g., 
DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006).  
  A central tenet of motivational theories of fatigue and self-control is that exerting 
control and fatigue cause a shift in motivation towards more rewarding activities with less 
costs and away from less rewarding ones with higher costs (Hopstaken et al., 2015; Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012). Importantly, according to these theories, the ability to control oneself 
can be maintained when incentives are sufficient and motivation to do so is high. There were 
perhaps several motivational factors that could explain the high compliance rate (over 80 
percent) in this study. Factors that could have motivated participants to cooperate despite 
being in an angry, fatigued state are: benefits for the self (e.g., the need for course credits), 
high motivation to comply with an authority figure (Milgram, 1974), the face-to-face return 
visit (Winstok, 2007). Regardless of the precise motive that may have driven participants’ 
compliance, our main argument here is that even after performing a mentally demanding 
task and after being provoked most subjects maintained the ability to control their anger 
when motivated to do so. These results are in line with diary studies showing that people are 
mostly able to control their anger, despite being provoked (e.g., Averill, 1983). As the 
expression of anger can be considered a self-control failure, given that people in general are 
highly motivated to control their anger (Stearns & Stearns, 1989) and angry behaviors are 
oftentimes expressed despite being not beneficial for the self (as otherwise control over 
anger was not needed in the first place), the present study indicates that mental fatigue is 
not a disinhibiting factor.  
  An important limitation of this study is that we only used one simple request as 
outcome measure for cooperative behavior. Several measures of cooperative behavior or a 
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more quantitative approach might have been even more informative. A strong benefit of this 
study on the other hand is that the request used in this study (a small favor) has strong 
external validity. Finally, some may argue that working memory tasks require attentional 
control and should therefore be ego depleting. As explained above, self-control specifically 
refers to a subset of self-regulatory processes that “aim to override unwanted, prepotent 
impulses or urges” (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012, p. 174). As the 2-back task 
requires no such kind of control, we consider the argument that working memory tasks 
works ego depleting as unlikely29. If these tasks are to be conceptualized as ego-depleting 
tasks, one could argue that any performance task can be conceptualized as such (as 
performance tasks always require some kind of executive function) and subsequently the 
distinction between the concepts “ego depletion” and “mental fatigue” becomes 
meaningless. Moreover, there is some evidence that performing working memory tasks do 
not result in ego depletion (Carter et al., 2015). In fact, these authors show in their meta-
analyses that the ego depletion effects may not be a real phenomenon.  
  Mindful of these limitations, we conclude from our study that, although performing a 
mentally fatiguing task that does not deplete self-control is accompanied by heightened 
irritability, it does not necessarily result in higher angry reactivity following provocation and 
does not result in a higher likelihood of refusing to cooperate in response to a small request. 
Hence, it seems that mental fatigue does not lead to less anger control and mental fatigue is 
not a disinhibiting factor. Conversely, based on the high compliance rates in this study it 
seems to be the case that people can maintain control over their anger despite being 
fatigued and provoked when motivation to do so is high. These conclusions implicate that 
                                                     
 
29 Although we do agree that working memory capacity can influence self-regulation 
capacities (Hofmann et al., 2012), for example by preventing external and internal 
distractions, we don’t consider working memory capacity as a limited resource that can 
become depleted, but rather as a fixed capacity that can lie dormant under certain situations 
(e.g., when motivation to perform well on a memory task is low) and can be recruited in 
situations when necessary (e.g., when motivation is high to suppress angry thoughts). Hence, 
in our view anger control may be better explained by individual differences in executive 
capacity rather than resulting from exhaustion of these self-control resources. 
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people should be more aware of the fact that mental fatigue does not necessarily results in 
angry or less cooperative responding, and that perhaps motivation and implicit theories 
about one’s ability to control their anger when tired may be more determining in whether 
one acts out in response to provocation. 
 
6.5. Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Alexandros Solos, Jolien van der Haar, and Melissa van Rekom for 
assisting in the data collection. 
 
143 
 
  
Chapter Six
 143 
 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Does Mental Fatigue Have an Impact on Anger and Refusal to Cooperate
 144 
  
  
 144 
  
  
 
145 
 
 
 Chapter Seven 
 
 
Summary, Discussion, and Concluding Remarks 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
 146 
  
The principal aim of this thesis was to improve our understanding of (neuro)cognitive 
processes involved in anger and a disposition towards anger (i.e., trait anger). The first step 
towards reaching this goal was to validate the Dutch version of the STAXI-2, as shown in 
chapter 2, in order to have a valid and reliable instrument to measure state and trait anger 
for the following experiments. The next step was to replicate and extend knowledge about 
neurocognitive processes involved in trait anger. More specifically, in chapter 3 and 4, we 
provided information about neural and behavioral indicators of cognitive control (i.e., 
response inhibition and error-processing) in relation to trait anger under conditions where 
anger was primed. Finally, the last step was to further our knowledge about the impact of 
the cognitive processes on anger and their interrelations using experimental designs. In 
chapter 5, we investigated the impact of angry rumination on inhibitory control and anger. 
In chapter 6, we examined the impact of a mentally fatiguing task on anger and anger 
control following provocation by the experimenter. The current chapter provides a summary 
and discussion of the main findings described in chapters 2 to 6 of this thesis.  
 
7.1. Assessing anger: The validity of the STAXI-2 
Given that anger may bring about substantial costs to individuals and society at large, it is of 
vital importance to enquire about anger difficulties. Especially in clinical settings, where 
anger is highly prevalent and most often manifests itself in dysfunctional forms (e.g., 
McDermut, Fuller, DiGiuseppe, Chelminski, & Zimmerman, 2009), a proper anger assessment 
is critical. This has spurred many scholars to develop anger assessment tools; mostly in the 
form of self-report given the subjective nature of anger (for reviews, see Eckhardt, 
Norlander, & Deffenbacher, 2004; Fernandez, Day, & Boyle, 2015).  
  The STAXI-2 is one of the most often used self-report instruments for measuring 
anger worldwide, as it is considered to have strong psychometric properties and relies on a 
strong theoretical background. For instance, in their critical review, Eckhardt, Norlander, and 
Deffenbacher (2004) conclude that “The STAXI-2 is based upon a solid conceptual model and 
possesses strong psychometric properties across a wide variety of normative groups, thus 
making it an excellent choice for researchers as well as clinicians”. At the start of this project, 
Chapter Seven
 147 
 
however, the Dutch version of the STAXI-2 was lacking. Moreover, little was known about 
differences in anger scores measured with the STAXI-2 between several groups of clinical 
populations and non-clinical populations. This information is important as it can bring to light 
differences in how clinical populations experience, express and control anger, thereby 
informing were upon anger treatments should focus. Therefore, the study described in 
chapter 2, further examined the validity of the STAXI-2 and compared anger scores between 
several clinical and non-clinical samples. Importantly, results confirmed that the STAXI-2 is a 
reliable, valid instrument for assessing the experience, expression, and control of anger. That 
is, the STAXI-2 was found to be reliable both in terms of internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability. Moreover, concurrent validity was supported by meaningful correlations between 
the STAXI-2 scales and anger-related constructs in both patient and non-clinical samples as 
well as by meaningful intrascale relationships. Additionally, a factor structure close to 
Spielberger’s (1999) original conceptualization was found supporting both construct and 
cross-cultural validity. In terms of criterion validity, we demonstrated that patients were 
inclined to experience and express anger more frequently than people from the general 
population. Most importantly, we also found that forensic outpatients with addiction 
problems were more inclined to express their anger outwardly than general psychiatric 
patients, although they did not differ in their anger experience or self-reported control over 
anger. These results imply that how forensic patients deal with their anger seems more 
important than the frequency at which their anger occurs, and that treatments should 
especially focus on educating forensic patients to deal with their anger in more constructive, 
non-expressive ways. All in all, findings in this study indicate that the STAXI-2, including the 
Dutch version, is a valuable, empirically anchored assessment tool for clinicians and 
researchers who want to conduct an anger assessment. A point that is further stressed by 
chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation by showing meaningful relationships between cognitive 
processes and the trait anger scale of the STAXI-2. Future studies are needed to explore the 
predictive validity of the STAXI-2 in terms of sensitivity and specificity. Moreover, more 
insight can be gained by including samples of patients primarily seeking treatment for anger 
problems (including covert anger problems).  
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  Although the STAXI-2 is in general an empirically sound instrument for measuring 
anger, the STAXI-2 is not free from limitations. One of the main critics is that the STAXI-2 
measures anger as a personality construct as opposed to a construct of clinical and 
diagnostic utility (Eckhardt, Norlander, & Deffenbacher, 2004). Related to that, the STAXI-2 is 
criticized to have a limited ability to distinguish between subtypes of dysfunctional angry 
clients (Digiuseppe & Tafrate, 2004). One counterargument to this proposition is that the 
STAXI-2 does have clinical utility, as differences between clinical and non-clinical samples 
were observed in our study using the STAXI-2. A second issue is that the STAXI-2 well informs 
about the experiential and behavioral components of anger, but provides insufficient 
information about cognitive (e.g., rumination, resentment) and motivational components 
(e.g., coercion, revenge). A third issue is that, like any other self-report measure of anger, the 
STAXI-2 provides good insight in subjective feeling of anger, but only provides an indirect 
assessment of other domains (e.g., the behavioral component of anger). As such, anger 
assessment using the STAXI-2 is prone to motivational and response distortions (e.g., social 
desirability response bias; McEwan, Davis, MacKenzie, & Mullen, 2009). Lastly, the STAXI-2 
dichotomizes between state and trait anger, whereas in reality many different forms of 
angry affect may exist laying somewhere in-between these two extremes, such as angry 
mood states. Perhaps researchers and clinicians in the field of anger may improve their 
anger assessment by adding concurrent anger measures in addition to the STAXI-2, such as 
anger logs, multiple self-report anger questionnaires, and observational measures or staff 
ratings (for reviews, see Eckhardt et al., 2004; Fernandez et al., 2015) in order to capture the 
multidimensionality of the construct properly. 
  In short, results of chapter 2 revealed that the Dutch version of the STAXI-2 is a 
reliable, valid instrument for measuring the experience, expression, and control of anger and 
therefore can be meaningfully used to asses anger and anger regulation strategies in clinical 
and non-clinical samples. 
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7.2. Cognitive Control in Relation to Trait Anger 
Cognitive control (cf. effortful control) refers to the ability to flexibly, voluntarily, and 
adaptively coordinate behavior in the service of goal-directed behavior (Luna, Garver, Urban, 
Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004). Cognitive control is presumed to be underlain by a set of separate 
but interacting functions, including (but not restricted to) response inhibition and action 
monitoring (Luna et al., 2004). For instance, response inhibition is needed in order to 
suppress automatic, inappropriate, goal-incompatible behavior, whereas action monitoring 
is required to monitor and evaluate ongoing behavior and to prevent future mistakes 
(Luijten et al., 2014). Studies into cognitive control have increasingly added neurobiological 
techniques (e.g., event-related potentials and functional magnetic resonance imaging) to 
gain more insight about the underlying neural networks. These studies have generally 
revealed that the subcomponents of cognitive control seem to have their specific but related 
neural networks (Luijten et al., 2014; Luna et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004).  
  Cognitive control takes a central place in theoretical models of trait anger and 
reactive aggression, whereby cognitive control serves as a inhibiting factor of angry and 
aggressive feelings and behavior (Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Finkel, 2007; Slotter & Finkel, 
2011; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). The reasoning is generally as follows: given the adverse 
outcomes associated with displays of anger and aggression, healthy individuals are usually 
motivated to regulate and control the experience and expression of anger (Stearns & 
Stearns, 1989; Tice & Baumeister, 1993), whereas high trait anger (HTA) individuals either 
lack sufficient cognitive control or allow these cognitive control processes to lay dormant in 
hostile situations resulting in more frequent and more aggressive anger episodes (Wilkowski 
& Robinson, 2008b, 2010). Indeed, several studies have demonstrated deficient inhibitory 
control in HTA individuals as compared to low trait anger (LTA) individuals on behavioral 
tasks measuring cognitive control, especially following exposure to anger-related stimuli 
(Wilkowski et al., 2010; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2007, 2008a; Wilkowski, 2011). Only a few 
EEG studies have been conducted to gain more insight in the neural mechanisms underlying 
the behavioral results found in HTA individuals (Fulwiler et al., 2012; Jaworska et al., 2012; 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Summary, Discussion and Concluding Remarks
 150 
  
Liu et al., 2014). These studies have found somewhat conflicting results. Whereas the study 
of Jaworska (2012) found support for reduced attentional control and diminished response 
inhibition on a continuous performance task, the study of Liu (2014) could not find evidence 
for inhibitory control deficits on the neurophysiological level as no reduced N2 and P3 (i.e.,, 
two electrophysiological indices of response inhibition) amplitudes were found on NoGo 
trials. As Wilkowski and Robinson (2008b, 2010) postulate that HTA individuals allow 
cognitive control processes to lay dormant in hostile contexts in particular whereas LTA do 
not, inhibitory control deficits may have remained undetected given the study of Liu (2014) 
used an affectively neutral task. Our goal was therefore to investigate inhibitory control on a 
neurophysiological level in a context where anger was primed. Above that, little was known 
about error-processing on the neurophysiological level in relation to trait anger at the start 
of this project, although there were indications to expect that error-processing may be 
distorted in HTA individuals at the behavioral level (Robinson et al., 2012). Given the central 
role cognitive control takes in explaining individual differences in trait anger, better insight 
into the dysfunction of neural networks in HTA individuals could provide a better 
understanding of the problems these individuals have with controlling anger and aggression. 
As such, the main aim of the studies described in chapter 3 and 4, was to extend knowledge 
about neurocognitive control processes involved in trait anger when confronted with anger-
related cues.  
  The main goal of the study described in chapter 3 was to compare anger-primed 
inhibitory control and error-processing between HTA and LTA individuals using event related 
potentials (ERPs). For this purpose, an affective Go/NoGo task was developed including 
anger-related pictures while behavioral performance (accuracy) and ERPs (N2, P3, ERN, Pe) 
were recorded. An extreme groups design (i.e., highest vs lowest scoring subjects on the 
Trait Anger Scale of the STAXI-2) was used resulting in 45 LTA individuals and 49 HTA 
individuals. It was expected that HTA individuals would demonstrate reduced inhibitory 
control compared to LTA as reflected by reduced accuracy rates and attenuated N2 and P3 
amplitudes on NoGo trials. As previous research indicates that inhibitory control deficits 
should become more apparent in hostile contexts for HTA individuals (2008b, 2010), we 
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further expected these inhibitory control deficits to be more pronounced for anger-related 
pictures. With respect to error-processing, we expected to find either reduced ERN or Pe 
amplitudes in HTA compared to LTA. Results revealed that in contrast to our expectations, 
HTA and LTA individuals performed equally well on the affective Go/NoGo Task. Moreover, 
no significant differences between groups emerged on the N2 and P3 amplitudes, whereas 
we did observe larger N2 and P3 across groups for NoGo trials compared to Go trials, 
suggesting that the affective Go/NoGo task worked as intended. Finally, we could not 
demonstrate more distinct deficits in inhibitory control in HTA individuals in the presence of 
anger-related cues. Together, these results suggest that groups did not differ regarding 
anger-primed inhibitory control. With regard to error-processing, results showed reduced Pe 
amplitudes following errors in HTA individuals compared to LTA individuals, whereas no 
differences were found on the ERN. These results indicate that HTA individuals are 
characterized by error-processing deficits during the more conscious stage of processing. 
Interestingly, these findings are in line with several neuroimaging studies showing 
attenuated activation in brain regions related to performance monitoring (i.e., the anterior 
cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex) in dysfunctional angry populations (Blair, 2012; 
Coccaro et al., 2007; Davidson, 2000; Fulwiler et al., 2012). This study adds to the literature 
by showing a relation between error-processing deficits and trait anger in healthy samples as 
well.  
  In sum, contrary to expectation HTA individuals did not show impaired anger-primed 
inhibitory control on both the behavioral as well as the neurophysiological level, whereas 
HTA individual did show impaired conscious error-processing deficits. These error-processing 
deficits may explain the continuation of impulsive behavior in HTA individuals regardless of 
their negative consequences.  
 While for the study described in chapter 3 an extreme groups design was chosen, we 
took a continuous measure approach (i.e. correlational design) for the study reported in 
chapter 4. Moreover, instead of using HTA undergraduate students, we conducted this study 
in a forensic psychiatric patient sample. The main aim of this study was to investigate 
whether scores on trait anger in forensic psychiatric patients were associated with individual 
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differences in anger-primed inhibitory control and error-processing. Behavioral performance 
(accuracy) and ERPs (N2, P3, ERN, Pe) were recorded in 38 forensic psychiatric patients who 
had a medium to high risk of recidivism of offending using the same affective Go/NoGo task 
as was used in chapter 3. We hypothesized that higher scores on trait anger in these 
offenders would be inversely related to accuracy rates on NoGo trials and the N2 and P3 
amplitudes on NoGo trials. Moreover, we expected that these effects would be more 
pronounced for anger-related pictures compared to neutral pictures. Additionally, we 
expected higher scores on trait anger to be accompanied by reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes. 
In line with expectations, we found higher scores on trait anger to be inversely related to 
accuracy, especially for anger-related pictures. That is, higher scores on trait anger were 
associated with less accurate performance on NoGo trials, especially for NoGo trials that 
included anger-related pictures. These findings suit well with the integrative cognitive model 
of trait anger and reactive aggression (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b, 2010). However, 
contrary to expectations, trait anger was not associated with the neurophysiological indices 
of response inhibition (N2 and P3). Currently, it seems that most reliable evidence for 
reduced N2 and P3 amplitudes have been found in impulsive (aggressive) offender samples 
(Chen et al., 2005; Guan et al., 2015; Munro et al., 2007b; Vilà-Balló et al., 2014). Our sample 
was quite heterogeneous (i.e. offenders with different types of underlying psychopathology) 
which may account for this inconsistent result. Alternatively, an explanation for this 
unexpected finding may be that whereas neural indicators of inhibitory control are 
associated with impulsive aggressive behaviors, they are not specifically related to trait 
anger or to planned aggressive behavior. Finally, whereas no significant relation was found 
between trait anger and Pe amplitudes, trait anger was significantly negatively associated 
with the ERN amplitudes. In other words, higher scores on trait anger in these patients were 
associated with reduced ERN amplitudes. These results are in line with neuroimaging studies 
showing diminished activation in the inferior frontal brain regions related to error 
monitoring (i.e., the anterior cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex) in dysfunctional 
angry populations (Blair, 2012; Coccaro et al., 2007; Davidson, 2000; Fulwiler et al., 2012). 
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In sum, the findings described in chapter 4 suggest that in a forensic population trait 
anger is associated with reduced inhibitory control on a behavioral level and reduced 
automatic error-detection on a neurophysiological level, which may explain the initiation and 
continuation of impulsive behavior in HTA forensic patients despite its negative 
consequences.  
  When comparing the results of the two studies investigating inhibitory control and 
error-processing in relation to trait anger, several noteworthy findings emerge. For instance, 
it is remarkable that although in both studies support was found for error-processing deficits 
in relation to trait anger, mixed results were found as to what component drives these error-
processing deficits. Whereas the study described in chapter 3 found evidence for reduced Pe 
amplitudes, indicating that deficits occur during more conscious stages of error-processing 
(Overbeek et al., 2005), the study described in chapter 4 found evidence for reduced ERN 
amplitudes, suggesting that deficits occur at more automatic stages of error-processing 
(Bernstein et al., 1995; Yeung et al., 2004). Other studies that focused on error-processing 
deficits in relation to externalizing psychopathology have also shown mixed results. For 
instance, whereas some studies found evidence for both reduced ERN and Pe amplitudes in 
undergraduate samples manifesting with externalizing symptomatology (e.g., Ruchsow, 
Spitzer, Grön, Grothe, & Kiefer, 2005) and patients samples characterized by externalizing 
symptomatology (Franken et al., 2007; Luijten, van Meel, et al., 2011), other studies found 
either evidence for reduced ERN amplitudes (Dikman & Allen, 2000; J. Hall et al., 2007; 
Heritage & Benning, 2012; Munro et al., 2007a; Potts et al., 2006; Vilà-Balló et al., 2014; Von 
Borries et al., 2010) or for reduced Pe amplitudes (Brazil et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2014; 
Maurer et al., 2015). These mixed results indicate that a better understanding is warranted 
as to what these components reflect precisely as well as to what extent these components 
are related to externalizing behaviour. Is the distinction between the ERN and the Pe truly a 
distinction between automatic or controlled processing or do these components share some 
overlap? Do these reduced Pe and ERN amplitudes represent markers for externalizing 
psychopathology in general or do they represent specific markers for only certain types of 
externalizing behaviour? To what extent are these error-processing deficits moderated by 
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other factors, such as motivational processes (Botvinick & Braver, 2015) or the presence of 
internalizing symptomatology (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008)? Currently, no definitive satisfactory 
answers can be provided to these questions, highlighting the need for further investigation. 
What does seem to become clear from our studies is that the reduced ERN or Pe amplitudes 
cannot easily be explained by a general deficit in information processing on a 
neurophysiological level, as in both our EEG studies no support was found for reduced N2 
and P3 amplitudes.  
 Another noteworthy finding is that whereas we found no support for inhibitory 
control deficits in HTA undergraduate students (chapter 3), we did find evidence for an 
inverse relation between trait anger and inhibitory control in forensic psychiatric patients 
(chapter 4). The most obvious explanation for these mixed results would be that the forensic 
psychiatric patients were more characterized by impulse control problems as a result of their 
anger as compared to the relatively healthy successful undergraduate student sample, 
making it easier to find a relation between trait anger and impulse control problems in the 
forensic sample. In other words, even though these students may be characterized by 
frequent anger episodes, they may show less impulsive behaviors and may have less 
interference in their social and occupational functioning due to sufficient cognitive control. If 
so, whether trait anger serves as a clinically relevant construct and results in destructive 
consequences may be dependent on the presence of other moderating factors, such as 
cognitive control. This is in concordance with the General Aggression Model (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002; DeWall et al., 2011) and the I3 theory (Finkel, 2007; Slotter & Finkel, 2011) 
that consider trait anger as a variable that increases the chance of aggressive behaviors, but 
of which its influence can be mitigated by the presence of other inhibiting factors. 
Alternatively, it may be that these cognitive control deficits in our patient sample can be 
accounted for by the presence of co-morbid psychopathology, such as substance abuse and 
a criminal history (e.g., Chen, Tien, Juan, Tzeng, & Hung, 2005; Luijten, Littel, & Franken, 
2011) or impulsivity in general. Lastly, it may be that cognitive control deficits are more 
strongly related to aggressive behavior than to anger per se.  
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  Finally, it should be noted that while the forensic psychiatric patients scoring high on 
trait anger performed less well on the Go/NoGo task measuring inhibitory control, 
performance in general was still quite high with an average accuracy rate of 77.7% for the 
NoGo trials (compared to 75.6% correct for undergraduate students). More substantial 
differences between these patients and undergraduate students would have been expected 
given the central role cognitive control takes in the model of Wilkowski and Robinson 
(2008b, 2010). Several explanations can be provided for this somewhat unexpected finding. 
First, there are many indications that different measures of impulsivity and cognitive control 
tend to be weakly related and sometimes fail to be related to more objectively visible 
impulsive behavior (Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011; Miyake et al., 2000). As such, it may be 
that the broad construct cognitive control does serve as an important factor in explaining 
individual differences in trait anger, but that the affective Go/NoGo task measures only one 
subcomponent of it (i.e., inhibitory control), that may be less suited for explaining 
differences in trait anger than other subcomponents underlying cognitive control. In this 
dissertation it seems that error-processing deficits may be more consistently related to trait 
anger than inhibitory control deficits. Alternatively, it could be that inhibitory control is an 
important factor in explaining individual differences in trait anger, but only under certain 
conditions (e.g., during stress or following provocation) that were not sufficiently simulated 
in our lab. That is, in our studies we tried to prime anger by using anger-related pictures, 
whereas perhaps more pronounced effects were have been found if anger-related words 
were used (also see Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002; Verona & Bresin, 
2015). One counterargument, however, is that inhibitory control deficits were more 
pronounced for anger-related pictures in our forensic psychiatric sample, indicating these 
pictures exerted some effects. Alternatively, different results may have been obtained if an 
anger-induction was conducted before participants performed the affective Go/NoGo task, 
as information processing deficits may be more likely to manifest themselves during state 
anger episodes in HTA individuals (Owen, 2011; Schultz et al., 2010).  
  To conclude, the results of chapter 3 and 4 indicate that trait anger is related to 
deficiencies in error-processing. These error-processing deficits may take a central role in 
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explaining the continuation of impulsive behaviour in HTA individuals despite its negative 
consequences. Additionally, results were mixed with regard to inhibitory control on a 
behavioural level, whereby a relation between inhibitory control deficits and trait anger was 
only found in a clinical forensic psychiatric sample. Finally, no evidence could be found for a 
relation between trait anger and inhibitory control on the neurophysiological level; not even 
in the clinical sample. These results seem to be better explained by the I3 theory and the 
GAM than the integrative cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression. Although 
there are indications that under specific conditions using specific measures results are in line 
the integrative cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression, the current data is 
generally not in line with this model. Clearly, more research is needed to explore the 
boundary conditions regarding the relation between trait anger and inhibitory control.  
 
7.3. The impact of angry rumination and mental fatigue on anger and self-control 
The second main aim of this research project was to further our knowledge about the impact 
cognitive processes have on anger as well as to gain knowledge about their interrelations 
using experimental designs. More specifically, we examined the impact of angry rumination 
on inhibitory control and anger in chapter 5, and the impact of a mentally fatiguing task on 
anger and anger control following provocation in chapter 6. In both these experiments self-
control took a central place. As such, before elaborating on the results of these experiments, 
we will shortly recapitulate the theoretical background of the construct self-control.  
  Thus far we have discussed cognitive control as a stable, fixed, and trait-like capacity 
on which individuals can differ, whereby some individuals are proposed to have high 
cognitive control capacities in all sorts of tempting or anger-provoking situations, whereas 
others seem to lack these capacities. A different way to approach cognitive control is to view 
it as a state-dependent process (Baumeister et al., 2007; Hofmann et al., 2012), whereby the 
ability to control oneself varies over time. For instance, individuals with a high degree of 
cognitive control in general may fail to hold their horses in some situations (e.g., a usually 
calm professor that suddenly snaps during an argument with a student). Currently, it 
remains a puzzle why people respond to some provocations with controlled anger but 
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explode with aggression at others. According to the Strength Model of Self-Control 
(Baumeister et al., 2007), these temporary reductions in self-control can be explained by 
previous attempts to exert self-control causing the depletion of self-control resources from a 
limited reservoir of self-control. For example, suppressing angry expressions towards a 
colleague at work during the day may deplete self-control resources, thereby reducing self-
control resources left and increasing the likelihood of expressing anger towards a significant 
other during the evening.  
  In extension to the Strength model of Self-Control, the multiple systems model of 
angry rumination predicts that angry rumination may result in reduced self-control 
explaining rumination-induced aggression (Denson, 2013). That is, angry rumination should 
result in reduced self-control as a result of ego depletion following attempts to (a) reduce 
anger intensity, (b) inhibit angry thoughts, and (c) to inhibit aggressive inclinations, 
subsequently heightening the likelihood of aggressive behaviors. Note here that, while the 
integrative cognitive model of trait anger and reactive aggression suggests a unidirectional 
relation between cognitive control and angry rumination, whereby it is presumed that 
individuals with sufficient cognitive control can more easily distract themselves from 
ruminative thoughts, the multiple systems model of angry rumination suggests that the 
relation between angry rumination and self-control may be reciprocal. Direct investigation of 
this hypothesis, however, was scarce at the start of this project. To our knowledge, the only 
direct investigation of the impact on angry rumination on self-control was a series of studies 
conducted by Denson, Pedersen, Friese, Hahm, and Roberts (2011). In one of these 
experiments, these authors showed that angry rumination following provocation resulted in 
decreased self-control, relative to distraction, as measured via self-report (i.e., the State Self-
Control Capacity Scale). In a second experiment they found indirect support for the role self-
control plays in rumination-induced aggression, by showing that glucose consumption, which 
is proposed to replenish the ability to exert self-control (Gailliot et al., 2007), improved 
performance on a Stroop task relative to a placebo drink following angry rumination but not 
following distraction. A limitation of these studies, however, is that self-control was rather 
subjectively and indirectly measured, leaving the question whether angry rumination indeed 
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results in lower behavioral self-control. As such, the goal of the study described in chapter 5 
was to advance our knowledge about the impact of angry rumination on self-control by using 
a more direct indicator of self-control (i.e. behavior on the affective Go/NoGo task).  
 For the study, described in chapter 5, it was expected that angry rumination would 
augment anger and would lead to reduced self-control as reflected by higher self-reported 
anger and more commission errors on NoGo trials relative to distraction. First, participants 
were instructed to recall and imagine an autobiographical memory in which they became 
very angry in order to induce anger. Both before and after this anger-induction participants 
indicated their affective state. Next, participants either received an angry rumination (n = 37) 
or distraction (n = 35) manipulation. Participants in the angry rumination condition were 
instructed to recall the autobiographical memory and to focus upon the emotional aspects of 
this event. Participants in the distraction condition were instructed to focus on how campus 
looks like in their mind’s eye (e.g., think about the campus routes you normally walk). Finally, 
all participants indicated their affective state once more and completed the affective 
Go/NoGo task. In line with previous research (Bushman, 2002; Denson, Moulds, et al., 2012; 
Denson, 2013; Fabiansson et al., 2012; Konecni, 1974; Mischkowski et al., 2012; Ray et al., 
2008; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), results revealed that provocation-focused angry 
rumination resulted in increased anger, whereas distraction resulted in decreased anger. 
However, contrary to expectations, both groups made a comparable number of errors on 
NoGo trials, indicating that self-control was not differentially affected by rumination and 
distraction manipulations.  
  The most forward explanation for the findings described in chapter 5, would be that 
angry rumination amplifies anger but has no impact on self-control; at least not as measured 
with inhibitory control. This finding may not be as surprising as initially thought given that 
accumulating research questions the existence of the ego depletion effect on which the 
multiple systems model of angry rumination is based. Some argue, for instance, that 
motivational processes better account for reductions in self-control rather than limited 
resources of self-control due to previous acts of self-control (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). In 
line with this motivational account as opposed to the ego depletion account, a recent review 
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by Botvinick and Braver (2015) highlights that ego depletion “involves changes in activity 
both in reward networks and in centers that have been linked with control costs” (p. 100). 
Others argue that the ego depletion effect is overestimated due to publication bias, and may 
not even be a real phenomenon warranting explanation (Carter et al., 2015). If so, then how 
could we explain the increased likelihood of aggressive behaviors following angry 
rumination? In line with the GAM, we suggest that the increased chance of aggressive 
behavior is better explained by the heightened accessibility of aggressive cognition, feelings, 
and arousal (Pedersen et al., 2011). In a somewhat similar vein, DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 
(2010) argue that with an increased number of aggressive urges due to angry feelings caused 
by angry rumination, chances of aggressive behavior become higher with each instance one 
ruminates about the anger provoking situation. 
  Alternatively, we could argue that angry rumination does have an impact on cognitive 
control, and that our study helps in identifying moderators of this relation, as our approach 
differed from the experiments conducted by Denson et al. (2011), potentially explaining our 
deviant results. For instance, as described in chapter 5, it may be that whereas perceived 
self-control may be affected by angry rumination, actual self-control abilities are not. This 
explanation would be in line with motivational accounts of self-control (Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2012), as this explanation suggests that people may no longer feel able or 
motivated to control themselves causing them to exercise less self-control than they could 
rather than that they are actually no longer able to control themselves. As has been noted 
before, it may also be that not inhibitory control over motor responses, but other aspects 
underlying self-control may be affected by angry rumination, such as the cognitive restraint 
of aggression or the modulation of the emotion anger. Finally, it may be that the impact 
angry rumination has on self-control may differ as a result of how angry rumination was 
initiated. That is, it could be that angry rumination on past angering events has less strong 
effects on self-control than angry rumination caused by a recent actual provocation that is 
still fresh in the mind.  
  In short, the results described in chapter 5, suggest that whereas provocation-
focused angry rumination amplifies anger, it does not result in reduced inhibitory control as 
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measured with an affective Go/NoGo task. As of yet, we could provide little support for a 
reciprocal relation between angry rumination and self-control. Future research is needed to 
explore the boundary conditions with regards to the role of self-control in understanding 
rumination-induced aggression.  
 As noted above, heavily debate exists as to what extent self-control failures can be 
explained for by ego depletion. Other potential candidates moderating the effects observed 
in ego depletion experiments may be motivational processes and a general state of mental 
fatigue. More specifically, an important question is whether effects of ego depletion 
manipulations on aggressive behavior are caused specifically by engaging in acts of self-
control or may also be caused by a more general state of mental fatigue. In chapter 6, we 
therefore investigated the impact of a mentally fatiguing task (i.e. 2-back task), unrelated to 
ego depletion, on anger and anger control (cf. refusal to cooperate) following provocation by 
the experimenter. It was expected that mentally fatigued participants would experience 
more intense anger and would more likely refuse to cooperate with experimenter following 
provocation compared to non-fatigued individuals. First, baseline mood was measured after 
which participant were either instructed to perform a mentally fatiguing 2-back task or to 
watch a neutral documentary. Next, all participants performed a frustrating task while being 
harassed by the experimenter. Finally, when the participants believed the experiment to be 
finished, the experimenter asked participants for their cooperation with a small request. In 
between these manipulations mood measures were conducted. Results showed that 
participants were more fatigued following the 2-back task as compared to watching the 
documentary, and that all participants were angrier following the anger-induction than at 
baseline, indicating that the manipulations led to the expected outcomes. However, contrary 
to our expectations, the mentally fatigued participants did not experience more anger 
following the provocation than the non-fatigued participants. More importantly, a high 
number of participants cooperated with the experimenters’ request (>80%) regardless of the 
condition they were in. These findings implicate that performing a mentally fatiguing task 
does not necessarily result in higher angry reactivity and lower anger control in reaction to 
provocation. It rather seems to be the case that even under stressing conditions (mental 
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fatigue combined with provocation) people are quite capable of regulating their anger when 
their motivation to do so is high.  
  To summarize, the results described in chapter 6 implicate that mental fatigue does 
not necessarily result in angry or less cooperative responding, and hence does not serve as a 
disinhibiting factor under conditions where individuals are highly motivated to contain 
themselves. These results are well in line with diary studies highlighting that even though 
people oftentimes experience the inclination to hurt someone when experiencing anger, 
they are highly capable of controlling their anger (e.g., Averill, 1983).  
  Finally, when taking the results from chapter 5 and 6 together, we can conclude that 
while angry rumination and mental fatigue do seem to be accompanied by heightened 
anger, these constructs cannot easily explain for state self-control reductions (as found in 
ego depletion experiments). As such, in the current dissertation we could not provide 
empirical evidence for interrelations between the cognitive processes implicated in trait 
anger and reactive aggression.  
 
7.4. Limitations of the described studies and some theoretical considerations 
Several limitations should be borne in mind. First, whether the neurocognitive aspects 
related to trait anger represent vulnerability factors for or epiphenomena of trait anger 
remains uncertain, as the studies presented in chapter 3 and 4 had an observational design 
and no causal inferences can be drawn from these studies. A third unknown variable could 
be responsible for the relationships found in the current dissertation as well. This could very 
well be the case with regard to the effects observed in chapter 4, as we examined a relatively 
heterogeneous offender sample. For instance, trait anger may be part of a broader spectrum 
of externalizing disorders, whereby the ERN represents a general vulnerability for this 
broader externalizing spectrum (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008). High levels of this psychological 
construct may, for example, indicate the presence of disruptive behaviour disorders, such as 
oppositional defiant and conduct disorder. Unfortunately, experimental studies can only 
inform about the causal impact of these neurocognitive processes on state anger, but cannot 
provide information about cause and effect regarding trait anger. Hence, longitudinal 
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research should be performed to clarify the role of these neurocognitive aspects in 
developing trait anger. A second limitation has to do with the anger-related Go/NoGo task 
used to measure inhibitory control in this dissertation. As participants always received the 
neutral blocks first, diminished performance on anger-related trials may be due to stimulus-
order effects. Although we deliberately chose to (a) used a blocked design as previous 
studies indicate blocked designs elicit more interference and (b) to present the neutral 
blocks first in order to prevent carry-over effects, different results may have been obtained 
using a random design (whereby picture type had been varied trial-by-trial) or a 
counterbalanced design (i.e. alternating between with block participants receive first). Third, 
the amount of anger elicited may not have been sufficient to observe effects on response 
inhibition (chapter 3 & 4) or state self-control (chapter 5 & 6). It may be that intense feelings 
of anger are necessary in order for individuals to lose control (over their anger) (Potegal & 
Qiu, 2010). However, we would like to note that we did observe some effects of our anger-
primed pictures in both EEG studies and that we used validated anger inductions (Lobbestael 
et al., 2008) for the studies described in chapter 5 and 6 of which the impact on anger was 
comparable with that found in other studies in the field of anger and aggression (e.g., 
DeWall et al., 2007; Stucke & Baumeister). Another limitation is that in all the studies 
included in this thesis trait anger was measured using a self-report questionnaire. Self-report 
is dependent on sufficient self-awareness of ones behavior as well ones motivation to 
genuinely report this behavior. As such, replication is needed using more objective measures 
of trait anger. Finally, some of the studies in this dissertation lacked sufficient power to 
detect effects of small effect size which could account for some null-findings.  
 Besides these limitations, several theoretical considerations are of importance. For 
instance, there seems to be some confusion regarding the constructs related to cognitive 
control. An important question relates to what extent the concepts “cognitive control”, 
“effortful control”, “self-control”, “response inhibition” differ from each other, and to what 
extent these construct refer to the same underlying construct? Currently, these concepts 
seem to be used interchangeably, although there might be nuanced differences. Similarly, 
researchers may confuse phenomena related to mental fatigue with phenomena related to 
 
163 
 
ego depletion, obscuring theoretical progress. Finally, the question remains to what extent 
effects observed in subclinical angry populations (i.e. healthy undergraduate students 
scoring high on a personality trait) can be generalized to patient samples manifesting with 
anger problems. Are the differences between these subclinical and actual patient samples of 
quantitative or qualitative nature? For instance, a limitation of this dissertation may be that 
most studies were conducted in relatively young, well-educated female subjects, thereby 
reducing the generalizability of results. At the end of the day most acts of violence are 
committed by men. Hence, perhaps the (neuro)cognitive processes investigated in this thesis 
may be of higher importance in male samples. However, we would like to note that several 
reviews point out that few gender differences exist with respect to anger (Kring, 2000).  
 
7.5. Treatment implications and suggestions for future research 
The STAXI-2 turned out to be a clinically relevant assessment tool for measuring the 
experience, expression and control of anger. Hence, similar to the English version, the Dutch 
version of the STAXI-2 can be used to investigate the presence of anger and the way patients 
deal with their anger. One intriguing research avenue would be to compare scores on the 
STAXI-2 between ‘undercontrolled’ violent offenders and ‘overcontrolled’ violent offenders 
which are characterized by a sudden anger outburst after keeping anger in for a period of 
time. Moreover, the Dutch version of the STAXI-2 can be used to evaluate treatment 
efficacy. Third, future studies should focus on different, more objective measures of trait 
anger. For instance, ecological momentary assessment can be used to measure the presence 
of trait anger as well as the extent to which (neuro)cognitive processes underlie this 
disposition (R. C. Martin & Vieaux, 2013). Finally, the current thesis focused mostly on trait 
anger with regard to cognitive control. Future studies could also focus on cognitive control in 
relation to the anger expression and control scales using the STAXI-2.  
  The correlational and experimental studies included in this dissertation are of a 
relatively fundamental nature and therefore may not have immediate clinical relevance. 
Although it may take some time for these fundamental findings to be translated into clinical 
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practice, our studies do, however, inform indirectly about practical implications next to 
providing important theoretical implications.  
 For instance, EEG might prove useful as a diagnostic tool in the treatment of 
dysfunctional anger in the near future. Especially, the ERN and the Pe, which show excellent 
psychometric properties and can be measured using relatively few trials (Hofmann et al., 
2012; Olvet & Hajcak, 2009; Rietdijk et al., 2014), may inform about individuals at risk for 
relapsing into negative behavior despite their negative consequences. Moreover, these 
measures may be used to predict efficacy of and dropout from anger management 
therapies. Previous studies, for instance, have shown that cognitive control deficits may 
indicate fewer capacities to recognize problematic behavior, reduced motivation for 
treatment as well as dropout from therapy in substance (Ersche & Sahakian, 2007; 
Severtson, von Thomsen, Hedden, & Latimer, 2010); similar results may be expected for HTA 
individuals. However, before implementing EEG as a diagnostic tool, future studies are also 
needed to examine the predictive validity (sensitivity and specificity) of the ERN and the Pe 
as predictors of trait anger and relapse of aggressive behavior. 
  Although EEG studies provide important information on temporal processing, these 
studies provide little information about spatial processing. Hence, other imaging methods, 
such as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 
and Diffusion Tensor Imaging, need to be implemented as well in order to gain more 
complementary insight about the neurocognitive aspects related to trait anger. Similarly, 
functional connectivity patterns in HTA individuals may bring important insights regarding 
the connectivity of brain regions underlying neurocognitive functions (Fulwiler et al., 2012). 
Finally, direct training of brain regions related to cognitive control, such as the anterior 
cingulate cortex, inferior frontal gyrus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, via neurofeedback 
techniques, deep brain stimulation or via repetitive transmagnetic stimulation can inform 
about the causal relation between neurocognitive processes and trait anger. Recent studies 
have also shown that cognitive bias modification paradigms targeting some of the 
(neuro)cognitive processes investigated in these thesis, may be effective in reducing anger or 
aggression (Wilkowski et al., 2015).  
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  As shown in this thesis, investigating (neuro)cognitive process related to trait anger 
under conditions of emotional arousal and provocation is of essential importance. Hence, 
future studies are needed in which state anger is elicited using validated anger inductions in 
order to examine the presence and influence of neurocognitive processes. Especially in jail 
settings, virtual reality technology may prove useful in doing so. Using this relatively new 
technique patients may be exposed to anger inducing situations in safe and controlled 
settings.  
 Another interesting avenue for research is to explore to which extent self-control 
failures with respect to anger and aggression may be explained by motivational accounts. 
The results from the current dissertation suggest that perceived reduced self-control may be 
more important in explaining aggressive behavior than actual, objectively measured self-
control reductions. As such, HTA individuals should be made aware of the fact that they are 
still highly capable of controlling their mood states despite being in a fatigued, agitated 
state. By doing so, HTA individuals may feel more accountable for their actions, which may 
lead to higher self-control over anger and aggressive behavior in provoking situations. 
Moreover, it would be of interest to explore the development of the (neuro)cognitive biases 
themselves that were investigated in this thesis. For instance, there are indications that 
these biases stem from harsh treatments of parents (e.g., Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed, 
2000). Finally, more studies are needed exploring the interrelations and combined influence 
of the neurocognitive processes involved in trait anger.  
 
7.6. Main conclusions 
Based on the results of the studies described in this thesis, several conclusions can be drawn. 
First, it can be concluded that the Dutch version of the STAXI-2 is a reliable instrument to 
assist the clinical practitioner or researcher in measuring the experience, expression, and 
control of anger. Second, trait anger seems to be related to deficits in cognitive control 
under both neutral and anger-inducing conditions, of which error-processing deficits seem to 
be most consistently related to trait anger. Reduced anger-primed inhibitory control in 
relation to trait anger, however, could not be consistently confirmed. Finally, the studies 
described in this thesis showed that although angry rumination and mental fatigue seem to 
be accompanied by increased anger, these processes seem to have little effect on cognitive 
control. Overall, the current thesis increased knowledge about the impact of neurocognitive 
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processes in relation to trait anger. At the same time, this thesis highlights that more 
research is needed in order to explore the impact of neurocognitive processes on trait anger 
as well as their interrelations. 
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Achtergrond: Boosheid als emotionele staat en als dispositie 
 Boosheid wordt in het kort gedefinieerd als “een emotionele gemoedstoestand die bestaat 
uit gevoelens die in intensiteit variëren van milde ergernis en irritatie tot woede en razernij, 
en die gepaard gaat met arousal30 van het autonome zenuwstelsel” (Spielberger, 1988, p.1; 
vrij vertaald) Een bredere en preciezere omschrijving van boosheid als emotionele staat 
wordt geboden door DiGiuseppe en Tafrate (2010, p. 21; vrij vertaald):  
“Boosheid is een subjectief ervaren emotionele toestand die gepaard gaat met hoge 
sympathische arousal. Deze wordt in eerste instantie opgeroepen door een waargenomen 
dreiging (voor iemands fysieke welbevinden, eigendommen, huidige of toekomstige bronnen, 
zelfbeeld, sociale status of het beeld van de groep, de sociale regels die het dagelijks leven 
reguleren, of comfort), maar ze kan ook aanhouden nadat de dreiging geweken is. Boosheid 
gaat ook gepaard met attributionele en evaluatieve cognities die de wandaden van anderen 
benadrukken en die de persoon tot antagonistische reacties aanzetten, zoals het blokkeren, 
verhinderen of aanvallen van, of wraak nemen op de bron van de waargenomen dreiging. 
Boosheid wordt gecommuniceerd via gezichtsuitdrukking en/of lichaamshouding, of via 
intonatie, aversieve uitspraken of agressief gedrag. De strategie die iemand gebruikt om 
boosheid te communiceren kan variëren naar gelang de sociale rol, leertheorie en 
omgevingsfactoren”31. 
  Boosheid, als emotionele staat, wordt gezamenlijk met blijdschap, verdriet en angst 
in iedere classificatie van basisemoties opgenomen (Ekman, 1999; Panksepp, 1998; 
Strongman, 2003), hetgeen betekent dat het een emotie betreft die vermoedelijk 
                                                     
 
30 Arousal geeft een algemene staat van lichamelijke opwinding weer; specifieker beschrijft 
arousal de activatietoestand van het centrale en autonome zenuwstelsel. 
31 N.B.: individuele verschillen in de frequentie, intensiteit en duur waarmee woede wordt 
ervaren, ontbreekt in deze omschrijving. Ook komen biologische (predisposerende) factoren, 
zoals temperament (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000) of frontale lesies (Potegal & Stemmler, 
2010a), in deze definitie gebrekkig aan bod. 
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aangeboren is en universeel bij alle mensen voorkomt en herkend wordt32. 
Dagboekonderzoeken tonen aan dat mensen boosheid in milde vormen vrijwel dagelijks 
ervaren (Averill, 1983; Kassinove, Sukhodolsky, Tsytsarev, & Solovyova, 1997; Meltzer, 1933; 
Schieman, 2010; Tafrate, Kassinove, & Dundin, 2002). Veel van deze boze episoden ontstaan 
tijdens interpersoonlijke contacten met de mensen die we aardig vinden en/of waar we van 
houden (Averill, 1983; Schieman, 2010). Verscheidene factoren kunnen boosheid ontlokken. 
Situaties die het meest vaak woede ontlokken, betreffen situaties waarin we dreiging 
ervaren, doelbewust pijn gedaan worden, niet gerespecteerd worden, beledigd worden, 
onrecht ervaren, ongewenste acties van anderen waarnemen en wanneer onze normen en 
waarden overschreden worden (Potegal & Novaco, 2010). Voornamelijk situaties die te 
voorkomen waren en waarin er doelbewust gehandeld werd, zullen boosheid ontlokken. Net 
als bij andere emoties, kan de intensiteit waarmee boosheid ervaren wordt op een 
continuüm geplaatst worden variërend van milde vormen van boosheid (bijvoorbeeld 
irritatie en ergernis) tot meer hevige vormen van boosheid (bijvoorbeeld kwaadheid, woede, 
razernij)33. Bovendien is boosheid, net als andere emoties, veelal van korte duur (Potegal & 
Qiu, 2010). Gewoonlijk houdt boosheid ongeveer zo’n vijf tot 15 minuten aan (Potegal & Qiu, 
2010). Echter, boos rumineren (herkauwen)34 en wraakgedachten kunnen de duur van 
boosheid behoorlijk verlengen (Novaco, 2011). Ook kan boosheid over langere tijdsperioden 
ervaren worden met een lage intensiteit (variërend van enkele uren tot enkele dagen); veelal 
spreken we dan van een boze stemming (Fernandez, 2013).   
                                                     
 
32 Hoewel boosheid als een basisemotie beschouwd wordt die universeel geuit en herkend 
wordt, kan de manier waarop boosheid geuit wordt per cultuur verschillen (Matsumoto et 
al., 2010). Sommigen wetenschappers veronderstellen zelfs dat woede een geleerd script 
betreft dat niet eenduidig en met absolute zekerheid gedefinieerd kan worden (Russell & 
Fehr, 1994). 
33 In dit proefschrift wordt boosheid gezien als één construct dat kan variëren in intensiteit in 
plaats van onderscheid te maken tussen kwalitatief verschillende vormen van boosheid.  
34 Boos rumineren betreft het langdurig, herhaaldelijk terugdenken aan een autobiografische 
betekenisvolle woede-opwekkende gebeurtenis.  
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  Net als bij andere emoties, wordt verondersteld dat boosheid een adaptieve functie 
heeft en ingebakken is ons neurobiologisch systeem (Panksepp, 1998). Sommige 
onderzoekers hangen het idee aan dat boosheid dient om sociale orde te versterken 
(Matsumoto et al., 2010), terwijl anderen geloven dat de belangrijkste functie van boosheid 
is om te voorkomen dat er wandaden tegen zichzelf gericht worden en om onderwerping 
aan anderen te voorkomen (Potegal & Stemmler, 2010b). Enigszins hieraan gerelateerd zijn 
enkele onderzoekers van mening dat boosheid voornamelijk dient om zich fysiek en 
geestelijk voor te bereiden op agressief gedrag (Berkowitz, 2012; Fessler, 2010).  
  Kort samengevat komt boosheid als emotionele staat universeel bij mensen voor en 
is boosheid in zekere mate functioneel en adaptief; afhankelijk van hoe het wordt geuit. 
Boosheid neemt echter disfunctionele vormen aan wanneer de boosheid ongepast en 
disproportioneel geuit wordt (i.e., te intens, te langdurig, te veelvuldig) en/of schade 
berokkent voor de persoon in kwestie of zijn of haar omgeving (Fernandez, 2013).  
  Een begrip dat nauw gerelateerd is aan disfunctionele boosheid (DiGiuseppe & 
Tafrate, 2004) en dat ingaat op individuele verschillen in hoe en wanneer boosheid ervaren 
wordt, betreft trait anger (Spielberger, 1999). Trait anger, in het Nederlands ook wel 
dispositie35 tot boosheid geheten (Hovens et al., 2014), kenmerkt zich door de neiging om 
een verscheidenheid aan situaties als vervelend of frustrerend te ervaren en op deze 
situaties met boosheid te reageren. Korter omschreven, omvat trait anger de neiging om 
frequent, langdurig en op een intense manier boosheid te ervaren. Niet verwonderlijk is een 
dispositie tot woede gekoppeld aan een tal van negatieve uitkomsten. Zo blijkt trait anger 
geassocieerd te zijn met agressief gedrag en geweld zowel binnen het laboratorium als 
daarbuiten, waaronder een verhoogde kans tot moord (DiGiuseppe & Tafrate, 2010), 
kindermishandeling (Nomellini & Katz, 1983), huiselijk geweld (Barbour et al., 1998), woede 
op de weg (Deffenbacher et al., 2001; Deffenbacher, 2013) en agressief gedrag na een 
                                                     
 
35 De term dispositie kan ook begrepen worden als ‘aanleg tot’ en wijst erop dat er sprake is 
van een persoonlijkheidskenmerk.  
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provocatie36 (Bettencourt et al., 2006). Zo blijken mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid 
wel drie keer zo vaak geneigd te zijn met agressief gedrag te reageren na provocatie in 
vergelijking tot low trait anger individuen (Tafrate et al., 2002). Naast de associatie met 
agressief- en gewelddadig gedrag is trait anger ook gerelateerd aan andere nadelige 
gevolgen, waaronder riskant rijgedrag (Deffenbacher et al., 2001), middelenmisbruik 
(Leibsohn et al., 1994; Shopshire & Reilly, 2013; Spielberger et al., 1995), suïcidaal37 gedrag 
(Daniel et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012), problemen in intieme relaties (Baron et al., 2006; 
Kassinove & Tafrate, 2002; Novaco, 2011), problemen op het werk (Douglas & Martinko, 
2001), gezondheidsproblemen (Baron et al., 2006; T. Smith et al., 2004), verlaagd algemeen 
welzijn (Mahon et al., 2000), comorbide psychopathologie38 (McDermut et al., 2009) en een 
verhoogde kans op negatieve behandeluitkomsten (Erwin et al., 2003; Fassino et al., 2003, 
2007; Mammen et al., 1997; Rizvi et al., 2009; Rüsch et al., 2008).  
  Kortweg kan geconcludeerd worden dat mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid een 
veelvuldigheid aan negatieve consequenties ervaren indien de boosheid onbehandeld blijft. 
Tot op heden is echter nog onduidelijk waarom sommige mensen gemakkelijk en in 
toenemende mate woedend en/ of agressief worden bij relatief kleine provocaties, terwijl de 
meeste mensen niet snel boos te krijgen zijn en hun kalmte weten te bewaren. Derhalve is 
het van essentieel belang om beter inzicht te krijgen in de factoren die aan deze schadelijke 
persoonlijkheidstrek ten grondslag liggen.  
  
                                                     
 
36 Provocatie staat voor uitlokken/ tergen.  
37 Suïcide betreft een ander woord voor zelfmoord.  
38 Comorbide psychopathologie staat voor het tegelijkertijd aanwezig zijn van meerdere 
psychiatrische stoornissen (mentale problemen).  
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Doel en relevantie van het huidige proefschrift 
Het huidige proefschrift heeft als belangrijkste doel om meer inzicht te verschaffen in welke 
(neuro)cognitieve processen39 een rol spelen bij (een dispositie tot) boosheid.  
 Een eerste belangrijke stap in die richting betrof de vertaling en validering40 van de 
Nederlandse versie van de State Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 
1999). In de klinische praktijk komen therapeuten veelvuldig in aanraking met boze 
patiënten waarbij hun boosheid zich veelal op disfunctionele wijze manifesteert (DiGiuseppe 
& Tafrate, 2004). Gedegen informatie over de vorm van boosheid die bij de patiënt aanwezig 
is (toestandsboosheid versus dispositieboosheid) en hoe de patiënt zijn boosheid reguleert 
en/of tot uiting laat komen, is van essentieel belang om de behandeling met succes te 
kunnen afronden. De STAXI-2 is wereldwijd één van de meest gebruikte meetinstrumenten 
om boosheid (zowel toestandsboosheid als een dispositie tot boosheid) en de uiting en 
regulatie hiervan in kaart te brengen. De STAXI-2 wordt beschouwd als een meetinstrument 
met sterke psychometrische eigenschappen41 en een sterke wetenschappelijk onderbouwde 
theoretische achtergrond (Eckhardt et al., 2004; Fernandez et al., 2015). Aan het begin van 
het promotietraject was de Nederlandse versie van de STAXI-2 echter nog niet beschikbaar. 
Bovendien was er beperkt informatie beschikbaar over hoe verschillende patiëntengroepen 
scoren op de STAXI-2 in vergelijking tot elkaar en in vergelijking tot een niet-klinische 
(“gezonde”) populatie. Het doel van het eerste onderzoek van dit promotietraject, zoals 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 2, betrof derhalve de vertaling en validering van de Nederlandse 
versie van de State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 (STAXI-2). Als subdoel werden 
                                                     
 
39 Aandacht, geheugen en interpretatie zijn voorbeelden van neurocognitieve processen. 
Verwacht wordt dat de invloed van een gebeurtenis wordt bepaald door hoe deze 
gebeurtenis in de hersenen verwerkt wordt.  
40 Valideren bekent ongeveer het wetenschappelijk toetsen van de kwaliteiten van een 
vragenlijst. 
41 Pyschometrische kwaliteiten betreffen statistische gegevens in hoeverre een 
meetinstrument betrouwbaar is en in welke mate het meetinstrument meet wat het 
behoort te meten.  
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daarnaast de scores van enkele klinische en niet-klinische steekproeven op deze vragenlijst 
met elkaar vergeleken.  
  Op het moment dat het promotietraject van start ging was er bovendien vrijwel geen 
onderzoek verricht met behulp van een electro-encephalogram (EEG)42 bij mensen met een 
dispositie tot boosheid. In het bijzonder ontbrak er kennis over neurocognitieve correlaten 
van cognitieve controle in relatie tot een dispositie tot boosheid, terwijl verscheidene 
theoretische cognitieve modellen suggereren dat cognitieve controle een belangrijke rol 
speelt bij een dispositie tot boosheid (DeWall et al., 2011; Finkel, 2007; Wilkowski et al., 
2010; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008b). Volgens deze theorieën zou cognitieve controle 
individuen namelijk in staat stellen hun boze en agressieve neigingen en gedachten te 
onderdrukken. Cognitieve controle verwijst naar het vermogen om flexibel, vrijwillig en op 
een adequate manier gedrag te coördineren ten behoeve van doelgericht gedrag (Luna et al., 
2004). Verschillende neurobiologische onderzoeken hebben aan de hand van neuroimaging 
technieken (bijv. een electro-encefalogram en functional magnetic resonance imaging 
[fMRI]) aangetoond dat meerdere afzonderlijke, doch op elkaar inwerkende, mentale 
processen van belang zijn bij cognitieve controle (Luna et al., 2004), waaronder, maar niet 
beperkend tot, impulscontrole en foutverwerking. Impulscontrole is bijvoorbeeld nodig om 
automatische, ongewenste en/of ongepaste gedragingen die niet in lijn liggen met een 
persoon zijn of haar lange termijn doelen te onderdrukken (Luijten et al., 2014). 
Foutverwerking is weer van belang om gedrag te monitoren en waar nodig bij te sturen om 
toekomstige fouten te verkomen (Luijten et al., 2014). Mensen met een dispositie tot 
boosheid zouden ofwel over onvoldoende cognitieve controle beschikken dan wel in 
provocerende situaties minder geneigd zijn deze cognitieve processen aan te spreken, 
hetgeen resulteert in frequentere en intensere boze buien. Belangrijk hierbij is dat 
                                                     
 
42 Hersencellen communiceren met elkaar door middel van elektrische signalen. EEG is een 
soort hersenscan, waarbij de elektrische activiteit van de hersenen wordt gemeten. 
Proefpersonen krijgen een soort badmuts op met elektrodes die de elektrische activiteit van 
de hersencellen meet. 
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verondersteld wordt dat beperkingen in cognitieve controle voornamelijk zichtbaar worden 
in situaties waarin boze gedachten geactiveerd zijn (Wilkowski et al., 2010). Door het EEG te 
gebruiken in combinatie met cognitieve taken ontstaat een beter beeld van de 
neurocognitieve processen die betrokken zijn bij een dispositie tot woede. Bovendien 
hebben EEG technieken het voordeel dat zij een meer directe en zodoende objectievere 
maat betreffen voor cognitieve processen die betrokken zijn bij een dispositie tot boosheid. 
Zo zijn deze maten bijvoorbeeld minder afhankelijk van de snelheid waarmee iemand 
reageert (reactiesnelheid) aangezien de activiteit in de hersenen direct gemeten wordt. 
Meer inzicht in de neurocognitieve achtergrond van een dispositie tot boosheid kan 
belangrijke informatie verschaffen over welke processen aangepakt dienen te worden in de 
behandeling. Een tweede doel van dit proefschrift was zodoende informatie te verschaffen 
over neurologische en gedragsmatige indicatoren van cognitieve controle (i.e., 
impulscontrole en foutverwerking) in relatie tot een dispositie tot woede onder condities 
waarin boosheid geactiveerd werd (zie hoofdstuk 3 & 4).  
  Tot slot is getracht kennis te verbreden over de invloed van cognitieve processen die 
betrokken zijn bij boosheid als emotionele staat, alsook hoe deze cognitieve processen met 
elkaar gerelateerd zijn, met behulp van experimentele onderzoeken (zie hoofdstuk 5 & 6). 
De meeste onderzoeken hebben tot nu toe cognitieve processen (interpretatie, cognitieve 
controle, ruminatie) in relatie tot een dispositie tot boosheid in isolatie onderzocht. De kans 
is echter groot dat risicofactoren op elkaar inwerken en gezamenlijk bepalen in welke mate 
een persoon geneigd is boosheid te ervaren; ook wel de combined cognitive bias hypothese 
geheten (Everaert et al., 2012). Derhalve is in dit proefschrift onderzocht in hoeverre 
cognitieve processen op elkaar inwerken met betrekking tot boosheid.  
  Cognitieve controle is tot dusverre benadert als een stabiele, vastliggende capaciteit 
waarbij individuen van elkaar kunnen verschillen wat betreft de mate waarin zij tot 
cognitieve controle beschikken. Een andere manier om cognitieve controle te benaderen, is 
door cognitieve controle te zien als een proces dat door de tijd heen kan verschillen en dat 
afhankelijk is van de staat waarin iemand verkeert. Zo kunnen mensen die in het algemeen 
over veel cognitieve controle beschikken in sommige situaties hun zelfgeduld verliezen (bijv. 
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een professor die vlak voor een deadline ontploft van woede wanneer zijn computer 
vastloopt). Tot op heden is nog onvoldoende kennis beschikbaar over waarom mensen in de 
meeste situaties hun kalmte weten te bewaren, terwijl zij in andere situaties door het minste 
geringste kunnen ontploffen. Volgens het Strenght Model of Self-Control van Baumeister 
(2007) kunnen tijdelijke verminderingen in zelfcontrole verklaard worden door eerdere 
pogingen zelfcontrole uit te oefenen, waardoor bronnen van zelfcontrole uitgeput raken 
(ook wel ego depletion geheten). Net als bij het leeg raken van spierkracht zou het 
simpelweg uitoefenen van zelfcontrole paradoxaal genoeg kunnen leiden tot minder 
zelfcontrole. Gebaseerd op de voorgaande theorie voorspeld het multiple systems model of 
angry rumination van Denson (2013) dat boos rumineren eveneens leidt tot minder 
zelfcontrole over boosheid met agressief gedrag als gevolg. Boos rumineren ontstaat 
voornamelijk door problemen in selectieve aandacht met het loslaten van woede-
gerelateerd materiaal (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). Praktisch gezien houdt boos rumineren 
in dat mensen (a) hun aandacht richten op negatieve boze buien, (b) ze woede-ervaringen 
uit het verleden herhaaldelijk blijven ophalen uit hun geheugen, (c) wraakfantasieën erop na 
houden en (d) ze continu nadenken over de oorzaken en gevolgen van de woedebuien 
(Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). Boos rumineren zou volgens dit model leiden tot dalingen in 
zelfcontrole, aangezien het inhiberen (remmen) van boze gevoelens, boze gedachten en 
agressief gedrag (ontstaan door boos rumineren) zelfcontrole zou kosten (Denson et al., 
2011). Aan de start van het project was er echter beperkt onderzoek beschikbaar waarin 
werd aangetoond dat boos rumineren daadwerkelijk tot een afname in zelfcontrole leidt. 
Ook bestond hevig debat over de mate waarin mislukte pogingen zichzelf te controleren 
daadwerkelijk verklaard kunnen worden door ego depletion. Sommige onderzoekers 
beargumenteren bijvoorbeeld dat veranderingen in motivationele processen beter in staat 
zijn reducties in zelfcontrole te voorspellen dan het leeg raken van zelfcontrole bronnen 
(Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Andere onderzoekers veronderstellen weer dat mentale 
vermoeidheid een betere verklaring biedt voor het verliezen van zelfcontrole dan ego 
depletion (Hagger et al., 2010). Mentale vermoeidheid (geestelijke vermoeidheid) beschrijft 
een toestand waarin personen een afkeer hebben tegen verdere inspanning, wat tevens 
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gepaard gaat met veranderingen in stemming, motivatie en de verwerking van informatie 
(Hopstaken et al., 2015). Een praktisch voorbeeld is bijvoorbeeld wanneer een persoon zich 
(a) vermoeid voelt, (b) minder concentratievermogen ervaart en (c) geen zin meer heeft in 
het afmaken van een taak, wanneer hij of zij daarvoor een lange mentaal inspannende 
vergadering heeft gehad. 
  Een belangrijke vraag bij de experimenten uit hoofdstuk 5 & 6 betrof zodoende in 
welke mate cognitieve controle tijdelijk afneemt als gevolg van mentale vermoeidheid en 
boos rumineren. Beter begrip van de invloed van mentale vermoeidheid en boos rumineren 
op boosheid en de controle over boosheid kan leiden tot beter inzicht in waarom mensen 
soms de controle over hun boosheid verliezen en tot agressief gedrag overgaan, terwijl zij in 
andere situaties de rust kunnen bewaren. 
  Hieronder volgt een samenvatting en discussie van de hoofdbevindingen, zoals 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 6. Eerst wordt echter kort omschreven hoe electro-
encephalogram (EEG) is toegepast binnen het huidige proefschrift.  
 
Elektro-encefalogram als methodiek 
Ten doeleinde meer zicht te krijgen op de relatie tussen neurale indicatoren van cognitieve 
controle en een dispositie tot boosheid, is binnen dit proefschrift vooral gebruik gemaakt 
van EEG als neuroimaging techniek, waarbij gebruik is gemaakt van event-related potentials 
(ERPs). Een event-related potential houdt een door een stimulus opgeroepen patroon van 
positieve dan wel negatieve electrofysiologische activiteit in ten tijde van een specifieke 
gebeurtenis, zoals gemeten met een EEG (Fabiani et al., 2000). Aan verschillende cognitieve 
functies zijn verschillende ERPs verbonden. Met betrekking tot foutverwerking zijn twee 
ERPs van belang, te weten de Error-Related Negativity (ERN) en de Error Positivity (Pe). De 
ERN betreft een elektro-negatieve golf die kort (gemiddeld 50-100ms) na het maken van een 
fout tijdens de uitvoering van reactietijd taken43 ontstaat, zoals een GoNoGo taak, en wordt 
                                                     
 
43 Reactietijdtaken zijn taken waarop de proefpersonen snel een reactie dient te geven.  
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43 Reactietijdtaken zijn taken waarop de proefpersonen snel een reactie dient te geven.  
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verondersteld foutverwerking op onbewust niveau te reflecteren (Bernstein et al., 1995; 
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stimulus ontstaat en wordt verondersteld een index voor stimulus evaluatietijd te 
reflecteren (Kok et al., 2004; Verleger et al., 2006). Verscheidene onderzoeken hebben 
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onderdrukken op reactietijdtaken (Falkenstein et al., 1999; Falkenstein, 2006; Luijten et al., 
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Samenvatting onderzoeksbevindingen 
Uit de resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 kwam naar voren dat de STAXI-2 een betrouwbaar en 
valide meetinstrument is om de ervaring, expressie en regulatie van boosheid vast te stellen. 
De betrouwbaarheid van de STAXI-2 bleek uit een voldoende interne consistentie (Cronbachs 
alpha) en test-hertest betrouwbaarheid44. De concurrente validiteit45 werd eveneens 
ondersteund middels betekenisvolle (inter)correlaties tussen de STAXI-2 schalen en aan 
boosheid-gerelateerde constructen (agressie, vijandigheid, impulsiviteit) in zowel de 
                                                     
 
44 Test-hertest betrouwbaarheid geeft de mate aan waarin een test twee keer hetzelfde 
resultaat geeft. Indien je een persoonlijkheidskenmerk meet, verwacht je dat de test bij een 
tweede afname grotendeels dezelfde resultaten geeft.  
45 Concurrente validiteit geeft de mate aan waarin de score op het meetinstrument 
samenhangt met de score op een ander meetinstrument dat ongeveer hetzelfde meet. Zo 
verwacht je dat boosheid sterker samenhangt met een meetinstrument voor agressie dan 
een meetinstrument die de hoeveelheid vreetbuien meet.  
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klinische als niet-klinische steekproeven. Tevens werd een factorstructuur46 overeenkomend 
met Spielberger’s (1999) originele conceptualisatie gevonden waarmee zowel de 
constructvaliditeit als crossculturele validiteit ondersteund werd. Met betrekking tot de 
criteriumvaliditeit toonde het huidige onderzoek aan dat psychiatrische patiënten vaker 
geneigd zijn boosheid te ervaren en te uiten in vergelijking tot niet-klinische (“gezonde”) 
populaties. Bovenal werd gevonden dat ambulant behandelde forensische psychiatrische 
patiënten met verslavingsproblemen meer geneigd zijn hun boosheid fysiek en verbaal te 
uiten dan de overige psychiatrische patiënten, ondanks dat zij niet verschillen van de overige 
patiënten wat betreft de ervaring en regulatie van hun boosheid. Ofwel de forensische 
psychiatrische patiënten verschilden niet van de overige patiënten in de frequentie waarmee 
ze boosheid ervoeren en waren evenveel geneigd hun boosheid onder controle te krijgen. 
Deze resultaten impliceren dus dat de manier waarop forensische psychiatrische patiënten 
hun boosheid uiten van groter belang is dan de frequentie waarmee zij hun boosheid 
ervaren en dat behandelingen zich vooral moeten richten op het aanleren van meer 
constructieve (minder agressieve) manieren om boosheid te uiten. Concluderend kan gesteld 
worden dat de STAXI-2, waaronder de Nederlandse versie, een waardevol, wetenschappelijk 
onderbouwd meetinstrument is voor clinici en onderzoekers die boosheid in kaart willen 
brengen.  
 Het doel van het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 was te onderzoeken of 
mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid gekenmerkt worden door een verminderde 
responsinhibitie en foutverwerking middels gedragsmatige en neurale indicatoren. Hierbij 
werd tevens gekeken of problemen met impulscontrole sterker aanwezig waren indien 
boosheid geactiveerd werd. Voor dit doeleinde werd gebruik gemaakt van een affectieve 
GoNoGo taak waarbij neutrale en aan boosheid gerelateerde plaatjes getoond werden. Een 
                                                     
 
46 De factorstructuur geeft aan in welke mate bepaalde items (vragen) onderdeel uitmaken 
van een overkoepelende term. Zo verwacht je dat wanneer twee vragen over 
aantrekkelijkheid gaan en twee vragen over eendjes, dat de twee vragen over 
aantrekkelijkheid sterker met elkaar samenhangen en tot de factor ‘aantrekkelijkheid’ 
behoren, terwijl de vragen over eendjes tot de factor ‘eendjes’ behoren.  
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GoNoGo taak betreft een taak waarbij proefpersonen vrijwel continu een reactie dienen te 
geven door een toets in te drukken op Go trials en slechts af en toe bij de vertoning van een 
NoGo trial hun gedrag dienen te onderdrukken. Doordat er infrequent op onverwachtse 
momenten een respons onderdrukt dient te worden, maakt de taak sterk aanspraak op 
impulscontrole. De gedragsmatige data (accuratesse) en ERPs geassocieerd met 
impulscontrole (N2, P3) en foutverwerking (ERN, en Pe) werden tijdens uitvoering van deze 
taak gemeten. Groepen met extreme scores op de Trait Anger schaal van de STAXI-2 werden 
geselecteerd, resulterend in 45 mensen met een lage dispositie tot boosheid (LTA) en 49 
mensen met een hoge dispositie tot boosheid (HTA). Er werd ten eerste verwacht dat HTA 
mensen minder goed in staat zouden zijn hun responsen te onderdrukken, wat zou blijken 
uit een lagere accuratesse en verlaagde N2 en P3 amplitudes op NoGo trials. Ten tweede 
werd verwacht dat het vermogen responsen te onderdrukken in grotere mate verminderd 
zou zijn op het moment dat aan boosheid gerelateerde plaatjes getoond zouden worden. Tot 
slot was de verwachting dat HTA mensen in mindere mate fouten zouden verwerken, 
hetgeen zou blijken uit verlaagde ERN en Pe amplitudes tijdens het maken van fouten. In 
tegenstelling tot onze verwachting presteerden beide groepen even goed op de affectieve 
GoNoGo taak. Evenmin vonden we groepsverschillen op de N2 en P3 golven ongeacht of er 
neutrale plaatjes dan wel aan boosheid gerelateerde plaatjes werden getoond. Wel werd 
gevonden dat de N2 en P3 amplitudes verhoogd waren op NoGo trials ten opzichte van Go 
trials, waaruit we kunnen opmaken dat de taak heeft gewerkt zoals beoogd. De beschreven 
resultaten tonen aan dat mensen met een sterke dispositie tot boosheid niet verschillen van 
mensen met een lage dispositie tot boosheid wat betreft impulscontrole. Met betrekking tot 
foutverwerking vonden we wel verlaagde Pe amlitudes na het maken van fouten bij HTA 
individuen in vergelijking tot LTA individuen. De groepen verschilden echter niet van elkaar 
op de ERN golven. Deze resultaten tonen aan dat HTA individuen gekenmerkt worden door 
een verminderde verwerking van fouten tijdens de meer bewuste fase van foutverwerking 
en een minder diepe verwerking van fouten in de hersenen. Deze bevindingen komen 
overeen met enkele neuroimaging onderzoeken waarin verlaagde activatie van 
hersengebieden gerelateerd aan de continue evaluatie van gedrag (ofwel de anteriore 
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cingulate cortex en de orbitofrontale cortex) gevonden wordt in disfunctioneel boze 
patiëntenpopulaties (Blair, 2012; Coccaro et al., 2007; Davidson, 2000; Fulwiler et al., 2012). 
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan de literatuur door een relatie tussen verstoorde foutverwerking 
en een disposititie tot boosheid eveneens aan te tonen bij een gezonde steekproef.  
  Waarbij voor het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 gekozen werd voor een 
design met extreme groepen, is in hoofdstuk 4 voor een correlationeel design gekozen 
waarin trait anger als continue maat werd meegenomen. Bovendien werd ditmaal een 
forensisch psychiatrische steekproef getest in plaats van een steekproef studenten. Het 
hoofddoel van het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 was om te achterhalen of de scores 
op de trait anger schaal van forensische psychiatrische patiënten geassocieerd waren met 
individuele variaties in impulscontrole en foutverwerking gemeten middels gedragsmatige 
en neurologische indicatoren. Gebruikmakend van dezelfde GoNoGo taak als in hoofdstuk 3 
werden accuratesse en ERPs (N2, P3, Pe & ERN) gemeten bij 38 forensisch psychiatrische 
patiënten met een matig tot hoog recidiverisico47 op crimineel gedrag. Verwacht werd dat 
scores op de trait anger schaal bij deze misdadigers negatief zouden samenhangen met het 
vermogen responsen te onderdrukken op NoGo trials alsook met de ERPs gerelateerd aan 
impulscontrole (N2 en P3 golven). Net als bij hoofdstuk 3 werd verwacht dat deze effecten 
sterker aanwezig zouden zijn voor aan boosheid gerelateerde plaatjes dan voor neutrale 
plaatjes. Tot slot was onze verwachting dat verhoogde scores op de trait anger schaal 
zouden samengaan met ERPs gerelateerd aan foutverwerking (ofwel verlaagde ERN en Pe 
golven). In lijn der verwachting vonden we dat hogere scores op de trait anger schaal samen 
gingen met verlaagde prestaties op NoGo trials; met nog sterkere effecten voor NoGo trials 
waarbij aan boosheid gerelateerde plaatjes werden getoond. Deze bevindingen zijn in lijn 
met het cognitieve model van trait anger en reactieve agressie ontwikkeld door Wilkowski 
en Robinson (2008b, 2010), waarin verondersteld wordt dat impulscontrole ten tijde van 
vijandige situaties een belangrijke rol speelt in het verklaren van een dispositie tot boosheid. 
                                                     
 
47 Recidiverisico staat voor de kans dat een persoon terugvalt in bepaald (veelal ongewenst) 
gedrag.  
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In tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen vonden we echter geen samenhang tussen scores op 
de trait anger schaal en de neurologische indices van impulscontrole (N2 & P3).  
  Verlaagde N2 en P3 amplitudes worden herhaaldelijk aangetoond in steekproeven 
met impulsieve agressieve misdadigers (Chen et al., 2005; Guan et al., 2015; Munro et al., 
2007b; Vilà-Balló et al., 2014). Onze steekproef was vrij heterogeen (i.e. misdadigers met 
verschillende vormen van onderliggende psychopathologie), hetgeen deze onverwachte 
tegenstrijdige bevinding met eerder onderzoek mogelijk kan verklaren. Een andere 
verklaring voor deze onverwachtse bevinding is dat neurale indicatoren van impulscontrole 
mogelijk wel geassocieerd zijn met impulsieve agressieve gedragingen, maar niet zozeer met 
een dispositie tot boosheid. Met betrekking tot de foutverwerking vonden we in dit 
onderzoek geen associatie tussen een dispositie tot boosheid met Pe golven, maar wel een 
negatieve samenhang tussen een dispositie tot boosheid en ERN amplitudes. Anders 
omschreven vonden we dat hogere scores op de trait anger schaal samengingen met 
verlaagde ERN golven, hetgeen impliceert dat wanneer de patiënt hoger scoort op een 
dispositie tot boosheid hij of zij fouten minder goed detecteert op onbewust niveau.  
  Kort samenvattend kunnen we uit de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 4 opmaken dat in 
een forensische psychiatrische populatie een dispositie tot boosheid geassocieerd is met een 
verminderd vermogen gedrag te onderdrukken op gedragsmatig niveau en een verminderde 
foutverwerking op onbewust niveau in de hersenen.  
  In het kort kan men uit de resultaten van hoofdstuk 3 en 4 concluderen dat een 
dispositie tot boosheid gerelateerd is aan een verminderde verwerking van fouten. De 
verminderde foutverwerking speelt vermoedelijk een rol bij mensen met een dispositie tot 
boosheid in de voortzetting van impulsief gedrag ondanks de negatieve gevolgen. Resultaten 
met betrekking tot impulscontrole waren gemengd, waarbij een dispositie tot boosheid 
binnen de forensisch psychiatrische steekproef enkel op gedragsmatig niveau geassocieerd 
werd met impulscontrole. Er werd geen bewijs gevonden voor een relatie tussen een 
dispositie tot boosheid en impulscontrole op neurofysiologisch gebied; zelfs niet in de 
klinische steekproef. Er is duidelijk behoefte aan meer onderzoek waarin de 
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randvoorwaarden wat betreft de relatie tussen trait anger en impulscontrole verhelderd 
worden.  
 Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft een experimenteel onderzoek waarin getracht werd de 
invloed van boos rumineren op boosheid en zelfcontrole te meten in vergelijking tot 
afleiding. Boosheid werd gemeten aan de hand van zelfrapportage middels visueel analoge 
schalen. Zelfcontrole werd gemeten met behulp van een affectieve GoNoGo taak. Verwacht 
werd dat proefpersonen die geïnstrueerd werden om te rumineren (herhaaldelijk 
terugdenken aan de boze situatie) meer boosheid zouden rapporteren en meer fouten 
zouden maken op NoGo trials op de affectieve NoGo taak in vergelijking met proefpersonen 
die via instructies werden afgeleid. Allereerst werden alle proefpersonen uit beide groepen 
geïnstrueerd een autobiografische herinnering waarin zij ontzettend boos waren op te 
roepen en te bespreken met de proefleider met als doel bij de proefpersonen boosheid op te 
wekken. Zowel voor als na de woede-inductie werd de stemming van de proefpersonen 
gemeten. Vervolgens werden proefpersonen verdeeld over ofwel een ruminatie conditie (n = 
37) dan wel een afleidingsconditie (n = 35). Proefpersonen in de ruminatie conditie werden 
gevraagd de boze herinnering wederom terug te halen in hun gedachten en zich te richten 
op de emotionele aspecten van de gebeurtenis. Proefpersonen in de afleidingsconditie 
werden geïnstrueerd in gedachten te visualiseren hoe de campus eruit ziet. Tot slot 
indiceerden de proefpersonen nogmaals hun stemming en voltooiden zij de affectieve 
GoNOGo taak. In overeenstemming met voorgaand onderzoek toonden de resultaten aan 
dat boos rumineren leidde tot een toename in boosheid, terwijl afleiding zorgde voor een 
daling in boosheid (Bushman, 2002; Denson, Moulds, et al., 2012; Denson, 2013; Fabiansson 
et al., 2012; Konecni, 1974; Mischkowski et al., 2012; Ray et al., 2008; Rusting & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998). Echter, in tegenstelling tot onze verwachting, presteerden beiden groepen 
even goed op de GoNoGo taak, hetgeen betekent dat zelfcontrole niet anders beïnvloed 
werd door boos rumineren dan door afleiding. De meest logische verklaring voor de huidige 
bevindingen is dat boze ruminatie leidt tot een toename in boosheid, maar geen invloed 
uitoefent op zelfcontrole; althans niet op impulscontrole zoals gemeten met een affectieve 
GoNoGo taak.  
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  In hoofdstuk 6 wordt tot slot een experimenteel onderzoek beschreven waarin de 
invloed van een mentaal vermoeiende taak (n-back taak) op boosheid en controle over 
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 Indien we de resultaten uit hoofdstuk 5 en 6 tezamen nemen, kunnen we 
concluderen dat hoewel boos rumineren en mentale vermoeidheid gepaard gaan met 
toenames in boosheid, maar desondanks niet zozeer leiden tot ego depletion (tijdelijke 
verlagingen in zelfcontrole). Zodoende is er binnen het huidige proefschrift geen empirische 
ondersteuning gevonden voor associaties tussen cognitieve processen die betrokken zijn bij 
een dispositie tot boosheid en agressief gedrag.  
 
Beperkingen van de huidige onderzoeken 
De onderzoeken uitgevoerd in dit proefschrift zijn niet vrij van beperkingen. Ten eerste kan 
vanwege het cross-sectionele aard van de onderzoeken beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 & 4 geen 
conclusie woorden getrokken over oorzaak en gevolg. Ondanks dat een samenhang is 
aangetoond, blijft het zodoende onduidelijk of de neurocognitieve processen geassocieerd 
met een dispositie tot boosheid risicofactoren dan wel bijverschijnselen betreffen. Zo is het 
net zo goed mogelijk dat een derde onbekende variabele de samenhang tussen 
neurocognitieve processen en een dispositie tot boosheid verklaart. Gezien de heterogene 
groep die is onderzocht in hoofdstuk 4 is deze verklaring niet uitgesloten. Zo bestaat de 
mogelijkheid dat een dispositie tot boosheid een symptoom betreft van een onderliggende 
externaliserende stoornis die gekenmerkt wordt door een lagere ERN (Olvet & Hajcak, 2008), 
zoals een antisociale persoonlijkheidsstoornis. Een tweede beperking is dat experimentele 
onderzoeken enkel een oorzakelijke relatie kunnen aantonen tussen neurocognitieve 
processen en boosheid als emotionele staat, maar niet tussen neurocognitieve processen en 
een dispositie tot boosheid. Longitudinaal onderzoek (gedurende een langere periode met 
herhaaldelijke metingen) is zodoende van belang om aan te kunnen tonen dat verstoorde 
neurocognitieve processen leiden tot een dispositie tot boosheid. Een andere belangrijke 
beperking is dat de boosheid die is opgewekt in de huidige experimenten mogelijk niet 
intens genoeg is geweest om effecten te vinden op impulscontrole (H3 & H4) en zelfcontrole 
(H5 & H6). Mogelijk dient boosheid in hevige mate aanwezig te zijn alvorens het zelfcontrole 
beïnvloed (Potegal & Qiu, 2010). Een vierde beperking is gekoppeld aan het feit dat een 
dispositie tot boosheid in dit proefschrift is gemeten met behulp van zelfrapportage. 
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Aangezien zelfrapportage afhankelijk is van sociale wenselijkheid en zelfinzicht (Hornsveld, 
2007; McEwan et al., 2009) is replicatie van belang waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van 
objectieve maten. Een andere beperking heeft te maken met de GoNoGo taak die is gebruikt 
in dit proefschrift. Aangezien de neutrale foto’s altijd als eerst werden getoond, kan een 
verminderde prestatie op vijandige plaatjes ook te wijten zijn aan volgorde-effecten (bijv. 
vermoeidheid). Andere resultaten waren wellicht verkregen indien een random design (type 
plaatje variërend per plaatje) werd gekozen in plaats van een blocked design (dezelfde types 
foto’s per blok). Ook had counterbalancing (waarbij sommige proefpersonen beginnen met 
de neutrale foto’s terwijl anderen beginnen met de vijandige foto’s) tot andere resultaten 
kunnen leiden. Tot slot bestaat er een mogelijkheid dat effecten met een kleine 
effectgrootte niet zijn opgemerkt vanwege een gebrekkige power (te weinig proefpersonen).  
 Een belangrijke vraag betreft tot slot in welke mate de effecten die zijn gevonden bij 
subklinisch boze populaties (ofwel relatief gezonde, hoog opgeleide studenten die kampen 
met een dispositie tot boosheid) te generaliseren vallen naar groepen patiënten die voor 
hun boosheid behandeld worden. De bevinding dat een verlaagde impulscontrole wel bij 
patiënten werd gevonden, maar niet bij studenten onderstreept het belang van deze vraag.  
 
Klinische toepassing en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek 
De STAXI-2 blijkt een klinisch relevant meetinstrument waarmee de ervaring, expressie en 
regulatie van boosheid in kaart kan worden gebracht. Gelijkend aan de Engelstalige versie, 
kan de Nederlandse versie van de STAXI-2 gebruikt worden om de aanwezigheid van 
boosheid en de manier hoe patiënten met hun boosheid omgaan te onderzoeken. De 
Nederlandse versie van de STAXI-2 kan eveneens ingezet worden om de effectiviteit van 
behandelingen te evalueren. Een interessante onderzoeksvraag betreft hoe impulsieve 
gewelddadige misdadigers zouden scoren op de STAXI-2 en maten voor cognitieve controle 
in vergelijking met overgecontroleerde gewelddadige misdadigers die gekenmerkt worden 
door een plotselinge boze uitbarsting nadat zij hun boosheid gedurende een langer periode 
hebben ingehouden (Davey et al., 2005). Hoewel vragenlijsten van toegevoegde waarde zijn, 
dient toekomstig onderzoek zich eveneens te richten op het ontwikkelen van verschillende 
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meer objectieve maten waarmee een dispositie tot boosheid in kaart kan worden gebracht 
(Hornsveld, 2007). Zo kan gebruik gemaakt worden van ecological momentary asessments 
om de aanwezigheid van een dispositie tot boosheid en de mate waarin cognitieve 
processen hieraan ten grondslag liggen te onderzoeken (R. C. Martin & Vieaux, 2013). In het 
huidige proefschrift is vooral gekeken naar de relatie tussen een dispositie tot boosheid en 
cognitieve controle. Toekomstig onderzoek zou zich kunnen richten op de relatie tussen 
cognitieve controle en de expressie en regulatieschalen van de STAXI-2.  
  De correlationele en experimentele onderzoeken beschreven in het huidige 
proefschrift zijn van dusdanig fundamentele aard dat de directe toepasbaarheid in de 
klinische praktijk nog op zich laat wachten. Ondanks dat het mogelijk wat zal tijd vergen 
voordat deze fundamentele bevindingen vertaald kunnen worden naar de klinische praktijk, 
hebben de bevindingen belangrijke theoretische implicaties en bieden ze een aantal 
aanknopingspunten voor toekomstig onderzoek. Zo kan het EEG bijvoorbeeld in de toekomst 
ingezet worden als diagnostisch instrument in de behandeling van disfunctionele boosheid. 
Voornamelijk de ERN en de Pe amplitudes bezitten goede psychometrische kwaliteiten 
(Hofmann et al., 2012; Olvet & Hajcak, 2009; Rietdijk et al., 2014) en zouden ingezet kunnen 
worden om te informeren welke individuen een verhoogd risico lopen op een terugval in 
ongewenst (agressief) gedrag. De ERPs zouden eveneens gebruikt kunnen worden om de 
effectiviteit en/of uitval van agressietherapie en woedebeheersing te voorspellen. 
Voorgaand onderzoek op het gebied van middelenafhankelijkheid heeft bijvoorbeeld 
aangetoond dat de aanwezigheid van gebrekkige cognitieve controle voorspellend is voor (a) 
een verminderd vermogen om het eigen gedrag als problematisch in te zien, (b) een 
verlaagde motivatie voor behandeling en (c) een verhoogde kans op vroegtijdige staking van 
de behandeling (Ersche & Sahakian, 2007; Severtson et al., 2010). Soortgelijke resultaten zijn 
te verwachten voor mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid. Echter, voordat het EEG als 
diagnostisch instrument ingezet kan worden, zal toekomstig onderzoek de predictieve 
validiteit (ofwel de sensitiviteit en specificiteit) van de ERN en de Pe dienen aan te tonen met 
betrekking tot een dispositie tot woede en een recidiverisico voor gewelddadig gedrag.  
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  Hoewel EEG onderzoeken belangrijke informatie verschaffen over de timing van 
cognitieve processen in de hersenen, verschaffen zij weinig inzicht over welke 
hersengebieden geactiveerd zijn tijdens deze neurocognitieve processen. Derhalve, zijn 
andere imaging technieken, zoals Functional Magnetic Resonance Imgaging, Structual 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging en Diffusion Tensor Imganing, van belang om meer inzicht te 
krijgen over neurocognitieve aspecten die betrokken zijn bij een dispositie tot boosheid. Ook 
dient vervolgonderzoek zich te richten op hoe de hersengebieden die onderliggend zijn aan 
de cognitieve processen met elkaar verbonden zijn door te kijken naar de functionele 
connectiviteit (zie bijvoorbeeld Fulwiler et al., 2012). Tot slot kan de invloed van cognitieve 
controle onderzocht dan wel versterkt worden bij mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid 
met behulp van neurofeedback, deep brain stimulation en transcraniële magnetische 
stimulatie. Recente onderzoeken hebben eveneens aangetoond dat cognitieve bias 
modificatie paradigma’s effectief kunnen zijn in het verminderen van boosheid en agressie 
(Wilkowski et al., 2015).  
 Het is eveneens van belang dat vervolgonderzoek zich richt op de rol die 
neurocognitieve processen spelen bij een dispositie tot boosheid onder condities waarin 
sprake is van emotionele opwinding en hevige provocatie. Zo zou men eerst een woede-
inductie of stressinductie kunnen toepassen alvorens de activiteit en invloed van 
neurocognitieve functies bij mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid te onderzoeken. Binnen 
gesloten instituten biedt virtual reality technologie hiertoe een uitkomst. Door gebruik te 
maken van deze relatief nieuwe technieken kunnen patiënten blootgesteld worden aan 
situaties die boosheid ontlokken onder gecontroleerde omstandigheden.  
  Verder zou het interessant zijn om te onderzoeken in welke mate gefaalde pogingen 
boosheid en agressie te controleren, worden beïnvloed door motivationele processen. Uit de 
resultaten van het huidige proefschrift komen geen objectieve verminderingen in cognitieve 
controle capaciteiten naar voren als gevolg van toenames in boosheid of vermoeidheid. 
Mogelijk speelt de perceptie die een persoon heeft over zijn vermogen zichzelf te 
controleren een grotere rol dan zijn of haar daadwerkelijke capaciteit zichzelf te controleren. 
Mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid dienen zich bewust gemaakt te worden van het feit 
Nederlandse samenvatting
 214 
  
dat zij hoogstwaarschijnlijk voldoende capaciteiten beschikken om zichzelf te reguleren 
ondanks dat zij vermoeid of in een geagiteerde staat verkeren. Door deze informatie kenbaar 
te maken voelen mensen met een dispositie tot boosheid zich mogelijk meer 
verantwoordelijk voor hun acties dan wel vaardiger, waardoor zij wellicht meer controle 
zullen vertonen over hun boosheid en agressie in provocerende situaties. Eveneens zou het 
interessant zijn om te onderzoeken hoe verstoringen in de beschreven (neuro)cognitieve 
processen zich ontwikkelen. Er zijn bijvoorbeeld indicaties dat verstoringen in 
informatieverwerking die gerelateerd zijn aan een dispositie tot boosheid ontwikkelen als 
gevolg van een hardhandige aanpak van ouders (Dodge, 2006; Pollak et al., 2000). Tot slot is 
er behoefte aan meer onderzoek waarin de wisselwerking tussen meerdere neurocognitieve 
processen betrokken bij een dispositie tot boosheid onderzocht wordt.  
 
Slotconclusie 
Gebaseerd op de onderzoeken beschreven in dit proefschrift kunnen enkele belangrijke 
conclusies worden getrokken. Allereerst kan geconcludeerd worden dat de STAXI-2 een 
betrouwbaar meetinstrument is die door clinici en onderzoekers gebruikt kan worden om de 
ervaring, expressie en regulatie van boosheid te meten. Ten tweede blijkt een dispositie tot 
boosheid gerelateerd aan verminderde cognitieve controle in zowel neutrale als vijandige 
condities, waarbij verstoringen in de foutverwerking het meest consistent gerelateerd zijn 
aan een dispositie tot boosheid. Verminderde impulscontrole in relatie tot een dispositie tot 
boosheid kon niet consistent aangetoond worden; ook niet onder condities waarin boosheid 
werd opgeroepen. Tot slot toont dit proefschrift aan dat ondanks dat boos rumineren en 
mentale vermoeidheid samenhangen met toenames in boosheid, deze processen geen tot 
een beperkte invloed hebben op cognitieve controle. Over het geheel genomen worden 
belangrijke neurocognitieve inzichten geboden met betrekking tot een dispositie tot 
boosheid, waarmee beter begrip is ontstaan voor waarom mensen met een dispositie tot 
boosheid frequent boos worden en impulsieve gedragingen voortzetten ondanks de 
negatieve gevolgen op lange termijn.  
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Bij de term “onderzoeker” ontstaat al snel het beeld van een ongeschoren, geïsoleerde in 
zichzelf mompelende man die uit het niets EUREKA noemt. Niets bleek echter minder waar: 
onderzoek is teamwerk en onderzoekers blijken ook nog eens vlotte, interessante, leuke 
mensen te zijn waarmee je prettig kan samenwerken. Ik wil graag mijn dank en waardering 
uitspreken voor de mensen die met hun steun, kennis, wijsheid, bemoedigende woorden en 
raad en daad hebben bijgedragen aan dit proefschrift.  
  Allereerst wil ik mijn dank betuigen aan mijn (co)promoteren zonder wiens hulp dit 
proefschrift er niet had gelegen.  
  Professor Hovens, beste Hans, er zijn weinig mensen die me keer op keer weten te 
boeien met hun kennis en verhalen, maar u is dat gelukt. Ik heb veel geleerd van uw 
wijsheid, praktische oplossingen en uw klinische, nuchtere kijk op zaken. Ik heb zowel de 
inhoudelijke alsook de wat meer luchtige gesprekken over zaken als reizen, films en het 
leven an sich, zeer gewaardeerd. Bedankt voor het vertrouwen en de betrokkenheid die u 
gedurende het hele project in mij heeft getoond. Of u nu gewoon thuis was, dan wel ver van 
huis in onder andere Californië, Israël, Rusland en Malawi verkeerde, u stond altijd vrijwel 
direct voor mij klaar en wist boven verwachting snel te reageren met waardevolle tips.  
  Ook mijn promotor professor Ingmar Franken ben ik erg dankbaar. Beste Ingmar, ik 
heb ontzettende waardering voor jouw integriteit. Ik vind het bijzonder knap hoe jij keer op 
keer de persoonlijke ontwikkeling van je promovendi voorop stelt. Ik voelde me door jou 
gesteund in mijn groeiproces als onderzoeker en ik ben het persoonlijke contact met de tijd 
meer en meer gaan waarderen. Ik kijk met veel plezier terug naar de borrelmomenten 
waarbij ik naast je bescheiden kant ook je meer feestelijke kant heb mogen ontdekken. Ik 
heb daarnaast ontzettende waardering voor hoe jij met soms kleine tips en subtiele 
opmerkingen artikelen substantieel weet te verbeteren. Ik kijk er naar uit verder aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit verbonden te blijven, wetende dat we elkaar daar nog vaak zullen 
treffen.  
  Dr. van der Veen, beste Freddy, als dagelijks begeleider (copromotor) stond jij 
eveneens dagelijks voor me klaar met wijze raad en daad. Jij wist ondanks de hectiek van alle 
dag frequent tijd voor mijn vragen vrij te maken om mij te adviseren, waardoor ik meestal 
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Erasmus Universiteit verbonden te blijven, wetende dat we elkaar daar nog vaak zullen 
treffen.  
  Dr. van der Veen, beste Freddy, als dagelijks begeleider (copromotor) stond jij 
eveneens dagelijks voor me klaar met wijze raad en daad. Jij wist ondanks de hectiek van alle 
dag frequent tijd voor mijn vragen vrij te maken om mij te adviseren, waardoor ik meestal 
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direct weer verder kon. Jouw gedegen commentaar op mijn papers, oprechte interesse en 
droge humor maakte de samenwerking voor mij meer dan prettig. Dank hiervoor!  
  Dr. Huijding, beste Jorg, de brainstormsessies met jou zal ik niet snel vergeten. Je 
vragen stimuleerde mij iedere keer weer tot nadenken en je enthousiaste pogingen om de 
theorie volledig te doorgronden werkte aanstekelijk. Ook bleken je tekstuele wijzigingen 
vaak van essentieel belang. Toen de moed mij langzaam in de schoenen begon te zakken, 
wist jij mij direct weer op te peppen en te motiveren. Dat was een leerzame ervaring en 
hiervoor ben ik je zeer dankbaar!  
  Ook mijn oud begeleider dr. Elke Geraerts neemt voor mij een belangrijke plaats in. 
Elke, sinds het eerste contact had jij vertrouwen in mij en konden we goed met elkaar 
overweg. Jij stimuleerde mij om de kans om te promoveren met beide handen aan te pakken 
en hebt mij zodoende gebracht tot waar ik nu ben. Ik heb ontzettende waardering voor hoe 
jij de wetenschap voor een breed publiek weet te vertalen naar de praktijk. Ik hoop nog vaak 
met je te samenwerken en je in de toekomst te blijven zien. 
 Zonder mijn kamergenoten, Jesper Hopstaken en Vincent Hoogerheide had dit 
project nooit zo prettig, leerzaam en lollig geweest als dat het was. De combinatie van 
enerzijds waardevolle, praktische en handige tips en anderzijds ontzettend veel lol en 
humor, maakte dat ik elk dag met plezier naar mijn werk ging. Wellicht is het power hour 
hier wel het beste voorbeeld van: enerzijds stimuleerde dit om iedere dag gericht aan mooie 
publicaties te werken, anderzijds leidde dit op slechte dagen (of goede?) dagen ertoe dat het 
soms bij dat ene uurtje bleef…..Doordat we allen hetzelfde proces doorliepen, wisten we 
elkaar competitief uit te dagen (alle papers op het prikbord, trakteren bij een publicatie, 
kamer met de hoogste Impact factor?), maar ook mental support te bieden. Ik kan oprecht 
zeggen dat ik er goede vrienden aan heb over gehouden! Mannen, bedankt voor de mooie 
tijd!  
 Mijn collega’s bij het Instituut voor Psychologie hebben mij altijd een warm gevoel 
gegeven en steun en gezelligheid geboden; bedankt hiervoor. In het bijzonder wil ik de C3-
ers (Lydia Arends, Kim Bul, Linda Dekker, Sanne van Dongen, Ingmar Franken, Colin van der 
Heiden, Pauline Jansen, Marlies Marissen, Birgit Mayer, Marieke van Meggelen, Martijn 
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Oostra, Marike Polak, Daniëlle Remmerswaal, Susan van Rijen, Guus Smeets, Freddy van der 
Veen, Ilse Verveer, Marjolein Wals) bedanken voor hun betrokkenheid en waardevolle 
feedback op mijn onderzoek. Mijn oud-kamergenoten Anita Eerland, Marijntje Zeijen, Mario 
de Jonge, Maartje Luijten en Ali Mohd Bin MD Salim [die jammer genoeg te vroeg is 
heengegaan] wil ik bedanken voor de gesprekken en ondersteuning. Oud-promovendi 
Angela Nederlof, Reshmi Marhe, Maartje Luijten, Anita Euser en Marianne Littel wil graag 
bedanken voor de adviezen en tips die mij zeer zeker geholpen hebben het traject op te 
starten. Jullie hebben mij vaak verder op weg geholpen met adviezen. Tevens waren jullie 
bereid onderzoekstaken met mij te delen, waar ik veel baat bij heb gehad. Ook alle 
medepromovendi, waarmee ik mijn onderzoek en lief en leed heb mogen delen tijdens 
borrels, “PhDinners” en lunchpauzes, ben ik dankbaar. 
 Een onderzoeksproject is niet mogelijk zonder instanties die hun hulp verlenen en 
zonder mensen die bereid zijn zich voor de wetenschap in te zetten. Alle proefpersonen, 
studenten, coördinatoren, ondersteunende personeelsleden en overige mensen die direct of 
indirect bij de onderzoeken betrokken zijn geweest: dank voor jullie hulp! In het bijzonder 
wil ik Ben van de Wetering, Ron van Outsem, Mike de Clercq en Els Bourgonjon bedanken. 
Zonder jullie hulp en inzet bij de werving van de proefpersonen afkomstig van Bouman, Delta 
en Sint-Jan Baptist Zelzate had ik nooit zulke interessante doelgroepen kunnen testen. Ook is 
een speciale dankbetuiging aan Gerrit Jan de Bie, Christiaan Tieman en Marcel Boom op zijn 
plaats. Jullie ondersteuning bij de ontwikkeling van de taken en de dataverwerking was van 
groot belang. Ook mijn masterstudenten en onderzoeksassistenten die soms met bloed, 
zweet en tranen hebben geholpen bij de dataverzameling verdienen het om in het zonnetje 
gezet te worden, te weten Alexandros Solos, Ahmet Yazir, Joy Heersma, Joost van Vierzen, 
Pryska Maas, Jeroen de Jong, Jolien van der Haar, Melissa van Rekom, Emel Heybeli, Desiree 
van Winden, Linda van der Kaaij, Margot van Dalen, Lucia den Hertog en Bart Kögeler. Lilian 
Naeije, jou wil ik in het bijzonder bedanken voor je hulp. Knap hoe jij je doel om onderzoeker 
te worden achterna streeft. Dat er maar vele publicaties mogen volgen!  
  Zowel voordat ik als promovendus aan dit PhD project begon als tijdens het project 
heb ik bij verschillende mensen het vak als scientist practitioner mogen leren. Ook zij 
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verdienen een plaats in dit dankwoord. Peter Muris, als onderzoeksassistent heb ik bij jou 
mijn eerste taak ontwikkeld en informed consent geschreven (die typerend met vele rode 
letters en track changes werd teruggestuurd). Hierbij heb ik ook mogen leren dat er een 
beest bestaat dat een Cuscus heet (al weet ik nog steeds niet of hij nu bijt of niet…). Mijn 
interesse voor de wetenschap is bij jou begonnen. Ontzettend leerzaam was ook het 
onderzoek dat ik mocht verrichten bij TBS patiënten tijdens mijn stage onder leiding van 
Ruud Hornsveld, Thijs Kanters en Almar Zwets. Jullie hebben mijn interesse in woede 
aangewakkerd alsook aangetoond dat onderzoek van praktisch nut kan zijn. Colin van der 
Heiden, samen met Elke Geraerts, schreef ik met jou mijn eerste artikel. Ook buiten het 
schrijven van artikelen om, heb ik veel kunnen leren van jouw praktische vaardigheden als 
clinicus waar ik nu de vruchten van pluk. Jan Rodenburg bedankt voor je praktische tips 
omtrent het STAXI-2 onderzoek alsook dat je mij de gelegenheid hebt geboden onderzoek te 
vervolgen naar morele beschadiging bij veteranen. Ik kijk uit naar een prettige 
samenwerking. Martijn Oostra, met veel plezier heb ik met je mogen sparren over je 
onderzoek naar Inquiry Based Stress Reduction bij depressieve patiënten. Daarnaast heb ik 
de persoonlijke gesprekken en je adviezen over mijn terugkeer naar de praktijk zeer 
gewaardeerd. Ook mijn huidige collega’s van HSK wil ik bedanken voor de mogelijkheid die 
zij mij hebben geboden om de geleerde kennis in praktijk te mogen brengen.  
 Tevens wil ik de leden van de promotiecommissie (Eric Rassin, Jan van Strien, Henk 
Nijman, Matthias Wieser, Anton Loonen en Ben van de Wetering) bedanken voor hun 
bereidwilligheid mijn proefschrift te lezen en mij hierover kritisch te bevragen tijdens de 
verdediging van mijn proefschrift.  
  Onderzoeksschool Experimental Psychopatholgy (EPP) verdient eveneens lof. Ik heb 
veel mogen leren van de symposia die door het EPP georganiseerd werden. Daarnaast heb ik 
tijdens de vele overnachtingen in de congreshotels in Utrecht en Heeze mooie contacten op 
kunnen doen met overige EPP leden. De samenwerking met Lieke Nentjes die na mijn 
promotietraject is gestart is hier een goed voorbeeld van. Lieke Nentjes, bedankt voor de 
mogelijkheid bij de UvA samen onderzoek te verrichten. Laten we hopen dat er een mooie 
publicatie uit volgt.  
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 Benjamin Wilkowski, Tom Denson, and Raymond Novaco: special thanks for sharing 
some inspiring articles and advices that helped me to progress my career as a researcher in 
the field of anger. As leading researchers in the field of anger, I have immensely appreciated 
your advice.   
 Ten tijden van inspanning is ook ontspanning van belang. De digitale (PSP 4) en real-
life voetbalwedstrijden met de Port of Rotterdam Killer Whales (Mario de Jonge, Jan 
Engelen, Vincent Hoogerheide, Jesper Hopstaken, Wim Pouw, Steven Raaijmakers, Tim van 
Marlen, Ali Mohd Bin MD Salim en Gertjan Rop) waren onvergetelijk mooi. Ook waren de 
Clinical Cognition Lab meetings, borrels en etentjes met Marieke van Meggelen, Kevin van 
Schie, Daniëlle Remmerswaal, Sabine Wanmaker, Elke Geraerts zowel inspirerend als 
vreugdevol. Sabine Wanmaker, wij waren destijds als klinische promovendi ongeveer 
tegelijkertijd begonnen. Vaak liepen we bij elkaar binnen voor vragen en ondersteuning en 
we hebben vele reizen gemaakt met alle workshops, symposia en congressen die we samen 
bezocht hebben. Jouw optimisme was inspirerend; zelf een verloren koffer tijdens een week 
congres in Peru kreeg jou niet klein. Thanks voor de leuke tijd! Marieke van Meggelen, ook 
met jou heb ik vele persoonlijke en prikkelende gesprekken mogen voeren (dien je een 
depressieve patiënt nu wel of niet te pamperen?). Ontzettend leuk om jou als collega te 
hebben mogen leren kennen. Maryse Kruithof, wij hebben elkaar leren kennen tijdens het 
Honours Program en sindsdien met groot plezier contact gehouden. Ik zal de lunches in het 
T-gebouw niet snel vergeten.  
 “Bedankt” is een te klein woord voor de mensen die zo’n centrale plek in mijn leven 
innemen als mijn vrouw, vrienden en familie. Met jullie hulp, vertrouwen en steun is geen 
uitdaging te groot. Lieve ouders, jullie staan werkelijk waar altijd voor mij klaar. Jullie 
onvoorwaardelijke liefde is iedere dag voelbaar en maakt dat ik vol vertrouwen in de wereld 
sta. Ik voel me ontzettend dankbaar met jullie in mijn leven en kan me geen betere ouders 
wensen. Kim, grote zus van me, met soms kleine adviezen, heb jij een groot effect op mijn 
leven. Robin, buiten het feit dat je een topzwager bent, ben je ook een uitstekende coach! Jij 
weet altijd met een korte doortastende zin, precies het juiste te zeggen. Ook mijn 
schoonfamilie heeft mij met open armen ontvangen en bood de welnodige ontspanning ten 
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tijde van dit project, waarbij de kerstvieringen eruit springen (Samuel Sumter, over 20 jaar 
verwacht ik een nog mooier boekje van jou, kleine professor). Jan-Willem, Damir, Laurens, 
Paul, Jeroen, jullie zijn ware vrienden voor het leven; een half gebaar is genoeg! Jullie staan 
zowel in goede tijden als mindere tijden altijd voor mij klaar, waarvoor dank. Special thanks 
to JW en Damir die met hun handige IT skills mijn leven als onderzoeker hebben 
vereenvoudigd. Damir, ook onze Starbucks momenten op de EUR gaven mij vaak weer 
energie om met goede moed aan het project verder te werken! Paul, als ik even niet meer 
wist hoe ik iets mooi en adequaat kon vertalen, kwam jij met adequate vertalingen op de 
proppen. Ook bedankt voor de mooie filosofische gesprekken die we hebben gehad over dit 
onderwerp en vele andere onderwerpen.  
  Lieve Hannah, zelfs tijdens onze eerste date heb je mij moeten missen vanwege mijn 
onderzoek. Ik diende nog wat brieven te posten en kwam te laat…Bedankt dat je mij altijd de 
ruimte en vrijheid hebt gegeven om mezelf te ontwikkelen; dat je me hebt helpen 
ontspannen met je maffe grapjes in tijden van stress; dat je me stimuleert mijn dromen 
achterna te jagen en …. dat je me soms ook even een schop onder mijn kont geeft wanneer 
dat nodig is. Een man is zo sterk als de vrouw die achter hem staat, luidt de uitdrukking. We 
hebben in de korte tijd dat we samen zijn al vele uitdagen mogen trotseren en mooie 
momenten mogen meemaken. Ik houd van jou en hoop nog vele mooie momenten met je te 
delen. 
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